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## THE REFORMATION AND NATURAL LAW.\*

The world of to-day is filled with the conflict about the modern understanding of the Gospel. The decision in this conflict cannot be reached merely through Biblical studies and the investigation of primitive Christianity; there is need also of a thorough acquaintance with the development of the evangelical Church and of the evangelical spirit, as well as with their influence upon the formation of the modern world. In this respect, however, evangelical theology must be pronounced positively backward. The Protestant scholar, who is at home in Babylonia and Assyria, in primitive Christianity, and in the first three centuries, is in Germany no less than in England and America often without a moderately adequate survey of the general development of his own Church. How fragmentary is the exposition in the general Church histories, how narrow and one-sided in the histories of doctrine. How many fields have still received very little cultivation, for example, non-German Protestantism, the great movement of the "Enlightenment" and of Rationalism, Christian life, Protestantism and culture, and the like. In view of this defect, Ernst Tröltsch deserves gratitude on account of the very fact that he has even undertaken such a work as the comparatively full presentation of "Protestant Christianity and the Modern Church", which he

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offers in the *Kultur der Gegenwart*.<sup>1</sup> His merit becomes greater on account of the fertility of his thought, and especially on account of the real breadth of vision, that has led him not to confine himself one-sidedly to German evangelical Christianity, but rather to attempt also an appreciation especially of Calvin and Calvinism, as well as of the smaller religious parties. Against such merits, it is true, must be set the entirely mistaken fundamental thesis of Tröltzsch that Luther and the entire Reformation belong to the Middle Ages. This assertion is rightly contradicted by men of the most various opinions—I name only Böhmer, Loofs, Kattenbusch, Hunzinger.<sup>2</sup>

Little, however, has yet been accomplished towards the refutation of that proposition, which can be regarded only as a catchword, similar to the various clever half-truths that appear in Tröltzsch's style. Students of recent history have long been agreed that the close of the seventeenth century, the conclusion of the religious wars, marks the beginning of a new epoch in Church history, the character of which, as Loofs<sup>3</sup> judiciously puts it, "stands in no less sharp contrast with the previous period of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, than that former period with the Middle Ages, and the Middle Ages with the period of the ancient Church". The peculiarity of the new period is, expressed in one word, what is called, sometimes with pride, sometimes with contempt, "modernism", or "the modern spirit". But if the division is a real one, there arises the question, embarrassing to every evangelical Christian, How is the modern spirit, which, since the seventeenth century, in spite of the check that it received in the nineteenth, has been unfolding itself

<sup>1</sup> Teil I, Abt. iv, 1. Hälfte, 1906, pp. 253-458; *Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit*.

<sup>2</sup> Böhmer, *Luther im Lichte der neueren Forschung*, Leipzig, 1906; Loofs, "Luthers Stellung zum Mittelalter und der Neuzeit", *Deutsch-evangelische Blätter*, 1907, Augustheft; Kattenbusch in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1907, Heft 1, and *Theologische Rundschau*, 1907, Heft 2; Hunzinger, *Der Glaube Luthers und das religionsgeschichtliche Christentum*, Leipzig, 1907.

<sup>3</sup> *Grundlinien der Kirchengeschichte*, p. 203.

with ever-increasing vigor, related to the Gospel of the Reformation? How could the age of the Reformation with its conflicts of faith be followed so suddenly by an age whose views about historical criticism and natural science, about politics and social life, are in part directly opposed to the Reformation conception of the world? What forces of the Gospel had a part in the development of the new way of thinking? What other, unevangelical, tendencies intruded themselves, and therefore, because they arose, for example, in Catholicism (and hence in false belief), or in an unbelieving and therefore pernicious development of civilization, must be combatted and eliminated? Or perhaps the Gospel of the Reformation is no longer judge over modern progress? Perhaps it is rather the latter that shall decide how much of the former is still tenable and fit for use?

To these questions, which, although they concern the systematic theologian as much as the historian, are primarily historical questions, I desire to make a slight contribution by examining the relation between the Reformation and Natural Law. For there can be no doubt that "natural law"—primarily a school of jurisprudence, usually regarded as beginning with Hugo Grotius and not till the nineteenth century replaced by the historical school—was one of the principal historical factors in the formation of the modern spirit, a factor whose after-effects are still perceptible in the most diverse spheres. For not only have the laws of the evangelical Church itself been influenced thereby, both in the collegial law of the eighteenth century and also, though not so strongly, in the modern presbyterial-synodical constitutions; but especially all the political reversals up to the French Revolution are most intimately connected with the natural-law theories. Rousseau's *Contrat social* is the last great manifest of natural law. This itself is sufficient to show that natural law was more than a mere political and legal system; it became also the starting-point for "natural theology", the broad religious basis of the religion of the "Enlightenment".

How could this natural law spring up on the ground of the Reformation, take such deep root and put forth such wide-spreading branches? Of course, it is far from my intention to include in the investigation the whole complicated phenomenon of natural law,<sup>4</sup> especially on its juristic and purely political side. My endeavor is only to study the beginnings of natural law on Protestant ground (which in many ways were interwoven with theological points of view), and even in this, I am not attempting anything like completeness, but desire merely, by means of certain chief representatives, to show from the origin of the natural law of the "Enlightenment", how far that movement was influenced whether positively or negatively by the ideas and motives of the Reformation.

## I

First of all, there can be no doubt that natural law received at one point in the Reformation theology itself, if not a formal treatment, at least an organic insertion into the general body of its dogmatico-ethical system, namely, in Melancthon. So early as in the first edition of his *Loci*,<sup>5</sup> that echo of the Gospel of Luther, he mentions the most

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<sup>4</sup> How extraordinarily numerous the forms are in which the theories of natural law have developed may be seen from the work of the acute professor of law at Bonn, Karl Bergbohm, *Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie*, Vol. i, *Das Naturrecht der Gegenwart*, Leipzig, 1892. Bergbohm has undertaken to study the complicated appearances, forms and operations of natural law in past and present, and with the searching broom of criticism to sweep them away from the science of jurisprudence. An example of the most extreme inconstancy in the use of the term, natural law, is afforded by the book of the philosopher, A. Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik*, Leipzig, 1868, a work which examines by a purely philosophical method the nature of law, that is, the ethical foundation of legal enactment, both according to the principle of law and according to the legal relations derived therefrom. In spite of the fluctuating element in the conception of natural law, it remains, nevertheless, for the historian, a definite historical quantity, and of course this alone is in view in the following discussion.

<sup>5</sup> *Melancthonis Opera*, in *Corpus Reformatorum*, xxi, cc. 116ff.



usual forms (*communissimas formas*) of the *lex naturae* or of the *ius naturale*, as the theologians and jurists were accustomed to set them forth. These he finds in three principal divisions of natural law—concerning the worship of God, concerning the formation of the state and the inviolability of the individual persons guaranteed in the state, and concerning property—and to these he appends a brief notice about the *ius gentium* with its regulations concerning marriage, business, trade and the like. Biblical attestation of the *lex naturae* with its innate moral principles is according to Melanchthon contained in the apostolic dictum, Rom. ii. 15. Nevertheless, he is unwilling at first to concede to natural law any influence upon his system, for, now that human reason has been darkened by the Fall, though the moral faculty of man survives, yet it would be a great mistake to suppose that the material content of the innate moral law can be disengaged from the corruptions that have intruded themselves.<sup>6</sup> So in 1521; but the disposition of the Reformer becomes much more favorable in the editions of the *Loci* subsequent to 1535, after he had turned aside towards synergism. While he recognizes no relation between the *naturalis notitia* and the Gospel, both on account of the character of the Gospel as *mysterium* and on account of the grace that is contained in it, he now sets up the equation: *legem divinam notitias esse nobiscum nascentes sicut aliarum artium principia et demonstrationes*.<sup>7</sup> *Una est lex et natura nota omnibus gentibus et aetatibus*.<sup>8</sup> It is true that emphasis is still placed upon the fact that natural law, especially with regard to the first table, is much obscured, and above all lacks the power for the execution of its commands; yet there is no principial but merely an accidental opposition between the revealed and the natural law. The Decalogue has rather merely the function of elucidating

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, xxi, c. 117: *insita nobis a deo regula iudicandi de moribus*. A little before: *est in univsum fallax humani captus iudicium propter cognatam caecitatem, ita ut etiamsi sint in animos nostros insculptae quaedam formae morum, tamen eae deprehendi vix possint*.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, xiii, c. 7.    <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, xxi, c. 417.

and expounding the law of nature. Accordingly, a number of natural-law principles are again discussed; for example, in the regulations of the Mosaic law about the forbidden degrees in marriage, an element is discovered which, since it belongs to natural law, is therefore binding upon the whole of humanity. In proof is cited the assertion of Scripture that the Canaanites (though they were not subject to the revealed law) were exterminated on account of their incestuous disregard of the marriage laws<sup>9</sup>—an argument which appears afterwards in Hugo Grotius in almost the same form.

With the disquisitions in the *Loci* agrees the frequent mention of natural law in other writings of the Reformer. To select merely one class of instances, I may refer especially to the frequent *Declamationes de dignitate legum*.<sup>10</sup> (God, so we hear in these passages, has infused a ray of His eternal wisdom and justice into the nature of men, and however weak that nature has become, God has left even to fallen men so much comprehension of His law that that law rules their outward behavior, indeed in a certain sense their will.<sup>11</sup> This law of nature is best expressed in the Decalogue.<sup>12</sup> Yet all other laws of the nations have issued from these *initia et principia* given by nature, and in spite of their diversity are, in accordance with the character of each nation, good and justifiable, in so far as they *ad illum radium lucis divinae transfusum in mentes hominum congruant, qui vocatur ius naturae, ex quo vult Deus extrui leges*.<sup>13</sup> Among all the legal systems that have been formed upon the basis of this law of nature, the Roman law deserves the palm; *nusquam extat perfectior et illustrior imago iustitiae quam in his [Romanis] legibus*.<sup>14</sup> Such expressions, it is

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, xxi, c. 391.

<sup>10</sup> Additional passages in Tröltzsch, *Vernunft und Offenbarung*, pp. 167ff.

<sup>11</sup> *Op. Mel.*, xi, c. 909; compare also xi, cc. 360, 639, 919; xii, c. 20.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, xi, c. 912; xii, cc. 21, 149.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, xi, c. 922; cf. xi, cc. 361, 631, 912, 921.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, xi, cc. 221, 361ff., 915; xii, c. 22.



true, contain nothing about a primitive contract or the like, yet evidently something more is intended than the mere natural faculty for law-making; for natural law is called in to decide the most important legal questions—not merely, for example, in an academic discussion as to whether or no the assassination of Cæsar was justifiable,<sup>15</sup> but also in the extremely important question of practical politics: *an liceat vi resistere Caesari vim iniustam inferenti*. With regard to this question Melanchthon's finding on the basis of natural law in 1530 still runs: *etiam sententiae iniustae iudicio sit obediendum*.<sup>16</sup> Later, on the other hand, in 1537, he expresses quite the opposite opinion: *Evangelium non tollit magistratum et ius naturae*; hence *licita defensio contra inferentem iniustum bellum*.<sup>17</sup>

An example of the variableness of natural-law conceptions! The estimate placed upon the law of nature receives further light, however, when it is observed that Melanchthon regards the natural moral law in general as the most valuable product of human reason, indeed as the highest achievement of philosophical thought. Nevertheless, in the equation between divine and natural law the point was given, where, in the orthodox system which was being formed, secular science, philosophy, law and the like could come into organic connection with the purely theological principles derived from the Gospel. Accordingly, Lutheran orthodoxy gives to the dogmatics and ethics that are derived from Revelation a substructure of natural sciences and arts, which, it is true, as a lower, secular sphere must allow its truth-content to be controlled and corrected by the higher, spiritual sphere. In this connection, even before Grotius, there appeared in Lutheran territory expositions of natural law by Oldendorp, Hemming, Winkler, which derived their nourishment substantially from the material afforded by Melanchthon's ideas.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, x, cc. 699f. The reasons for and against are opposed to each other without a final decision; the former are taken from natural law.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, ii, cc. 20-22. <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, iii, c. 631.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Kaltenborn, *Die Vorläufer des Hugo Grotius auf dem Gebiete*

Tröltzsch, who in his treatise, *Vernunft und Offenbarung bei Joh. Gerhard und Melanchthon*, first made these relations clear, is unwilling, it is true, to recognize in the whole phenomenon a creative act of genius on the part of Melanchthon, yet he regards it as a necessary "compromise between the autonomous reason that was so to speak incarnate in the productions of antiquity on the one side, and the religious spirit of humanity on the other". It was a compromise such as within our circle of culture "cannot be avoided by any theology", and one cannot refuse a certain admiration to the grandeur of the plain and straightforward sequence of thought.<sup>19</sup> We neither desire nor are we able to dispute this estimate here, but it should at least be said even at this point that the adjustment thus secured between secular and theological science remained entirely unfruitful for the future. When Lutheran orthodoxy fell to pieces, the new scientific impulses, in quite a special manner those for natural law, came from the West, from the science that had been developed in the Calvinistic camp. A Pufendorf and a Thomasius, as is well known, did not start from Melanchthon or the orthodoxy, but from Grotius and his spiritual kinsmen.

But if the natural-law theories could appeal to Melanchthon as their patron, is the same true for the other Reformers as well? For Luther, this is affirmed by the Paris theologian Eugène Ehrhardt, who has published a special investigation under the title, "*La notion du droit naturel chez Luther.*"<sup>20</sup> It is a fact that Luther often speaks of natural law or the law of nature,<sup>21</sup> and Ehrhardt, investigating, though not with absolute completeness, the use of the conception in the writings of the Reformer, believes he has

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*des jus naturae et gentium*, 1848; Tröltzsch, *Vernunft und Offenbarung*, 1891, p. 169.

<sup>19</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 173, 137.

<sup>20</sup> In the *Études de Théologie et d'Histoire publiées par MM. les Professeurs de la faculté de Théol. prot. de Paris en hommage à la faculté de Théologie de Montauban à l'occasion du tricentenaire de sa fondation*, Paris, 1901, pp. 285-320.

<sup>21</sup> "von dem Naturrecht oder dem natürlichen Gesetz."

discovered that the conception in Luther also has had its roots in fundamental principles of his theology.<sup>22</sup> This judgment becomes already precarious, however, when it is observed that the notion of natural law, which, it is true, is at all times variable, threatens in the Reformer to lose itself almost altogether in the most diverse interpretations. At one time, he thinks of it as like a law of reason which "issuing from free reason overleaps all books".<sup>23</sup> At another time it is like "natural equity".<sup>24</sup> At another time it is identified out and out with the law of Christian love,<sup>25</sup> when it is said of the law of nature: "which also the Lord declares in Luke vi. 31 and Mat. vii. 12: 'whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them'."<sup>26</sup> At another time, however, it is again only the law "which also heathen, Turks and Jews must keep", "kept among all heathen in common", which, although it forbids resistance to lawful authority, still is far from making a man a Christian.<sup>27</sup> In expressing himself about its relation to positive law, Luther now places it in the closest relation to Roman law,<sup>28</sup> now regards it as the source of all written law,<sup>29</sup> at another time he distinguishes the natural law as the general moral demands of conscience from Moses' law as the Jew's *Sachsenspiegel*, and yet says just afterwards that the natural laws are nowhere drawn up in such a fine and orderly manner as in Moses.<sup>30</sup> It is of course easy, in connection with Rom. i. 19ff. and ii. 15, to discover a ruling idea in these more or less divergent utterances, but if this

<sup>22</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 317.

<sup>23</sup> *Von weltlicher Obrigkeit*, Erlangen edition, 22, p. 105.

<sup>24</sup> *Ermahnung zum Frieden auf die 12 Artikel der Bauern*, Erlangen edition, 24<sup>2</sup>, p. 290.

<sup>25</sup> *Grosser Sermon vom Wucher*, Weimar edition, 6, pp. 52, 60; *Von Kaufhandlung und Wucher*, Erlangen edition, 22, p. 202; *Von weltlicher Obrigkeit*, Erlangen edition, 22, p. 104.

<sup>26</sup> *Grosser Sermon vom Wucher*, Weimar edition, 6, p. 49.

<sup>27</sup> *Ermahnung zum Frieden*, Erlangen edition, 24<sup>2</sup>, pp. 279, 282.

<sup>28</sup> *Tischreden*, herausg. von Förstemann und Bindseil, 3, 320; 4, 486; *Warnung an seine lieben Deutschen*, Erlangen edition, 25<sup>2</sup>, p. 15.

<sup>29</sup> *Auslegung des 101 Psalms*, Erlangen edition, 39, p. 284.

<sup>30</sup> *Wider die himmlischen Propheten*, Erlangen edition, 29, pp. 156f.

idea had, as Ehrhardt supposes, exerted a pervasive and fundamental influence over Luther's ethical, social and political views, Luther would probably have taken occasion to express himself more fully and definitely about the meaning and character of natural law.

Luther's conception of the state, its duties and its relation to the Kingdom of God, is plainly two-fold. On the one side, as is well known, he freed the natural arrangements of life in family and state from the ban of ecclesiastical asceticism; the "civil law and sword" is a divine institution that has its office from God.<sup>31</sup> The state's historical and positive laws have their authority according to the will of God, and no natural law may nullify them.<sup>32</sup> By virtue of the universal priesthood, the civil authority has the right of reformation. It has the right to abolish all abuses that have established themselves in the "Christian body",<sup>33</sup> that is, in state and Church, in case the ecclesiastical authority does not itself make the first move. In correspondence with this positive estimate of the functions of the state, the direction of Church affairs under the new conditions came later, in the evangelical territories, with at least the permission of the Reformer, into the hands of the princes and magistrates.

But alongside of the positive view of the state, stands a more negative one,<sup>34</sup> and to this indeed Luther has given more frequent expression in his writings. He starts here from a strict separation of the Kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world. There are "two divisions of Adam's children, of which one is in the Kingdom of God under Christ, the other, in the kingdom of the world under the magistrate".<sup>35</sup> The latter is by nature evil through and

<sup>31</sup> Erlangen edition, 22, pp. 63, 76, etc.; *Gal. Kommentar*, ii, 41.

<sup>32</sup> So R. Seeberg in his lecture, "Luthers Stellung zu den sittlichen und socialen Nöten seiner Zeit," in *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1901, p. 839.

<sup>33</sup> Erlangen edition, 21, p. 285.

<sup>34</sup> Erich Brandenburg in his lecture, "Martin Luther's Anschauung vom Staate und der Gesellschaft", *Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte*, H. 70, has placed this negative manner of regarding the state too one-sidedly in the foreground.

<sup>35</sup> *Von weltlicher Obrigkeit*, Erlangen edition, 22, p. 82.

through. "We are serving here in an inn, where the devil is master, and the world mistress, and all kinds of evil desires are the household; and these all together—master, mistress, and household—are the Gospel's enemies and adversaries. If a man steals thy gold, defames thy honor, remember, in this house, that is the way things go."<sup>36</sup> The civil authority has the commission to check evil in some measure, lest things devour one another.<sup>37</sup> Therefore it is necessary for the bad and the weak; but the Christians, the living members of the body of Christ, have no need of it at bottom. The Gospel "places the outward life altogether in suffering, injustice, a cross, patience and contempt of temporal goods and temporal life"; but where there is "nothing but enduring, no punishment, no law, no sword is needed".<sup>38</sup> "The kingdom of the world is a kingdom of wrath and sternness", "a true forerunner of hell and of eternal death", hence also its "instrument" is a naked sword.<sup>39</sup>

When such a negative view is held of legal institutions, the Scripture cannot of course be the source of their authority. A theologian must teach simply belief in the Lord Christ, and not meddle with secular affairs.<sup>40</sup> "God has subjected and entrusted the civil government to the reason, because that government has to control not the soul's salvation nor eternal goods, but only bodily and temporal possessions."<sup>41</sup> Now Ehrhardt calls up that passage from the treatise, *Von weltlicher Obrigkeit*,<sup>42</sup> in which natural law is identified with the reason, inasmuch as the reason is the "law-fountain"<sup>43</sup> of all written law. From this Ehrhardt draws the conclusion that Luther saw in natural law or the law of reason the particular source of all legal institutions.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>36</sup> *Auslegung des Johannes-Evangeliums*, Erlangen edition, 50, pp. 349f.

<sup>37</sup> Erlangen edition, 22, p. 68; 50, p. 317.

<sup>38</sup> Erlangen edition, 24<sup>2</sup>, p. 291; 22, p. 66.

<sup>39</sup> *Ein Sendbrief vom Büchlein wider die Bauern*, Erlangen edition, 24<sup>2</sup>, p. 318.

<sup>40</sup> *Antwort von der Gegenwehr*, Erlangen edition, 64, p. 265.

<sup>41</sup> *Auslegung des 101. Psalms*, Erlangen edition, 39, p. 330.

<sup>42</sup> Erlangen edition, 22, pp. 104f.

<sup>43</sup> "Rechtsbrunnen." <sup>44</sup> Ehrhardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 298f.



Luther had to fight against a double opposition, Ehrhardt continues—against the Catholic theocracy, and against the theocracy of the letter of Scripture, which the fanatics sought to establish. On both sides, he defended the independence of the state—both over against ecclesiastical tutelage, and also in recognition of the fact that state and Gospel belonged to entirely separate spheres of life. But this independence of the state and of society he secured by representing the foundation of their legal order to be natural law, which, in accordance with its origin in the primitive revelation, he could in a certain sense designate also as divine law. So the idea of natural law, Ehrhardt concludes, becomes a necessary middle term in the sequence of Luther's thought.<sup>45</sup>

Nevertheless, Ehrhardt is himself obliged to admit that in his practical instructions for dealing with individual legal and social questions, the Reformer often did not at all abide by his notion of natural law as Ehrhardt has conceived it; not in the attitude of the state with respect to the persecution of heretics, not with regard to property, marriage, interest and usury—that is, not in any of the individual questions that Ehrhardt discusses. Ehrhardt concludes that Luther indeed desired to make of his natural law a principle of social reform, but as soon as he tried to bring this conception into practical use, he had to borrow now from the Old and New Testaments, now from Roman law, from national traditions, indeed even from canon law.<sup>46</sup> It is possible to go still further and to maintain that, aside from isolated utterances, Luther's method of reasoning in the practical concerns of national and social life is based throughout upon the ethical principles of Christianity and the Bible. He desires to deal with the twelve articles of the peasants, in accordance with their proposal, on the basis of "clear, open, undeniable sayings of Scripture",<sup>47</sup> and so in all the disputed questions before him he treats the Christian-ethical principles derived from God's word as the decisive norm. His

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 290-296, 316ff.      <sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 318.

<sup>47</sup> *Ermahnung zum Frieden*, Erlangen edition, 24<sup>2</sup>, p. 272.



only quarrel with the fanatics is that they apply the letter of Scripture to the affairs of the state and of society as a rigid law, without regard for historical development, without recognition of the distinction between the Gospel and legal institutions. Natural law is for him, it is true, a familiar and recognized conception; but everywhere he permits it to play merely a secondary, incidental part. The best proof of this is afforded by the treatise, *Von weltlicher Obrigkeit*, in which Luther delivers himself at great length about the divine right of the civil authority, the limits of its power, the duties of a prince, with interpretation of the Bible texts in point; but takes notice of natural law only at the very end and in an extremely cursory manner.<sup>48</sup>

The above-mentioned antinomy in the thought of Luther about the state is to be judged similarly to the well-known antinomy in his view of the relation between law and Gospel. The *lex moralis* as a wage-agreement between God and man is, according to Luther, abolished for the regenerated man; indeed it is regarded by him as the pernicious, death-dealing, sin-increasing power. On the other hand, as moral obligation it is retained even by Luther, although his expressions are not always perfectly consistent. Indeed faith, Luther says, should procure for the law its true fulfilment.<sup>49</sup> To the former manner of regarding the law is closely related the negative view of the state and of legal institutions as a piece of this world, to which the Christian must with suffering accommodate himself. But accordingly this view is supplemented by the valuation of the state and of social relations as divine institutions; where, however, this positive valuation makes itself felt, there also the life of the state is subjected to judgment according to Christian-ethical standards, which are derived not from natural law but from the Scriptures. In this sense, Luther at any rate always taught the so-called *usus civilis* or *politicus* of the revealed

<sup>48</sup> Erlangen edition, 22, pp. 59-105; with regard to the natural law, only pp. 104f.

<sup>49</sup> Compare the convincing exposition in Loofs' *Dogmengeschichte*, 4. Aufl., pp. 770ff.

law,<sup>50</sup> upon which, as well as upon the New Testament passages about its own divine establishment,<sup>51</sup> the civil power supports its authority for the punishment of evil-doers.<sup>52</sup>

It is true, after all has been said, that the relation between ethics and law, Scripture truth and state institutions, was, in spite of many valuable beginnings, never brought by Luther to a perfectly clear definition; but this lack of clearness should not be exploited for the benefit of natural-law theories. Luther's merit is that he assigned to the state and to law an independent, well-grounded special province. But when it comes to developing that special province, Luther simply uses the ethical principles of the Christian revelation; or else he refers, as, for example, in a fine passage of his *Auslegung des 101. Psalms*,<sup>53</sup> to "God's wonder-workers",<sup>54</sup> whom He raises up now and then and whose mind and heart He endows with the power of separating the "healthy law" from the "diseased law", who either "change the law or so master it, that the whole land thrives and blooms". Luther intimates here that the secular law, so far as it proves itself useful and excellent, is given to the peoples by wise rulers, "heroes of law", who create it by their genius, their endowment from above; accordingly, he would have provided the historical school of jurisprudence of the nineteenth century, long before its appearance, with a convincing justification.

Even less than Luther does Calvin show himself a friend of natural law. He holds too strongly the fundamental Reformation conviction of the universal sinful corruption of the natural man. True, he admits in his *Commentary on Romans*<sup>55</sup> that there is *naturalis quaedam legis intelligentia, quae hoc bonum atque expetibile dictet, illud autem detestandum*, that *quasdam iustitiae ac rectitudinis conceptiones*,

<sup>50</sup> Compare with regard to this Loofs, *op. cit.*, p. 775.

<sup>51</sup> Rom. xiii; I Pet. ii.

<sup>52</sup> So, for example, *Wider die himmlischen Propheten*, Erlangen edition, 29, p. 140.

<sup>53</sup> Erlangen edition, 39, p. 285.

<sup>54</sup> "Wunderleute Gottes."

<sup>55</sup> On Rom. ii. 15.

quas Graeci προλήψεις vocant, hominum animis esse naturaliter ingenuitas. These "seeds of righteousness" consist in the fact that all peoples have a religion, punish adultery, theft, murder, also lay stress upon fidelity and trust in trade and intercourse.<sup>56</sup> Likewise Calvin speaks in the introductory chapters of the *Institutio* of the natural knowledge of God implanted in the human spirit, but at the same time he pronounces this knowledge completely corrupted and stifled. *Hinc rursus facile elicitur quantum ab hac confusa Dei notitia differat, quae solis fidelium pectoribus instillatur pietas, ex qua demum religio nascitur.*<sup>57</sup> The natural knowledge of God serves him only as a dark background to set off in all the clearer light the knowledge which faith derives from the revelation of God in Scripture. Therefore Calvin attributes also to the *lex naturae* as moral standard, in spite of that passage in the *Commentary on Romans*, only a subordinate value. Of the three passages where the *Institutio* mentions the *lex naturae*, it is said of it, in the first two merely that it affords only a very faint foretaste of what is really well-pleasing to God,<sup>58</sup> and serves only the purpose of preventing man from pleading before the judgment-seat of God the excuse of ignorance.<sup>59</sup> More important is the third place where it is mentioned, in the last chapter of the *Institutio*. Here the question under discussion is, Where does a Christian state secure the ethico-religious standard for its legislation? Even Calvin rejects here the unqualified subordination of the state's law to the law of Moses.<sup>60</sup> He distinguishes in the revealed law between the ethical principles, which are summed up in the commandment of love to God

<sup>56</sup> *Opera Calvini in Corpus Reformatorum*, Vol. xlix, cc. 37f.

<sup>57</sup> *Institutio*, I, iv, 4.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, II, viii, 1: *Homo per legem naturalem vix tenuiter degustat quis Deo acceptus sit cultus; certe, a recta eius ratione longissimo intervallo distat.*

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, II, ii, 22: *Finis legis naturalis est, ut reddatur homo inexcusabilis.*

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, xx, 14: *Sunt qui recte compositam esse rempublicam negent, quae neglectis Mose politicis, communibus gentium legibus regitur. Quae sententia . . . falsa ac stolidi est.*

and one's neighbor, and which for all peoples and all ages represent the eternal rule of righteousness, and the judicial, purely political regulations in the law of Moses) (*iudiciorum forma, iudiciariae constitutiones*), which have merely the temporary importance for Israel of confirming love, the eternal law of God, as the foundation of legal enactments and procedure in the Jewish people. From the second element of the revealed law, Calvin says the other peoples are free, but not from the former. For although laws may be very differently constituted in detail (*legis constitutio*) according to different conditions and circumstances, yet in their ethical tendency they must all exhibit a natural equity (*naturalis aequitas*), as it is demanded by the conscience of man. But since the revealed divine moral law is nothing else than *naturalis legis testimonium*, the best expression of that natural *aequitas*, it contains standard, goal, and limits for the legislation of the peoples and nations.<sup>61</sup> So the nations may indeed make their laws, Calvin says, without reference to Moses, as they think advantageous; only these laws must conform to the eternal fundamental law of love in God's commandment, so that though the form varies, the tendency shall remain the same.<sup>62</sup>

In this sequence of thought the incidental mention of natural law serves merely the purpose of strengthening the Calvinistic principle, that for the state and for law as well as for other things, despite all accidental differences, still the eternal norm is to found in the rightly understood revelation of the divine will in Scripture. This is in harmony also with the method of the Geneva thinker; natural law plays no part in his judgment of legal and social conditions. It is true that in the collection of his *Consilia*<sup>63</sup> we meet at

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, xx, 16: *Dei lex, quam moralem vocamus . . . sola ipsa legum omnium et scopus et regula et terminus sit oportet.*

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, xx, 15: *Libertas certe singulis gentibus relicta est condendi quas sibi conducere providerint, leges: quae tamen ad perpetuum illam caritatis regulam [divinorum praeceptorum] exigantur, ut forma quidem varient, rationem habeant eandem.*

<sup>63</sup> *Opera*, xa.

one point a remark about the *équité naturelle*, at another point, one about the *ius naturale*, which are identified both times with the rule of Christ, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them".<sup>64</sup> Indeed, in a difficulty, in order to strengthen his view that marriage with a brother's widow is opposed to the Mosaic law and therefore forbidden for Christians too, Calvin has recourse also to the *commune ius gentium* (whereby, however, he means nothing more than the *naturae honestas*), which declares that even *ipse naturae sensus* rejects such marriages as *foeditas*.<sup>65</sup> Similarly he places the law of Moses and the *commune ius gentium* side by side in still another difficulty about the marriage laws.<sup>66</sup> Further utterances of that kind, however, have not come to my notice in my search in the writings of Calvin for the point now under discussion. Everywhere else—in the treatment of usury,<sup>67</sup> of the right of the civil authority,<sup>68</sup> or of the duty of obedience even to tyrannical rulers,<sup>69</sup> and the like—natural law is passed over without a word. Most convincing, however, is the above-mentioned closing chapter of the *Institutio*. Here the Reformer, in his discussion about the civil authority and the constitution of the state, about legislation and the position of the subjects, offers in his way a "Politics". But in so doing, he never deserts the method that he employs throughout the whole of the *Institutio*—a method which is based upon Scripture and the *analogia fidei*, or in this case also upon the revealed moral law confirmed by the *naturalis acuitas*. This method he does not sacrifice at a single point for the benefit of a general ethical ratiocination, certainly not for natural-law theories of any description.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, xa, cc. 248, 264, in both cases in a discussion of the question of taking interest, which Calvin, in distinction from Luther, within the limits of that same natural equity or of Christian brotherly love, pronounces entirely permissible.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, xa, cc. 236f.      <sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, xa, c. 242.

<sup>67</sup> In the *Sermon on Deut.* xxiii, 18-20, *Opera*, xxviii, cc. 115-124.

<sup>68</sup> *Sermon on Tit.* ii. 15-iii. 2, *Opera*, liv, cc. 554-559.

<sup>69</sup> *Commentary on I Pet.*, *Opera*, lv, cc. 244f.



We may conclude as follows. All the Reformers recognized of course a natural moral faculty on the ground of Rom. ii. 15. But there are also indications that even they, at that early time, held as a matter of learned tradition some kind of conception of a specific natural law. But in distinction from Melanchthon, Luther attributed to it only a subordinate importance, Calvin almost no importance at all. Finally, the views about the relation of politics, law and equity to the word of God and to Christian ethics were as yet little elucidated, though Calvin was the most positive in hoping to find the foundations for an evangelical Christian conception of the state in the ethical principles of the Bible—which principles, however, are not to be identified off-hand with the Mosaic law.

## II

Under such circumstances, how did it happen that it was precisely decided Calvinists who, first among the men of evangelical faith, and so early as the sixteenth century, not merely developed natural law theoretically, but at the same time, as political publicists, made it a weapon in the conflicts of the time? Before we seek the explanation, however, we must briefly recall the fact itself. It is a question here primarily of the so-called "Monarchomachist" writers and jurists—not all of the Reformed faith, but some also Jesuit-Catholic (of the latter we shall speak further on)—who in the religious wars of the sixteenth century drew from the principle of the sovereignty of the people the revolutionary conclusion of a right of active resistance towards contract-breaking rulers. Among the Calvinists, besides the Reformer John Knox<sup>70</sup> should be mentioned particularly the Scotchman George Buchanan, the Frenchmen Hubert Languet (author, under the pseudonym Junius Brutus, of *Vindiciae contra tyrannos*), François Hotman (*Francogallia*),

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *Works*, iv, pp. 496f., 539f. The position of John Knox with regard to the question of natural law would require further investigation. Cf. Charles Martin, "De la genèse des doctrines politiques de J. K." in the *Bull. de la soc. de l'hist. du prot. franc.*, 1907, pp. 193ff.



and Lambert Daneau, and the German Johannes Althusius. The last-named—born in 1557 in the territory of Wittgenstein, from 1586 to 1604 teacher of law in the Reformed University at Herborn, from 1604 till he died syndic of the city of Emden—gave to the tendencies of the Monarchomachi, in his *Politics*, appearing in 1603, the methodically scholastic, and at the same time completest and most thorough-going expression. Otto Gierke, in his book, *Joh. Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien* (Breslau, 1880), has the merit both of rescuing the teachings of Althusius himself from the dust of oblivion and of assigning them their place in the general historical development of law from the Middle Ages to the close of the eighteenth century. The significance of the questions there under discussion becomes sufficiently evident from the single remark of Gierke<sup>71</sup> to the effect that a remarkable agreement just in a number of fundamental and distinctive ideas renders it probable that the *Politics* of Althusius was read and made use of by Rousseau for his *Contrat social*.

The following is a very rough sketch of the doctrine of the Monarchomachi concerning the state. We shall disregard their more or less serious differences from each other, and depend substantially upon the best-defined and most completely developed doctrines of Althusius. In the hands of the Monarchomachi the state loses more and more of its theocratic character. True, government is regarded as having its power from God; but it has it indirectly, not directly. Between it and God there stands a legal transaction of natural law. For natural law postulates an original natural condition when there was no state, when men lived in complete freedom and equality, indeed with community of goods. The state did not take its rise until a double contract had been freely concluded—the social contract and the governmental contract. By the social contract—the model of Rousseau's *Contrat social*—the community of men becomes for the first time a legal body; as such it then, by the second

<sup>71</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

contract, delegates the government to the rulers. The terms of the governmental contract could, it is true, be interpreted in two ways. It might be said, in the first place, as was done for example by Bodinus, the famous French absolutistic teacher of law, of the end of the sixteenth century, that by this contract the sovereignty was once for all fully and unconditionally transferred to the ruler. On the other hand, the original right of the people might be granted a permanent precedence over against the holder of the state power. In adopting the latter interpretation the Monarchomachi are a unit. For them the ruler is merely the highest officer of the people, holding his office by contract. His right to exert the power of the state is independent, it is true, but at the same time conditional and revocable. He has only a *munus sub conditione et stipulatione*; he is merely *mandatarius*.<sup>72</sup> Althusius supported the limitation of the power of the ruler in his logical radicalism with the proposition that the sovereignty, the majesty, is by its definition an indivisible unity, which can belong only to one of the two powers, the people or the ruler. But since the prerogatives of sovereignty are as necessary to the nature and existence of the social organism, *populus universus in corpus unum symbioticum ex pluribus minoribus consociationibus consociatus*, as life is an inalienable possession of every man,<sup>73</sup> therefore in the governmental contract those prerogatives must have remained in possession of the people. But beside them there can be no full, unlimited monarchical sovereignty, but in the last analysis only a chief business-manager. To this is added still a further deduction, which again appears in an especially incisive form in Althusius. As in the governmental contract, so also before that in the social contract, the individual surrendered only so many rights as were necessary for the accomplishment of the governmental ends. Therefore there remain to the individual under every form of government certain inalienable rights of man, which from the time of the Monarchomachi on

<sup>72</sup> Gierke, *op. cit.*, pp. 144f.      <sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 29.

played an ever more important part in various schools of natural law, until in the French Revolution they became, as everyone knows, the battle-cry that moved the peoples. But in order to make the rights of the people effective, there was recognized, even at the beginning and by the Monarchomachi themselves, the need of representatives, estates, or, as Althusius calls them after an expression used incidentally by Calvin,<sup>74</sup> ephors, who represent the people, assist the ruler especially in legislation, and restrain him when he exceeds his authority, if necessary by force.

One needs only to recall these propositions in order to become conscious of their revolutionary character, but at the same time of the fruitful element in them that could enable them gradually to produce the modern constitutional forms of the state. But the motive which forced the Monarchomachi to these theories is quite plain. Their teaching is confined throughout to the political or legal sphere. Their postulation of the rights of man, their reduction of all social and national life to the individuals as the constitutive factors, involves no contradiction of dogma or revelation. But forced as they were into the fearful battle with the Counter-Reformation, the Reformed Monarchomachi sought merely an adequate justification of the right of resistance against the tyrannical government. Over against a state-power which without hesitation exhausted all means to suppress the Gospel, they too had recourse to the last resort, to civil war. But could that be justified? Now it is true that Calvin in a brief remark at the very end of his *Institutio*<sup>75</sup> had expressed himself to the effect that where there are popular magistrates, estates, who like the ephors in Sparta, or the tribunes of the people in Rome, are intended to champion the rights of the people, these lower officials are justified in offering resistance to the tyranny of the supreme head of the state. But this remark, however gladly it was exploited, seemed far from being sufficient; for Calvin had placed at the head of his "Politics" as highest prin-

<sup>74</sup> *Institutio*, IV, xx, 31.

<sup>75</sup> IV, xx, 31.

ciple the duty of passive obedience, and had with all energy declared this principle to be the clear intention of Scripture. Therefore, the ground remained uncertain. Although a way could be found to transcend the mere passive resistance, simply by the abundant use of the Old Testament, yet that was continually hindered by the great authority of the Biblical scholar of Geneva. Therefore, in order to arrive at a plain and firm position, recourse was taken to natural law. Here was found what was needed; only on this foundation could the Old Testament examples of resistance against tyrannical power develop their full strength; it was deemed certain that in connection with the natural-law doctrine of the sovereignty of the people the law of the Decalogue was at the same time finding its first perfect application to politics.

Yet almost at the same time at which the Monarchomachi, in order to attain a firm legal foundation for resistance against the anti-Reformation governments, sanctioned natural law, natural law forced itself forward also out of inter-confessional conflicts into Reformed Protestantism—I mean, through the book of the Anglican divine, Richard Hooker, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity Eight Books*.<sup>76</sup> This work appeared in a number of parts consecutively—the first four books in 1594, the very copious fifth book in 1597, the last three books not till many years after the early death of the author (1600), under the restoration of Charles II. The genuineness of the last three books has been questioned, but without sufficient reason, since the same style and the same peculiar type of thinking prevail throughout. Hooker's work has been subjected to a sympathetic estimation by Leopold von Ranke in an essay entitled, *Zur Geschichte der politischen Theorien*,<sup>77</sup> principally from the point of view that it was written in defence of the ecclesiastical supremacy of the English king over against Rome. But this judgment gives an entirely incorrect picture of the origin and

<sup>76</sup> In *The Works of Rich. Hooker*, 2 vols., Oxford, 1841.

<sup>77</sup> *Sämmtliche Werke*, Vol. 24, pp. 238ff.

purpose of the *Ecclesiastical Laws*. The book did not grow out of the conflict with Rome, but out of the spiritual unrest into which the Anglican world under Elizabeth was thrown by the rising Puritanism. Hooker, a man of the second generation (born 1553), the pupil of Bishop Jewel of Salisbury, who was the first defender of the Anglican form of the Church as a happy mean between Catholicism and (Reformed) Protestantism, set himself the task, as he repeatedly reminds us and as the whole content of his book undeniably testifies, of justifying Anglicanism against the criticism of the Puritans and Presbyterians. In this defense it was a question chiefly of the Anglican ceremonies and the Anglican constitution. Accordingly, Hooker deals with the former in books iv and v, and with the latter in books vi-viii (concerning the presbyterial-episcopal constitution and the question of the supremacy); the discussions of the separate points are preceded by a philosophical substructure in the first three books: concerning the nature of laws, the authority of Scripture, and the idea of the Church.

The chief lever of the Puritan criticism was the radical Reformed doctrine of Scripture to the effect that absolutely everything must be based upon God's word, that the Scripture alone must decide about doctrine and life, about Church and state. Hooker seeks to oppose these claims first of all by limiting the authority of Scripture. It is true, he approves the rejection of tradition, and also approves the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture;<sup>78</sup> but he holds that human aids, the studies of learned men, also councils, are indispensable for the purpose of determining what Scripture teaches.<sup>79</sup> The Scripture is indeed the foundation of all things, but the authority of man is the key that unlocks its meaning. Nor did the opposing party, Hooker claims, have any better right to say that their teaching was the pure truth of God; they too depended in their interpretation of Scripture upon human opinion. Further, Hooker calls attention to the differing character of the contents of Scrip-

<sup>78</sup> *Works*, 1841, i, p. 210.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, i, pp. 260ff.



ture. Of course, everything that is necessary to salvation is revealed in it, but it does not by any means afford a clear precept of the divine will for every trifle of daily life.<sup>80</sup> Indeed, Hooker even ventures the assertion that there are matters which in themselves are indifferent from the ethico-religious point of view.<sup>81</sup> At any rate, not everything in Scripture is eternally obligatory; a great deal in the Bible depends upon the temporary circumstances and was prescribed for those circumstances alone. The Gospel is eternal, but not the rites and ceremonies.<sup>82</sup>

However reasonable many of these propositions may appear to us, Hooker was nevertheless fully conscious that, despite all such means, he could scarcely make it credible, under the dogmatic view of Scripture that then prevailed, that the Anglican ceremonies and a form of government with leanings towards Catholicism could stand before the forum of the Bible as well as could the claims of the Presbyterians. Therefore, he too had recourse to an additional aid, namely, to the law of reason and nature. Even in matters of revelation, we cannot do without the reason; only rational reflection can make us certain what God's word is. The *testimonium spiritus sancti internum* is not sufficient to insure the authority of the Word; for the operations of the Spirit are by their nature obscure and must be tested by the reason before their genuineness can be settled. For a legislation such as is demanded by the situation of the English people, the mere precepts of the Bible are insufficient; we obtain something useful only from Scripture and reason together.<sup>83</sup> Man has within himself a law of reason, which in every individual case points out what is good, and that, too, with compelling force, so that it must be done.<sup>84</sup> This law of reason corresponds to the operations of nature, it is the law of nature.<sup>85</sup> In it the moral faculty of man finds expression, and it is therefore universally valid; to it the positive laws, which owe their origin to definite legislative

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, i, pp. 270ff.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, i, p. 238.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, i, pp. 217f.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, i, pp. 308-314.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, i, p. 178.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, i, p. 178.



acts, whether of a human state or of God, stand related as regulations that cannot be obligatory for ever.<sup>86</sup> Among the latter Hooker includes certain "supernatural duties".<sup>87</sup> The law of nature as the natural light of reason does not, it is true, embrace all necessary laws; above all, it cannot be kept without the continual help and coöperation of God;<sup>88</sup> but still it can be recognized without the assistance of Revelation. Standing upon this theologico-philosophical foundation, Hooker accordingly derives the origin of states purely by natural law from a primitive social contract, from which, it is true, he does not clearly distinguish the governmental contract.<sup>89</sup> With regard to the terms of the latter, however, he maintains, like the Monarchomachi, that the individual did not completely surrender his native right of self-government and that the legislative power still remains in substance in the hands of the community. A king who does not base his laws upon the general consent is a tyrant; the people, moreover, declares its consent through its representatives, the parliaments.<sup>90</sup> But since in Hooker's opinion the Church is included among the political associations to which laws are given in this way,<sup>91</sup> he finally ventures the conclusion: king and parliament have the full right to issue such legal regulations for the Anglican Church as seem to them suitable, and if these regulations turn out to be different from those of other churches and peoples, this is to be explained by the requirements of the time and of the nation.

So Hooker found in natural law the most valuable ally for the defense of Anglicanism against the assaults of the Puritans. On the other hand, the consequences of this point of view could not fail to appear. True, the Anglican is willing to subtract nothing from the absolute necessity of the supernatural-mystical way of redemption through the Son of God, and maintains further that the knowledge of this way is to be obtained only in a supernatural manner.<sup>92</sup> But if reason and nature alone make it possible to distin-

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, i, p. 189.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, i, p. 217.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, i, pp. 178-181.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, i, pp. 186ff.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, i, pp. 191ff.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, i, p. 194.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, i, pp. 215f.

guish between the eternally valid elements in Revelation and the perishable admixtures that were added to it in correspondence to temporary needs, it can readily be seen how precarious the position has thereby become. This uncertain attitude even diminished Hooker's Protestant firmness against Rome; the Papal Church also is for him a church of Christ, although with many errors, which we pray God to take from her.<sup>93</sup> So there we have in Hooker, leaving out of account his opposition to monarchical absolutism, all the elements which later, in the English Revolution, brought Anglicanism to disaster,—the tendency towards Catholicism, the beginnings of the latitudinarianism of a Laud and of other high-church representatives of the system of the Stuarts. But we must not forget that all this grew not without an inward necessity out of the conflict with Puritanism; for the latter was unable in its rigid Biblicism to adapt itself to the needs of the ever more consciously active religious spirit of the English people. The uncompromising *jus divinum* called the *jus naturae* with a certain necessity into the arena.

The English latitudinarianism had on the Continent its more original and more vigorous parallel in Arminianism. But if in England latitudinarianism and natural-law ideas form a union, so, as everyone knows, the Remonstrant Hugo Grotius becomes the scientific founder of the modern school of natural law. Nothing more natural than this coincidence! Arminianism was dogmatic criticism, criticism of the one central dogma of Calvinism; and that not on the ground of a strong new religious motive, but on the ground of the humanistic-scientific subjectivity of highly refined culture. This criticism could not stop with one dogma; it had to tone down the entire orthodox-Reformed view of life. To that end, Grotius could scarcely have chosen anything apparently less dangerous and at the same time in its almost unlimited possibilities more effective than his natural law. And yet, however disintegrating the effect of Grotius' *Three*

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, i, p. 283.

*Books concerning the Law of War and Peace* upon the early Reformed view of the world and of life, it cannot be emphasized strongly enough that he too followed not only a noble purpose, but also an actual compulsion of circumstances. When in 1625 he published his work in Paris, Germany was bleeding in the Thirty Years' War, the Netherlands also had no certain peace with Spain, and in general frightful wars, both civil and foreign, had torn almost all countries of Europe for fifty years. At that time, in the midst of conflicts, this man raised his voice for law; his expressed purpose was to guide the fighters towards humanity by teaching them that even in war there are legal conditions which must be respected, and that war exists merely to prepare for peace. This purpose, however, appeared impossible of attainment merely by an appeal to the *ius divinum*, the divine commands of justice and peacefulness. For the wars of that time were waged just on account of Revelation and the differing interpretations of it; this method of urging peace would have meant simply becoming a partisan to the conflict. Only what belonged to all of humanity in common, only what existed before all parties and was recognized by all, in a word, only natural law seemed adapted to the need. Accordingly Grotius proposed for his book the second task of bringing the principles of natural law, in clear distinction from positive law, into scientific form.<sup>94</sup> The title of his book, it is true, called to mind primarily only the *ius gentium*, which had formerly been regarded rather as an appendix to natural law proper.<sup>95</sup> But by skilful arrangement, in accordance with which the first book is devoted to the legal admissibility of war, the second to its causes, and the third to the manner of conducting it and to the conclusion of peace, Grotius was able to weave into his exposition almost the entire private and internal law of the state.

The influence of the work is thus explained. For two

<sup>94</sup> *De iure belli et pacis*, Prolegomena, § 30.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. Bergbohm, *op. cit.*, p. 156; Gierke, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

hundred years after the appearance of the *De iure belli et pacis* of Grotius, almost the whole of jurisprudence was controlled by the natural-law theories. And yet the mighty influence of the book is, on the other hand, a riddle, for even to the eye of a juristic layman the scientific weaknesses of this classical work of jurisprudence become immediately apparent. In it the theological element is still predominant to an astonishing degree; the boundaries between law and ethics are scarcely determined at all. But especially, what a variable thing it is after all, this natural law! First of all, the doctrine of popular sovereignty and in general the revolutionary tendencies of the natural law of the Monarchomachi are considerably weakened, not without arbitrariness and contradiction. The people, so Grotius maintains, can in the governmental contract very well have surrendered the government to its ruler definitely and finally, just as every man can enter the state of private slavery.<sup>96</sup> Still more does a king who has conquered a people through force hold the right of government as his unconditional and even alienable property.<sup>97</sup> Against a state-power that comes into conflict with natural or divine law, nothing more than passive resistance is in any case justifiable;<sup>98</sup> even the *inferiores magistratus*, the ephors of Althusius, have no higher competence.<sup>99</sup> Here, however, Grotius immediately makes an exception; if the tyranny of the ruler endangers the existence of the state, which was established through the primitive contract, then forcible resistance is permitted as a right of necessity.<sup>100</sup> Especially full of contradiction is the relation of Grotius' natural law to the divine commands. On the one side, he emphasizes the fact that natural law itself, though proceeding from the inward principles of man, is from God;<sup>101</sup> indeed, he even ventures the assertion, "Natural law is so unchangeable that even God cannot change it".<sup>102</sup> In another passage, however, he seems to suggest that, as

<sup>96</sup> *Op. cit.*, Lib. I, cap. iii, dist. 8. I use the *Editio nova* of 1632.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, I, iii, 12. <sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, I, iv, 2. <sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, I, iv, 6. <sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, I, iv, 7.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, Prolegomena, § 12. <sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, I, i, 10.

applied to certain materials, natural law has relaxed its strictness and adapted itself to the customs of the time.<sup>103</sup> Or take another example. Grotius declares as a matter of principle that "God has made the principles [of natural law] clearer through express laws";<sup>104</sup> so the revealed law would be the interpretation of the law of nature. But then again the divine law as something positive and arbitrary stands in contrast with the natural law;<sup>105</sup> indeed, it is repeatedly asserted that natural law and the Gospel (he means the ethical regulations of the Gospel) are by no means identical: it is possible for a thing to be strictly forbidden in the Gospel which is permitted by natural law—for example, polygamy.<sup>106</sup> Something similar is true of slavery, which the natural law of Grotius permits without scruple.<sup>107</sup>

These examples are sufficient to illustrate the attenuation of the moral judgment, which, already bound up with the casuistic method of Grotius, becomes glaring through the contrast between natural law and Revelation. Already there is beginning to appear that way of thinking to which reason and nature are everything, Scripture truth nothing but an unimportant historical expression of them. Yet, however much fault may be found with the undertaking of the learned Remonstrant, that undertaking is primarily to be understood as arising from the necessity of constructing for the religious parties that were lacerating one another some sort of common basis of law and of peace.

After the book of Grotius, natural law began its triumphant course; it penetrated into almost all Protestant movements. A Hobbes employed it in order to deduce with still greater incisiveness than Bodin the absolute right of absolutism; the Independents, Roger Williams and the poet Milton, by means of it supported their demands for civil and religious liberty. We have no further interest in following up all the various forms assumed by the natural-law theory; only one classical representative of that theory, the philo-

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, II, i, 13.    <sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, Prolegomena, § 13.    <sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, I, i, 13.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, I, ii, 6; compare also II, i, 10.    <sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, II, v, 27.



sopher John Locke, may finally be mentioned in passing. First, however, we may offer some general remarks in explanation of his doctrine, with regard to which the recent book of a French writer, Bastide, affords valuable information.<sup>108</sup> In spite of Williams, Milton and other Independents, the great English Revolution stands by no means under the standard of natural law. On the contrary, Weingarten (however antiquated his book on the English churches of the revolution<sup>109</sup> may be in other respects) is correct in his fundamental thesis, when he sees in the Revolution the last mighty attempt to establish the theocratic principle, and at the same time the crisis of the theocracy. The Puritan army of the saints fought against the absolutistic, catholicizing and latitudinarian tendencies for divine truth and divine regulation of the Church and state, under the conviction that it was thereby guaranteeing to the conscience the free worship of God. But when the victory had been won, it became evident in the so-called Barebones Parliament of 1653 that the enthusiasts, in spite of all their faith in the Bible, lacked clear and positive ends and were incapable of establishing the new order of things. Hence, after Cromwell too had passed away without having established a permanent reorganization, the restoration of the Stuarts became a necessity. All the achievements of the great conflict would have been lost if the follies of Charles II and James II, and the threatening phantom of the reintroduction of Catholicism, had not for a moment extinguished the internal disputes between Whigs and Tories, and made possible the glorious Revolution of 1688 with the accession of William of Orange. Now, through the Bill of Rights, the aristocratic-constitutional form of government in England was definitely established, and at the same time the religious conditions most happily settled in such a way, that, while Anglicanism continued to be the state Church, the dissenting religious parties

<sup>108</sup> Ch. Bastide, *J. Locke, ses théories politiques et leur influence en Angleterre*, Paris, 1906.

<sup>109</sup> *Die Revolutionskirchen Englands*, Leipzig, 1868.



were granted a tolerance that was at first limited but later became increasingly extensive.

For the reorganization of England, however, natural law offered the more or less clearly recognized theoretical basis. Natural law appeared as though of its own accord, where the saints of the Barebones Parliament had waited in vain for illumination through the Spirit and through Revelation. The Bill of Rights was in fact such a governmental contract between ruler and subjects as natural law referred to primitive times, and John Locke, the son of a Puritan father as well as the adherent and friend of the latitudinarian, not to say skeptical elder Shaftesbury, justified the Revolution of 1688 with opinions which, although by no means already the common property of the English people, were destined in many respects to become such. Of Locke's writings, there come in question in the first place *The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina*, and then the *Letter concerning Toleration* and *Two Treatises of Government*, which appeared in 1689 but were in part composed earlier.<sup>110</sup> Like all adherents of natural law, Locke here derives the origin of the state from the social and the governmental contracts. But in so doing he emphasizes, like the Monarchomachi before him, the innate rights of man, "liberty and property"; the primitive men in forming a union surrendered only so much of their rights as is necessary for the protection of life and property. The state is in essence only a legally constituted organization, whose compulsion does not extend further than is required by the above-mentioned tasks, or, as Locke also expresses it, by the common good. Within the state, Locke regards the churches as purely corporations, similar to the guilds or to the learned societies; to them, even including Catholics and Socinians or other free-religious societies, is due complete liberty to constitute their worship, form of government and dogmas as they think best. Only the atheists, whose unbelief endangers the trustworthiness of oaths, as well as all religious movements, which, by tran-

<sup>110</sup> Bastide, *op. cit.*, pp. 42ff., 108.

scending the spiritual sphere, threaten the stability and peace of the state, must be suppressed by force. And the trouble-makers, Locke thinks, are only the fanatically intolerant, domineering preachers and priests. Thus entered into the modern liberalism at its beginning the hatred of priests and theologians that is still in part characteristic of it.

But, in general, Locke's adjustment between state and Church certainly cannot give complete satisfaction; the purpose of the state as it is restricted by Locke is too narrow and is contradicted by all history. But still less can the churches attain a full development on the basis of the mere right of association—perhaps the Independents might do so, but certainly not the Calvinists and least of all the Catholics. In Locke's notion of the Church, too little place is given to the institutional element, to the recognition that the Church is primarily a public institution with divine authority and a divine function. A closer examination reveals the deeper cause of these defects in Locke's philosophico-religious position. As is well known, he is a moderate deist; that is, there are for him two sources for the apprehension of truth, the reason and Revelation. By examining both (in the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* and *The Reasonableness of Christianity*), he thinks he has discovered that many things in life prevent us from attaining certitude; we must therefore often be satisfied with mere probability.<sup>111</sup> Our highest duty is therefore humility and love. In this way the demand for tolerance is based upon human weakness. Therein, however, is revealed the Achilles heel of the entire system. The doctrine of universal reason, into which in the age of Deism and of the "Enlightenment" the natural-law theories developed more and more, did not fill its adherents with absolute, impregnable certainty; therefore that doctrine necessarily dissipated and destroyed more than it built up. Even in a Locke, a keen eye can detect the seeds of those destructive tendencies which later in France and the French Revolution exhibited their fearful explosive power. But

<sup>111</sup> Cf. Bastide, *op. cit.*, pp. 252f.

that ought never to cause us to forget that the natural-law theories were for the England of the seventeenth century again to a certain extent a necessity. As circumstances stood, those theories alone were able to conserve the tolerance which was the result of the great Revolution; they have therefore contributed their full share towards the happy reorganization of the civil and ecclesiastical constitution of England.

### III

We pause here. We have seen how natural law, despite the rather unfavorable attitude of Calvin, pours itself like an irresistible stream into Reformed Protestantism, attains a decisive importance in its vital problems, becomes fundamental in the political constitutions produced by it, and in general enters as one of the most important factors into the spirit of the "Enlightenment" and of the entire modern period. We are now, I think, in a position to form a final judgment concerning natural law in its relation to the Reformation.

The first thing that I have to notice is that natural law is for the Reformation a part of tradition, more particularly an inheritance from the Catholicism of the Middle Ages. The former fact can be at once surmised, so soon as one observes how much as a matter of course, indeed how naïvely, Luther refers to natural law, and lets it appear in varying colors, without, however, conceding to it any fundamental importance. When Melancthon assumed an attitude so much more favorable, and permitted the circle of ideas that is connected with natural law and the law of nature to become influential for his entire system, it is certain that his classical leanings contributed largely to that end; but they were not the only motive and not even the proximate occasion. It would be highly incorrect, we believe, to suppose that the ideas of natural law are a humanistic inheritance from the ancient world, which was half received by Melancthon and then gradually emancipated

itself. It is true, the original source of natural law lies, as we all know, in antiquity. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle already cherished the notion of a natural law in distinction from the arbitrary laws of men. The form of these views which was most influential for the future was contained in the Stoic doctrine of the world-reason and the pantheizing law of nature: after Cicero, under Platonic influence, had so modified this doctrine that the natural laws inherent in human nature received at the same time a theonomic, divinely obligating character.<sup>112</sup> But aside from the fact that such teachings never remained uncontradicted in antiquity, Melanchthon himself at his first mention of the natural laws in the *Loci* of 1521<sup>113</sup> takes his start from the *Theologi* and *Iurisconsulti*, that is, from the schoolmen and jurists of his time, and introduces only by comparison with these the utterances of Plato and Cicero. However, no matter how Melanchthon's position be conceived, it is impossible that a theory of ancient philosophy should merely on Melanchthon's authority, while the other Reformers were at least indifferent, have revived just after the Reformation with such vigor and exerted such an enduring influence, if it had been dormant during the entire Middle Ages.

Just the opposite is in reality the case. From the height of the Middle Ages, natural law was a recognized, though, it is true, also an extremely multiform doctrine of ecclesiastical and civil law, as well as of scholastic theology. So early as the *Decretum Gratiani*, we read: *Ius naturale est commune omnium nationum, eo quod ubique instinctu naturae, non constitutione aliqua habetur, ut viri et feminae conjunctio, liberorum successio et educatio, communis omnium possessio et omnium una libertas, acquisitio eorum, quae coelo, terra marique capiuntur*.<sup>114</sup> Natural law is in

<sup>112</sup> Bergbohm, *op. cit.*, pp. 151ff.; Tröltsch, *Vernunft und Offenbarung*, p. 165.

<sup>113</sup> *Op. Mel.*, xxi, c. 116.

<sup>114</sup> Dist. I, c. vii; cf. dist. I, c. i; dist. IX, c. xi; dist. V and VI. Bergbohm, *op. cit.*, pp. 157ff; Gierke, *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht*, iii: *Die Staats- und Korporationslehre des Altertums und des Mittelalters*, Berlin, 1881, pp. 610ff.

the *Decretum* at one time identified with the revealed law (*quod in lege et evangelio continetur*), more particularly, with the saying of Christ, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them"; at another time it is assigned an independent place between the divine and the human law. With increased weight, though also in equally uncertain terms,<sup>115</sup> natural-law theories are set forth by Thomas Aquinas. In that part of his *Summa Theologiae* which is devoted to the law, he treats successively the *lex aeterna*, *lex naturalis* and *lex humana*.<sup>116</sup> The law of nature is *participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura*;<sup>117</sup> hence it is contained *primo in lege aeterna, secundo in naturali iudicatorio rationis humanae*.<sup>118</sup> So it oscillates between God's command and the law of reason. From the Gospel or the *lex nova*, the *lex indita naturalis* differs again through its lack of the *donum superadditum gratiae*.<sup>119</sup> Nevertheless, it is the foundation of all human laws, so that if a law differs from the law of nature, it is no longer law but corruption of the law.<sup>120</sup>

Accordingly, Thomas in the treatise, *De regimine principum* refers also the origin of the state to the *ius naturale*. A certain independence is thereby conceded to the state, in that it is regarded no longer as a product of sin (which was still the view of Bonaventura), but as the product of a reasonable impulse in human nature; but at the same time in that way it is delivered over to the control of Church and Papacy as constituting the higher sphere of grace and faith. But under the influence of Thomas, the theories of natural law become more and more the common property of mediæval thought. So early as the year 1300, they were seized upon by the popular political writers, both parties using them as a weapon in the great conflict between Church and state—a fact for which Richard Scholz, in his instructive investigations concerning *Die Publizistik zur Zeit Philipps*

<sup>115</sup> Cf. Bergbohm, *op. cit.*, p. 260, Anm. 37.

<sup>116</sup> *Summa Theologiae*, Prima secundae, qu. 90, 91, 93, 94, 95ff.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, qu. 91, art. 2.      <sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, qu. 71, art. 6.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, qu. 106, art. 1.      <sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, qu. 95, art. 2.



*des Schönen*, has produced ample proofs.<sup>121</sup> But, in general, a glance into Gierke's *Althusius* or into the third volume of his *Deutsches Genossenschaftsrecht* is sufficient to show how in the second half of the Middle Ages almost all schools of jurisprudence were permeated by these views. All the individual doctrines that have their roots in natural law—the doctrines of the primitive contract and of the sovereignty of the people, and the principle of representation—existed long before the Reformation in more or less thoroughly-developed forms. The strict curialistic school, as well as the teachings of Marsilius of Padua, which contended for popular freedom and the national state; the adherents of the conciliar idea, as well as pre-Reformers like Wiclif; above all, finally, the humanistic school of jurisprudence, which flourished in Italy and then, in the century of the Reformation, in France, and which was cultivated by teachers and friends of Calvin like Alciati and François de Connan—all these had accustomed themselves to erect their conception of the state upon a natural-law foundation.

But such a unanimity of the jurists, theologians and humanists is by no means accidental, for it is a well-known fact that the entire mediæval Catholic system of faith and life is characterized by the separation between the natural and the supernatural—the two spheres are built up one on top of the other like two stories of a house. The natural is the lower sphere of the secular, the transitory; it too proceeds from the Creator's hand and is therefore not altogether sinful, but it must be held in check by a higher power. The supernatural, on the other hand, is the eternal, holy, divine, it is that which rules the lower sphere and thereby gives it an organic part in the Kingdom of God. For an example we do not need to go further than the doctrine of the primitive state of man. The *dona naturae* are supplemented by the *dona supernaturalia*. Similarly, the natural light of reason, with its natural knowledge of God, is the

<sup>121</sup> *Kirchenrechtliche Abhandlungen von Stutz*, 6-8 Heft, Stuttgart, 1903, pp. 68ff., 101, 113f., 134f., 142ff., 222f., 311, 323ff., 362, 370.

lower sphere in comparison with the supernatural revelation. Saving faith in the latter can be attained only through the sacramental-magic inpouring of the *illuminatio spiritus*. In the same way, over against the *lex naturae*, which is merely explained and elucidated by the *lex Mosis*, stands the *lex Christi* or the *lex gratiae*; in connection with justification, over against the *praeformatio ad gratiam* afforded by work-righteousness, the *infusio gratiae*; in ethics, over against the *praecepta* destined for all, the *consilia* of monasticism. The relation of Church and state is exactly similar. The Church is the divine establishment, the institute of salvation clothed with supernatural authority. The state is a mere product of man's natural social requirement, it proceeded from a primitive contract by virtue of natural law. It must therefore necessarily subordinate itself to the Church if the ends of the one *civitas Dei* are to be attained. Indeed, the Church, being the guardian and interpreter of the natural as well as of the divine law, can depose those rulers who in her opinion are infringing the primitive contract, and can summon the subjects to revolution. Such was the practice of the Curia, at least when the political situation promised success in making good the claim; such was the more or less decided teaching of the theorists.

Natural law with all its political consequences must accordingly, so far as one may speak here at all of religious and ecclesiastical determination, be regarded, despite its beginnings in antiquity, as a thoroughly Catholic product. The proof of this view is made still stronger by the fact that simultaneously with the Reformed Monarchomachi, Catholic Monarchomachi appeared, among whom the Jesuits like the Spaniard Juan Mariana<sup>122</sup> did not shrink even from directly instigating the assassination of tyrants. But since, on the other hand, the theories of natural law must be regarded as a central doctrine of the "Enlightenment", which has exerted an extensive influence upon the entire spirit of modern times in the political, ethico-religious and intel-

<sup>122</sup> Cf. his book, *De rege et regis institutione*, Tolet., 1599.

lectual spheres, a prospect is opened up which is diametrically opposed to the historical construction of Tröltsch. Not the Reformation, which in its chief representatives met natural law, if not with out-and-out rejection, at least with cool indifference, is mediæval and Catholic; rather has modern liberalism been influenced in its development by a group of ideas which was an integral part of the mediæval-Catholic view of the world. At the same time we see by this example how little value is to be attributed to such general schemes and catch-words as the one proposed by Tröltsch; for the most part they merely help partisans to establish one-sided judgments.

Yet if natural law has its roots in mediæval Catholicism, that only brings us to the chief question, How could doctrines that were Catholic in spirit be appropriated in Reformation territory at such an early time and with so little hesitation? This might be understood in the case of Hooker, for his opposition to Puritanism brought him still nearer to Rome than the genius of his Church would in itself suggest, so that he cites Thomas Aquinas quite expressly as a witness for his theory.<sup>123</sup> But how is it to be comprehended in the other Protestants, particularly the most anti-Catholic of all, the decided Calvinists? For Melanchthon, no doubt academic tradition and the demands of education exercised the determining influence. He saw how the doctrines of natural law were set forth in all schools, even by those who were neutral in the conflict between the confessions, namely, by the humanists; he found those doctrines taught in the works of ancient writers, like Cicero whom he prized so highly; he heard also how Luther spoke of natural law without opposing it, and even on occasion made use of it in his way—all this no doubt combined to remove Melanchthon's objections, which later on, after he had become a synergist, did not weigh very heavily with him anyhow. The men of the Reformed faith may well have been influenced by certain

<sup>123</sup> *Works*, i, p. 315. Here he calls Thomas "the greatest amongst the school divines", and cites *Sum. Theol.* i, 2, qu. 91, art. 3.

other things. Perhaps even the variability of the ideas in question, and their remoteness from the central truths of religion which made them appear almost like a mere scientific hypothesis, may have helped to commend them. Furthermore, the theories of natural law could be regarded as a principle of individualism, which would naturally be congenial to the Calvinists. But this was for them certainly not the principal reason, for their individualism had such firm root in their particular type of religion, that it needed no further support. The point of view which was finally decisive for the men of the Reformed confession was rather, we believe, the one which was indicated in our investigation, when we spoke of the inward necessity, the compulsion of circumstances, under which the entrance of natural law in all four of the phases discussed in our second section took place. This inward necessity can be made clear by some such general survey as the following.

The Reformation at its very beginning found itself in the presence of problems and exigencies of indefinite range, first of all, conflicts of purely religious and theological character—doctrinal, liturgical, and constitutional conflicts. What an amount of spiritual strength was consumed even by these conflicts! How much there was which went wrong! What unrest, what losses these conflicts produced! And yet the problems which then appeared could be settled by reference to the fundamental religious principle of Protestantism, and on the whole were in fact settled in a truly Protestant way. Much more difficult and dangerous, however, was a second adjustment, which lay more on the periphery of religious truth and yet was no less necessary—namely the adjustment to the general ethical, political and social problems, to science and art. This adjustment, I say, was unavoidable, for if Protestantism, over against the mediæval-Catholic world, involves a new world-view, then there must necessarily be a Protestant science of politics, a Protestant philosophy and science, a Protestant art. This conclusion cannot be avoided through the assertion that the Reformation achieved just

the liberation of the secular activities of the spirit from the control of the mediæval church and their restoration to their own immanent principles; for then that freedom would still have to be grounded more in detail, the boundary-lines would have to be drawn to show where the ethico-religious claims of the Gospel end and the rights of the free spiritual principle begin.

For such an adjustment, however, in the very nature of things, time is required; it cannot be accomplished by one man or by one generation. It was, indeed, a thankworthy undertaking, when Calvin in his *Institutio* did not entirely ignore politics, but the results were of such a kind that they did not give satisfaction even negatively, on the question of the obedience of subjects and the right of resistance, much less positively. But now the tasks and problems of culture came upon the young evangelical Church in a storm. Not so much upon the Lutherans. In their small states, where there was little cultural movement, they were able to settle down and persevere for two centuries on the basis of the theocratic idea as purified by the Reformation, and in analogy to the traditional forms of Church and state, as though all those questions of adjustment were really already settled by Melancthon's organization of the universities and of the sciences. The Reformed, on the contrary, were obliged to fight the hardest battles for existence; then, after the final victory, they had new states to found both at home and in the wilderness; above all, they had to settle the question of tolerance between the different parties that had arisen in their own camp. But the tasks were met by the will to accomplish them. Calvin had inspired in his disciples that energy of piety, which abhors all half-way measures, which boldly endeavors to make all the affairs of life subject to Christ, the Head and Lord. In this congregation of the elect, the individualism of the Reformation reached its climax, and despite all subjection under God's command, there was developed a thirst for liberty, which tolerated nothing that came in its way except after free and earnest investi-



gation. The chief merit of Calvinism is that it brought men's powers into the liveliest activity, undertook the most diversified tasks with vigorous confidence, and so with impatient energy carried humanity forward on its way. But the impulse to freedom can work itself out to the good of humanity only when it remains conscious of its limitations. But what was needed to keep it within bounds, the firm principles about the relation of the Reformation to the forces of culture—to the state, science and art—was lacking, and how could it be attained all at once in the midst of all the unrest of the time? Regarded in this way, we believe, the appearance of natural law becomes comprehensible. A doctrine of the state constructed on evangelical principles was not in existence. But such a doctrine was imperatively demanded by the need of the time. Men needed to have clearness about the relation of the ruler to the subjects, about the problem of Church and state, about the relation between different churches in the same country. No wonder that in the lack of a conception of the state revised in the light of fundamental evangelical ideas, men had recourse to the political theory taught in the traditional jurisprudence, without heeding the fact that that theory had an origin foreign to the Reformation and involved tendencies and consequences which would lead away from the Reformation. These tendencies, of course, became apparent later in slowly-developing after-effects, and then, especially after the spiritual enervation sustained in the protracted religious wars, they could not fail gradually to dissipate and destroy the Reformation's basis of faith.

Unless all indications are deceptive, the progress of events was similar in the case of other cultural questions. The desire for knowledge, the desire for activity, which was experienced by the individual after he had been liberated through the Reformation, plunged itself into all problems of the spiritual life of man, became absorbed in the traditional manner of their treatment, and was all too quickly satisfied with solutions which were not in agreement with

the fundamental ethico-religious factors of the practical religious life of the Reformation. The reaction did not remain absent. The evangelical life of faith became shallower, instead of deepening itself and developing in all directions. Here, however, the opposition between the modern spirit and the Reformation would seem to receive an explanation which grows out of an organic understanding of the historical development. It is not true that the Gospel of the Reformation has been outstripped; but spiritual culture in general has infinitely advanced, while its permeation with ethico-religious principles in the spirit of the Reformation has not kept pace. If it is true that the religious spirit of the Reformation in passing through Deism, the "Enlightenment" and Rationalism, was moving on a downward path, the reason for its deterioration was that the adjustment between the Reformation and culture was neither brought to a satisfactory conclusion nor even earnestly enough attempted. Nevertheless, we hope that such an adjustment may yet be accomplished; the better it succeeds, so much the more completely will the difficulties of our present religious situation disappear.

*Halle a. S.*

A. LANG.

## CALVIN'S DOCTRINE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

The first chapters of Calvin's *Institutes* are taken up with a comprehensive exposition of the sources and guarantee of the knowledge of God and divine things (Book I, chs. i-ix). A systematic treatise on the knowledge of God must needs begin with such an exposition; and we require no account of the circumstance that Calvin's treatise begins with it, beyond the systematic character of his mind and the clearness and comprehensiveness of his view. This exposition therefore makes its appearance in the earliest edition of the *Institutes* which attempted "to give a summary of religion in all its parts", redacted in orderly sequence; that is to say, which was intended as a text-book in theology. This was the second edition, published in 1539, which was considered by Calvin to be the first which at all corresponded to its title. In this edition this exposition already stands practically complete. Large insertions were made into it subsequently, by which it was greatly enriched as a detailed exposition and validation of the sources of our knowledge of God; but no modifications were made in its fundamental teaching by these additions, and the ground plan of the exposition as laid down in 1539 was retained unaltered throughout the subsequent development of the treatise.

We may observe in the controversies in which Calvin had been engaged between 1536 and 1539 a certain preparation for writing this comprehensive and admirably balanced statement, with its equal repudiation of Romish and Anabaptist error and its high note of assurance in the face of the scepticism of the average man of the world. We may trace in it the fruits of his eager and exhaustive studies prosecuted in the interval, as pastor, professor and Protest-

ant statesman; and especially of his own ripening thought as he worked more and more into detail his systematic view of the body of truth. But we can attribute to nothing but his theological genius the feat by which he set a compressed apologetical treatise in the forefront of his little book—for the *Institutes* were still in 1539 a little book, although already expanded to more than double the size of their original form (edition of 1536). Thus he not only for the first time supplied the constructive basis for the Reformation movement, but even for the first time in the history of Christian theology drew in outline the plan of a complete structure of Christian Apologetics. For this is the significance in the history of thought of Calvin's exposition of the sources and guarantee of the knowledge of God, which forms the opening topic of his *Institutes*. "Thus", says Julius Köstlin, after cursorily surveying the course of the exposition, "there already rises with him an edifice of Christian Apologetics, in its outlines complete (*fertig*). With it, he stands, already in 1539, unique (*einzig*) among the Reformers, and among Christian theologians in general up to his day. Only as isolated building-stones can appear in comparison with this, even what Melancthon, for example, offered in the last elaboration of the *Loci* with reference to the proofs for the existence of God."<sup>1</sup> In point of fact, in Augustine alone among his predecessors, do we find anything like the same grasp of the elements of the problem as Calvin here exhibits; and nowhere among his predecessors do we find these elements brought together in a constructive statement of anything like the completeness and systematic balance which he gave to it.

At once on its publication, however, Calvin's apologetical construction became the property of universal Christian thought, and it has entered so vitally into Protestant, and

<sup>1</sup> Article on *Calvins Institutio, nach Form und Inhalt, in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, printed in the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* for 1868, p. 39. Köstlin's whole account of the origin of these sections in the edition of 1539 is worth reading (pp. 38-39).

especially Reformed, thinking as to appear now-a-days very much a matter of course. It is difficult for us to appreciate its novelty in him or to realize that it is not as native to every Christian mind as it now seems to us the inevitable adjustment of the elements of the problems raised by the Christian revelation. Familiar as it seems, therefore, it is important that we should apprehend it, at least in its outlines, as it lies in its primary statement in Calvin's pages. So only can we appreciate Calvin's genius or estimate what we owe to him. A very brief abstract will probably suffice, however, to bring before us in the first instance the elements of Calvin's thought. These include the postulation of an innate knowledge of God in man, quickened and developed by a very rich manifestation of God in nature and providence, which, however, fails of its proper effect because of man's corruption in sin; so that an objective revelation of God, embodied in the Scriptures, was rendered necessary, and, as well, a subjective operation of the Spirit of God on the heart enabling sinful man to receive this revelation,—by which conjoint divine action, objective and subjective, a true knowledge of God is communicated to the human soul.

Drawn out a little more into detail, this teaching is as follows. The knowledge of God is given in the very same act by which we know self. For when we know self, we must know it as it is: and that means we must know it as dependent, derived, imperfect and responsible being. To know self implies, therefore, the co-knowledge with self of that on which it is dependent, from which it derives, by the standard of which its imperfection is revealed, to which it is responsible. Of course, such a knowledge of self postulates a knowledge of God, in contrast with whom alone do we ever truly know self: but this only the more emphasises the fact that we know God in knowing self, and the relative priority of our knowledge of two objects of knowledge which we are conscious only of knowing together may for the moment be left undetermined. Meanwhile, it is clear



that man has an instinctive and ineradicable knowledge of God, which, moreover, must produce appropriate reactions in his thought, feeling and will, whence arises what we call religion. But these reactions are conditioned by the state of the soul which reacts. Although, then, man cannot avoid possessing a knowledge of God, and this innate knowledge of God is quickened and developed by the richest manifestations of God in nature and providence, which no man can escape either perceiving or so far apprehending, yet the actual knowledge of God which is framed in the human soul is affected by the subjective condition of the soul. The soul, being corrupted by sin, is dulled in its instinctive apprehension of God; and God's manifestation in nature and history is deflected in it. Accordingly the testimony of nature to God is insufficient that sinful man should know Him aright, and God has therefore supernaturally revealed Himself to His people and deposited this revelation of Himself in written Scriptures. In these Scriptures alone, therefore, do we possess an adequate revelation of God; and this revelation is attested as such by irresistible external evidence and attests itself as such by such marks of inherent divinity that no normal mind can resist them. But the sin-darkened minds to which it appeals are not normal minds, but disordered with the awful disease of sin. What is to give subjective effect in a sin-blinded mind to even a direct revelation from God? The revelation of God is its own credential. It needs no other light to be thrown upon it but that which emanates from itself: and no other light can produce the effect which its own splendor as a revelation of God should effect. But all fails when the receptivity is destroyed by sin. For sinners, therefore, there is requisite a repairing operation upon their souls before the light of the Word itself can accredit itself to them as light. This repairing operation on the souls of sinful men by which they are enabled to perceive light is called the testimony of the Holy Ghost: which is therefore just the subjective action of the Spirit of God on the heart, by virtue of which

it is opened for the perception and reception of the objective revelation of God. The testimony of the Spirit cannot, then, take the place of the objective revelation of the Word: it is no revelation in this strict sense. It presupposes the objective revelation and only prepares the heart to respond to and embrace it. But the objective revelation can take no effect on the unprepared heart. What the operation of the Spirit on the heart does, then, is to implant, or rather to restore, a spiritual sense in the soul by which God is recognized in His Word. When this spiritual sense has been produced the necessity of external proofs that the Scriptures are the Word of God is superseded: the Word of God is as immediately perceived as such as light is perceived as light, sweetness as sweetness,—as immediately and as inamissibly. The Christian's knowledge of God, therefore, rests no doubt on an instinctive perception of God native to man as man, developed in the light of a patefaction of God which pervades all nature and history; but particularly on an objective revelation of God deposited in Scriptures which bear in themselves their own evidence of their divine origin, to which every spiritual man responds with the same strength of conviction with which he recognizes light as light. This is the basis which Calvin in his *Institutes* places beneath his systematic exposition of the knowledge of God.

The elements of Calvin's thought here, it will readily be seen, reduce themselves to a few great fundamental principles. These embrace particularly the following doctrines: the doctrine of the innate knowledge of God; the doctrine of the general revelation of God in nature and history; the doctrine of the special revelation of God and its embodiment in Scriptures; the doctrine of the noëtic effects of sin; the doctrine of the testimony of the Holy Spirit. That we may do justice to his thought we must look in some detail at his treatment of each of these doctrines and of the subordinate topics which are necessarily connected with them.

## I. NATURAL REVELATION.

That the knowledge of God is innate (I. iii. 3), naturally engraved on the hearts of men (I. v. 4), and so a part of their very constitution as men (I. iii. 1), that it is a matter of instinct (I. iii. 1, I. iv. 2), and every man is self-taught it from his birth (I. iii. 3), Calvin is thoroughly assured. He lays it down as incontrovertible fact that "the human mind, by natural instinct itself, possesses some sense of a deity" (I. iii. 1, *ad init. et ad fin.*; 3,—*sensus divinitatis* or *deitatis*),<sup>2</sup> and defends the corollaries which flow from this fact, that the knowledge of God is universal and indelible. All men know there is a God, who has made them, and to whom they are responsible. No savage is sunk so low as to have lost this sense of deity, which is wrought into his very constitution: and the degradation of men's worship is a proof of its ineradicableness—since even such dehumanization as this worship manifests has not obliterated it (I. iii. 1). It is the precondition of all religion, without which no religion would ever have arisen; and it forms the silent assumption of all attempts to expound the origin of religion in fraud or political artifice, as it does also of all corruptions of religion, which find their nerve in men's incurable religious propensities (I. iii. 1). The very atheists testify to its persistence in their ill-concealed dread of the deity they profess to despise (I. iv. 2); and the wicked, strive they

<sup>2</sup> *Instit.* I. iii. 1: *Quemdam inesse humanae menti, et quidem naturali instinctu, divinitatis sensum, extra controversiam ponimus; iii. 3 ad init.*: "This indeed with all rightly judging men will always be assured, that there is engraved on the minds of men *divinitatis sensum, qui deleri numquam potest*"; iii. 3, *med.*: *vigere tamen ac subinde emergere quem maxime extinctum cuperent, deitatis sensum*; iv. 4 *ad fin.*: *naturaliter insculptum esse deitatis sensum humanis cordibus*; iv. 4. *fin.*: *manet tamen semen illud quod revelli a radice nullo modo potest, aliquam esse divinitatem*. The phraseology by which Calvin designates this "natural instinct" (*naturalis instinctus*; III. 1. *ad init.*) varies from *sensus divinitatis* or *sensus deitatis* to such synonyms as: *numinis intelligentia, dei notio, dei notitia*. It is the basis on the one hand of whatever *cognitio dei* man attains to and on the other of whatever *religio* he reaches; whence it is called the *semen religionis*.

never so hard to banish from their consciousness the sense of an accusing deity, are not permitted by nature to forget it (I. iii. 3). Thus the cases alike of the savages, the atheists and the wicked are made contributory to the establishment of the fact, and the discussion concludes with the declaration that it is by this innate knowledge of God that men are discriminated from the brutes, so that for men to lose it would be to fall away from the very law of their creation (I. iii. 3, *ad fin.*).<sup>3</sup>

If the knowledge of God enters thus into the very idea of humanity and constitutes a law of its being, it follows that it is given in the same act of knowledge by which we know ourselves. This position is developed at length in the opening chapter. The discussion begins with a remark which reminds us of Augustine's familiar contention that the proper concern of mankind is the knowledge of God and the soul; to which it is added at once that these two knowledges are so interrelated that it is impossible to assign the priority to either. The knowledge of self involves the knowledge of God and also profits by the knowledge of God: the better we know ourselves the better we shall know God, but also, we shall never know ourselves as we really are save in contrast with God, by whom is supplied the only standard for the formation of an accurate judgment upon ourselves (I. i. 2). In his analysis of the mode of the

<sup>3</sup> That the knowledge of God is innate was the common property of the Reformed teachers. Peter Martyr, *Loci Communes*, 1576, *praef.*, declares that *Dei cognitio omnium animis naturaliter innata[est]*. It was thrown into great prominence in the Socinian debate, as the Socinians contended that the human mind is natively a *tabula rasa* and all knowledge is acquired. But in defending the innate knowledge of God, the Reformed doctors were very careful that it should not be exaggerated. Thus Leonh. Riissen, *F. Turretini Compendium . . . auctum et illustratum* (1695), I. 5, remarks: "Some recent writers explain the natural sense of deity (*numinis*) as an *idea of God impressed on our minds*. If this idea is understood as an innate *faculty* for knowing God after some fashion, it should not be denied; but if it expresses an *actual and adequate representation of God from our birth*, it is to be entirely rejected." (Heppe, *Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche*. p. 4.)

implication of the knowledge of God in the knowledge of self, Calvin lays the stress upon our nature as dependent, derived, imperfect and responsible beings, which if known at all must be known as such, and to be known as such must be known as over against that Being on whom we are dependent, to whom we owe our being, over against whom our imperfection is manifest, and to whom we are responsible (I. i. 1). As we are not self-existent, we must recognize ourselves as "living and moving" in Another. We recognize ourselves as products, and in knowing the product know the cause; thus our very endowments, seeing that they distil to us by drops from heaven, form so many streams up which our minds must needs travel to their Fountain-head. The perception of our imperfections is at the same time the perception of His perfection; so that our very poverty displays to us His infinite fulness. Our sense of dissatisfaction with ourselves, directs our eyes to Him whose righteous judgment we can but anticipate; and when in the presence of His majesty we realize our meanness and in the presence of His righteousness we realize our sin, our perception of God passes into consternation as we recognize in Him our just Judge.

The emphasis which Calvin places in this analysis upon the sense of sin and the part it plays in our knowledge of God, at once attracts attention. It is perhaps above everything the "miserable ruin" in which we find ourselves, which compels us, according to him, to raise our eyes towards heaven, spurred on not merely by a sense of lack but by a sense of dread: it is only, he declares, when we have begun to be displeased with ourselves that we energetically turn our thoughts Godward. This is already an indication of the engrossment of Calvin in this treatise with practical rather than merely theoretical problems. He is less concerned to show how man as man attains to a knowledge of God, than how man as he actually exists upon the earth attains to it. In the very act of declaring that this knowledge is instinctive and belongs to the very constitution



of man as such, therefore, he so orders the exposition of the mode of its actual rise in the mind as to throw the emphasis on a quality which does not belong to man as such, but only to man as actually existing in the world,—in that “miserable ruin into which we have been plunged by the defection of the first man” (I. i. 1). Man as unfallen, by the very necessity of his nature would have known God, the sphere of his being, the author of his existence, the standard of his excellences; but for man as fallen, Calvin seems to say, the strongest force compelling him to look upwards to the God above him, streams from his sense of sin, filling him with a fearful looking forward to judgment.

It is quite obvious that such a knowledge of God as Calvin here postulates as the unavoidable and ineradicable possession of man, is far from a mere empty conviction that such a being as God exists. The knowledge of God which is given in our knowledge of self is not a bare perception, it is a conception: it has content. “The knowledge of ourselves, therefore,” says Calvin (I. i. 1, *ad fin.*), “is not only an incitement to seek after God, but becomes a considerable assistance towards finding God.” The knowledge of God with which we are natively endowed is therefore more than a bare conviction that God is: it involves, more or less explicated, some understanding of what God is. Such a knowledge of God can never be otiose and inert; but must produce an effect in human souls, in the way of thinking, feeling, willing. In other words, our native endowment is not merely a *sensus deitatis*, but also a *semen religionis* (I. iii. 1, 2; iv. 1, 4; v. 1). For what we call religion is just the reaction of the human soul to what it perceives God to be. Calvin is, therefore, just as insistent that religion is universal as that the knowledge of God is universal. “The seeds of religion”, he insists, “are sown in every heart” (I. iv. 1; v. 1); men are propense to religion (I. iii. 2, *med.*); and always and everywhere frame to themselves a religion, consonant with their conceptions of God.

Calvin's ideas of the origin and nature of religion are set

forth, if succinctly, yet with eminent clearness, in his second chapter. Wherever any knowledge of God exists, he tells us, there religion exists. He is not speaking here of a competent knowledge of God such as redeemed sinners have in Christ. But much less is he speaking of that mere notion that there is such a Being as God which is sometimes called a knowledge of God. It may be possible to speculate on "the essence" of God without being moved by it. But certainly it is impossible to form any vital conception of God without some movement of intellect, feeling and will towards Him; and any real knowledge of God is inseparable from movements of piety towards Him. Piety means reverence and love to God; and the knowledge of God tends therefore to produce in us, first, sentiments of fear and reverence; and, secondly, an attitude of receptivity and praise to Him as the fountain of all blessing. If man were not a sinner, indeed, such would be the result: men, knowing God, would turn to Him in confidence and commit themselves without reserve to His care,—not so much fearing His judgments, as making them in sympathetic loyalty their own (I. ii. 2). And herein we see what pure and genuine religion is: "it consists in faith, united with a serious fear of God, comprehending a voluntary reverence, and producing legitimate worship agreeable to the injunctions of the law" (I. ii. 2, *ad fin.*).<sup>4</sup>

The definition of religion to which Calvin thus attains is exceedingly interesting, and that not merely because of its vital relation to the fundamental thought of these opening chapters, but also because of its careful adjustment to the state of the controversy in which he was engaged as a leader of the Reformation. In the first of these aspects, as we have already pointed out, religion is with him the vital effect of the knowledge of God in the human soul; so that inevitably religions will differ as the conceptions of God

<sup>4</sup> En quid sit pura germanaque religio, nempe *fides*, cum serio *Dei timore* conjuncta; ut timor et *voluntariam reverentiam* in se contineat, et secum trahat *legitimum cultum*, qualis in Lege praescribitur.

determining our thought and feeling and directing our life differ. In the estate of purity, the knowledge of God produces reverence and trust: and the religion of sinless man will therefore exhibit no other traits but trust and love. In sinful man, the same knowledge of God must produce, rather, a reaction of fear and hate—until the grace of God intervenes with a message of mercy. Sinful man cannot be trusted, therefore, to form his own religion for himself, but must in all his religious functioning place himself unreservedly under the direction of God in his gracious revelation. In its second aspect, then, we perceive Calvin carefully framing his definition so as to exclude all “will-worship” and to prepare the way for the condemnation of the “formal worship” and “ostentation in ceremonies” which had become prevalent in the old Church. The position he takes up here is essentially that which has come down to us under the name of “the Puritan principle”. Religion consists, of course, not in the externalities of worship, but in faith, united with a serious fear of God, and a willing reverence. But its external expression in worship is not therefore unimportant, but is to be strictly confined to what is prescribed by God: to “legitimate worship, agreeable to the injunctions of the law” (I. ii. 2, *fin.*). This declaration is returned to and expounded in a striking section of the fourth chapter (I. iv. 3; *cf.* I. v. 13), where Calvin insists that “the divine will is the perpetual rule to which true religion is to be conformed”, and asserts of newly-invented modes of worshipping God, that they are tantamount to idolatry. God cannot be pleased by showing contempt for what He commands and substituting other things which He condemns: and none would dare to trifle in such a manner with Him unless they had already transformed Him in their minds into another and different Being: and in that case it is of little importance whether you worship one god or many.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The significance and relations of “the Puritan principle” of absolute dependence on the Word of God as the source of knowledge of His

From this digression for the sake of asserting the "Puritan", that is, the "Reformed", principle with reference to acceptable worship, it is already apparent that Calvin did not suppose that men have been left to the *notitia Dei insita* for the framing of their religion, although he is insistent that therefrom proceeds a propensity to religion which already secures that all men shall have a religion (I. ii. 2). On the contrary, he teaches that to the ineradicable revelation of Himself which He has imprinted on human nature, God has added an equally clear and abundant revelation of Himself externally to us. As we cannot know ourselves without knowing God, so neither can we look abroad on nature or contemplate the course of events without seeing Him in His works and deeds (I. v). Calvin is exceedingly emphatic as to the clearness, universality and convincingness of this natural revelation of God. The whole world is but a theatre for the display of the divine glory (I. v. 5); God manifests Himself in every part of it, and, turn our eyes whichever way we will, we cannot avoid seeing Him; for there is no atom of the world in which some sparks of His glory do not shine (I. v. 1). So pervasive is God in nature, indeed, that it may even be said by a pious mind that nature is God (I. v. 5),—though the expression is too readily misapprehended in a Pantheistic (I. v. 5) or Materialistic (I. v. 4) sense to justify its use. Accordingly, no man can escape this manifestation of God; we cannot open our eyes without seeing it, and the language in which it is delivered to us penetrates through even the densest stupidity and ignorance (I. v. 1). To every individual on earth, there-  
will, and exclusive limitation to its prescriptions of doctrine, life, and even form of Church government and worship, are suggested by Dorner, *Hist. of Protest. Theol.*, I. 390, who criticizes it sharply from his "freer" Lutheran standpoint. But even Luther knew how, on occasion, to invoke "the Puritan principle". Writing to Bartime von Sternberg, Sept. 1, 1523, he says: "For a Christian must do nothing that God has not commanded, and there is no command as to such masses and vigils, but it is solely their own invention, which brings in money, without helping either living or dead" (*The Letters of Martin Luther, Selected and Translated* by Margaret A. Currie, p. 115).

fore, with the exclusion of none (I. v. 7), God abundantly manifests Himself (I. v. 2). Each of the works of God invites the whole human race to the knowledge of Him; while their contemplation in the mass offers an even more prevalent exhibition of Him (I. v. 10). And so clear are His footsteps in His providence, that even what are commonly called accidents are only so many proofs of His activity (I. v. 8).

In developing this statement of the external natural revelation of God, Calvin presents first His patefaction in creation (I. v. 1-6), and then His patefaction in providence (I. v. 7-9), and under each head lays the primary stress on the manifestations of the divine wisdom and power (I. v. 2-5, wisdom; 6, power: 8, wisdom and power). But the other attributes which enter into His glory are not neglected. Thus, under the former caption, he points out that the perception of the divine power in creation "leads us to the consideration of His eternity; because He from whom all things derive their origin must necessarily be eternal and self-existent", while we must postulate goodness and mercy as the motives of His creation and providence (I. v. 6). Under the second caption, he is particularly copious in drawing out the manifestations of the divine benignity and beneficence—of His clemency—though he does not scruple also to point to the signs of His severity (I. v. 7, *cf.* 10). From the particular contemplation of the divine clemency and severity in their peculiar distribution here, indeed, he pauses to draw an argument for a future life when apparent irregularities will be adjusted (I. v. 10).

The vigor and enthusiasm with which Calvin prosecutes his exposition of the patefaction of God in nature and history is worth emphasising further. He even turns aside (I. v. 9) to express his special confidence in it, in contrast to *a priori* reasoning, as the "right way and the best method of seeking God". A speculative inquiry into the essence of God, he suggests, merely fatigues the mind and flutters in the brain. If we would know God vitally, in our hearts, let



us rather contemplate Him in His works. These, we shall find, as the Psalmist points out, declare His greatness and conduce to His praise. Once more, we may observe here the concreteness of Calvin's mind and method, and are reminded of the practical end he keeps continually in view.<sup>6</sup> So far is he from losing himself in merely speculative elaborations or prosecuting his inquiries under the spur of "presumptuous curiosity", that the practical religious motive is always present, dominating his thought. His special interest in the theistic argument is, accordingly, due less to the consideration that it rounds out his systematic view of truth than to the fact that it helps us to the vital knowledge of God. And therefore he is no more anxious to set it forth in its full force than he is to point out the limitations which affect its practical value.<sup>7</sup> In and of itself, indeed, it has

<sup>6</sup> Cf. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvin* (1883), p. 8: "If Zwingli follows more the *a priori*, Calvin follows the *a posteriori* method"; and E. Rabaud, *Hist. de la doctrine de l'inspiration*, etc. (1883), p. 58: "his lucid and, above everything, practical genius."

<sup>7</sup> It is this distribution of Calvin's interest which leads to the impression that he lays little stress on "the theistic proofs". On the contrary, he asserts their validity most strenuously: only he does not believe that any proofs can work true faith apart from "the testimony of the Spirit", and he is more interested in their value for developing the knowledge of God than for merely establishing His existence. Hence P. J. Muller is wrong when he denies the one to affirm the other, as, *e. g.*, in his *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvin* (1883), p. 11: "Neither by Zwingli nor by Calvin are proofs offered for the existence of God, although some passages in their writings seem to contain suggestions of them. The proposition, 'God exists', needed no proof either for themselves, or for their coreligionists, or even against Rome. The so-called cosmological argument has no doubt been found by some in Zwingli (Zeller, *Das theolog. Syst. Zwinglis* extracted from the *Theol. Jahrb.* Tübingen, 1853, p. 33), and the physico-theological in Calvin (Lipsius, *Lehre der ev.-prot. Dogmatik*, ed. 2, 1879, p. 213); but it would not be difficult to show that we have to do in neither case with a philosophical deduction, but only with a means for attaining the complete knowledge of God." Though Calvin (also Zwingli) makes use of the theistic proofs to develop the knowledge of God, it does not follow that he (or Zwingli) did not value them as proofs of the existence of God. And we do not think Muller is successful (pp. 12 sq.) in explaining away the implication of the latter in Zwingli's use of these theistic arguments, or in Calvin's (p. 16). Schweitzer, *Glaubenslehre der ev.-ref. Kirche*

no limitations: Calvin is fully assured of its validity and analyses its data with entire confidence: to him nothing is more certain than that in the mirror of His works God gives us clear manifestations both of Himself and of His everlasting dominion (I. v. 11). But Calvin cannot content himself with an intellectualistic contemplation of the objective validity of the theistic argument. So dominated is he by practical interests that he actually attaches to the chapter in which he argues this objective validity a series of sections in which he equally strongly argues the subjective inability of man to receive its testimony. Objectively valid as the theistic proofs are, they are ineffective to produce a just knowledge of God in the sinful heart. The insertion of these sections here is the more striking that they almost seem unnecessary in view of the clear exposition of the noëtic effects of sin which had been made in the preceding chapter (ch. iv),—although, of course, there the immediate reference was to the *notitia Dei insita*, while here it is to the *notitia Dei acquisita*. ◡

Thus, however, our attention is drawn very pointedly to Calvin's doctrine of the disabilities with reference to the knowledge of God which are induced in the human mind by sin. He has, as has just been noted, adverted formally to them twice in these opening chapters of his treatise,—on the earlier occasion (ch. iv) with especial reference to the revelation of God made in the constitution of human nature, and on the later occasion (ch. v, §§ 11-15) with especial reference to the revelation of God made in His works and deeds. Were man in his normal state, he could not under this double revelation, internal and external, fail to know God as God would wish to be known. If he actually comes short of an adequate knowledge of God, therefore, this

(1844), I. 250, finds in Calvin's citation of Cicero's declaration that there is no nation so barbarous, no tribe so degraded, that it is not persuaded that a God exists, an appeal to the so-called *historical* argument for the divine existence (*cf.* the use of it by Zwingly, *Opera*. III. 156): but Calvin's real attitude to the theistic argument is rather to be sought in the implications of the notably eloquent ch. 5.

cannot be attributed to any shortcomings in the revelation of God. Calvin is perfectly clear as to the objective adequacy of the general revelation of God. Men, however, do come short of an adequate knowledge of God; and that not merely some men, but all men: the failure of the general revelation of God to produce in men an adequate knowledge of Him is as universal as is the revelation itself. The explanation is to be found in the corruption of men's hearts by sin, by which not merely are they rendered incapable of reading off the revelation of God which is displayed in His works and deeds, but their very instinctive knowledge of God, embedded in their constitution as men, is dulled and almost obliterated. The energy with which Calvin asserts this is almost startling, and matches in its emphasis that which he had placed on the reality and objective validity of the revelation of God. Though the seeds of religion are sown by God in every heart, yet not one man in a hundred has preserved even these seeds sound, and in no one at all have they grown to their legitimate harvest. All have degenerated from the true knowledge of God, and genuine piety has perished from the earth (I. iv. 1). The light which God has kindled in the breasts of men has been smothered and all but extinguished by their iniquity (I. iv. 4). The manifestation which God has given of Himself in the structure and organization of the world is lost on our stupidity (I. v. 11). The rays of God's glory are diffused all around us, but do not illuminate the darkness of our mind (I. v. 14). So that in point of fact, "men who are taught only by nature, have no certain, sound or distinct knowledge, but are confined to confused principles; they worship accordingly an unknown God" (I. v. 12, *fin.*): "no man can have the least knowledge of true and sound doctrine without having been a disciple of the Scriptures" (I. vi. 2 *fin.*): "the human mind is through its imbecility unable to attain any knowledge of God without the assistance of the Sacred Word" (I. vi. 4, *fin.*).

Calvin therefore teaches with great emphasis the bank-

ruptcy of the natural knowledge of God. We must keep fully in mind, however, that this is not due in his view to any inadequacy or ineffectiveness of natural revelation, considered objectively.<sup>8</sup> He continues to insist that the seeds of religion are sown in every heart (I. v. 1 *ad init.*); that through all man's corruption the instincts of nature still suggest the memory of God to his mind (I. v. 2); that it is impossible to eradicate that sense of the deity which is naturally engraved on all hearts (I. v. 4, *fin*); that the structure and organization of the world, and the things that daily happen out of the ordinary course of nature, that is under the providential government of God, bear a witness to God which the dumbest ear cannot fail to hear (I. v. 1, 3, 7, esp. II. vi. 1); and that the light that shines from creation, while it may be smothered, cannot be so extinguished but that some rays of it find their way into the most darkened soul (I. vi. 14). God has therefore never left Himself without a witness; but, "with various and most abundant benignity sweetly allures men to a knowledge of Him, though they persist in following their own ways, their pernicious and fatal errors" (I. vi. 14). The sole cause of the failure of the natural revelation is to be found, therefore, in the corruption of the human heart. Two results flow from this fact. First, it is not a question of the extinction of the knowledge of God, but of the corruption of the knowledge of God. And secondly, men are without excuse for their corruption of the knowledge of God. On both points Calvin is insistent.

He does not teach that all religion has perished out of the earth, but only that no "genuine piety" remains (I. iv. 1 *init*): he does not teach that men retain no knowledge of God, but no "certain, sound or distinct knowledge" (I. v. 12, *fin*). The seed of religion remains their inalienable possession, "but it is so corrupted as to

<sup>8</sup> P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn* (1883), pp. 18 sq., does not seem to bear this in mind, although he had clearly stated it in his *De Godsleer van Calvijn* (1881), pp. 13-25.

produce only the worst fruits" (I. v. 4, *fin*). Here we see Calvin's judgment on natural religion. Its reality he is quick to assert: but equally quickly its inadequacy—and that because not merely of a negative incompleteness but also of a positive corruption. Men have corrupted the knowledge of God; and perhaps Calvin might even subscribe the declaration of a modern writer that men's religions are their worst crimes.<sup>9</sup> Certainly Calvin paints in dark colors, the processes by which men form for themselves conceptions of God under the light of nature, or rather, in the darkness of their minds, from which the light of nature is as far as lies in their power excluded. "Their conceptions of God are formed, not according to the representations He gives of Himself, but by the invention of their own presumptuous imaginations" (I. iv. 1, *med.*). They set Him far off from themselves and make Him a mere idler in heaven (I. iv. 2); they invent all sorts of vague and confused notions concerning Him, until they involve themselves in such a vast accumulation of errors as almost to extinguish the light that is within them (I. iv. 4); they confuse Him with His works, until even a Plato loses himself in the round globe (I. v. 11); they even endeavor to deny His very existence (I. v. 12), and substitute demons in His place (I. v. 13). Certainly it is not surprising, then, that the Holy Spirit, speaking in Scripture, "condemns as false and lying whatever was formerly worshipped as divine among the Gentiles", nay, "rejects as false every form of worship which is of human contrivance", and "leaves no Deity but in Mount Zion" (I. v. 13). The religions of men differ, doubtless, among themselves: some are more, some less evil; but all are evil and the evil of none is trivial.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. F. C. Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*, etc., III. (1843), p. 41: "From this point of view"—he is expounding Calvin's doctrine—"the several manifestations in the history of religions are conceived not as stages in the gradually advancing evolution of the religious consciousness, but as inexcusable, sinful aberrations, as wilful perversions and defacements of the inborn idea of God."



Are men to be excused for this, their corruption of the knowledge of God? Are we to listen with sympathy to the plea that light has been lacking? It is not a case of insufficient light, but of an evil heart. Excuses are vain, for this heart-darkness is criminal. If we speak of ignorance here, we must remember it is a guilty ignorance; an ignorance which rests on pride and vanity and contumacy (I. iv. 1), an ignorance which our own consciences will not excuse (I. v. 15). What! shall we plead that we lack ears to hear what even mute creatures proclaim? that we have no eyes to see what it needs no eyes to see? that we are mentally too weak to learn what mindless creatures teach? (I. v. 15). We are ignorant of what all things conspire to inform us of, only because we sinfully corrupt their message: their insufficiency has its roots in us, not in them; wherefore we are without excuse (I. iv. 1: v. 14-15). Our "folly is inexcusable, seeing that it originates not only in a vain curiosity, but in false confidence, and an immoderate desire to exceed the limits of human knowledge" (I. iv. 1 *fin*). "Whatever deficiency of natural ability prevents us from attaining the pure and clear knowledge of God, yet, since that deficiency arises from our own fault, we are left without any excuse" (I. v. 15).

The natural revelation of God failing thus to produce its legitimate effects of a sound knowledge of God, because of the corruption of men's hearts, we are thrown back for any adequate knowledge of God upon supernatural activities of God communicating His truth to men. It is accordingly in an assertion and validation of these supernatural revelatory operations of God that Calvin's discussion reaches its true center. To this extent his whole discussion of natural revelation—in its inception in the implantation in man of a *sensus deitatis*, in its culmination in the patefaction of God in His works and deeds, and in its failure through the sin-bred blindness of humanity—may be said to be merely introductory to and intended to prepare the way for his discussion of the supernatural operations of God by which

He meets this otherwise hopeless condition of humanity sunk in its corrupt notions of God. These operations obviously must meet a twofold need. A clearer and fuller revelation of God must be brought to men than that which is afforded by nature. And the darkened minds of men must be illuminated for its reception. In other words, what is needed, is a special supernatural revelation on the one hand, and a special supernatural illumination on the other. It is to the validation of this twofold supernatural operation of God in communicating the knowledge of Himself that Calvin accordingly next addresses himself (chs. vi-ix).

One or two peculiarities of his treatment of them attract our notice at the outset, and seem to invite attention, before we enter into a detailed exposition of the doctrine he presents. It is noticeable that Calvin does not pretend that this supernatural provision of knowledge of God to meet men's sin-born ignorance is as universal in its reach as the natural revelation which it supplements and, so far as efficiency is concerned, supersedes. On the contrary, he draws it expressly into a narrower circle. That general revelation "presented itself to all eyes" and "is more than sufficient to deprive the ingratitude of men of every excuse, since", in it, "God, in order to involve all mankind in the same guilt, sets an exhibition of His majesty, delineated in the creatures, before them all without exception" (I. vi. 1, *init.*). But His supernatural revelation He grants only "to those whom He intends to unite in a more close and familiar connection with Himself" (*ibid.*); "to those to whom He has determined to make His instructions effectual" (I. vi. 3); in a word, to "the elect" (I. vi. 1; vii. 5 near end). In dealing with the supernatural revelation of God, therefore, Calvin is conscious of dealing with a special operation of the divine grace by means of which God is communicating to those He is choosing to be His people the saving knowledge of Himself. It is observable also that, in speaking of this supernatural revelation, he identifies it from the outset distinctly with the Scriptures (ch. vi). This is in accord-

ance with the practical end and engrossment which, as we have already had occasion to note, dominate his whole discussion. He was not unaware that the special revelation of God antedates the Scriptures: on occasion he speaks discriminatingly enough of this revelation in itself and the Scriptures in which it is embodied. But his mind is less on the abstract truth than on the concrete conditions which surrounded him in his work. Whatever may have been true ages gone, to-day the special revelation of God coalesces with the Scriptures, and he does not occupy himself formally with it except as it presents itself to the men of his own time. The task which he undertakes, therefore, is distinctly to show that men have in the Scriptures a special revelation of God supplementing and so far superseding the general revelation of God in nature; and that God so operates with this His special revelation of Himself as to overcome the sin-bred disabilities of man.

In this state of the case we may perhaps be justified in leaving at this point the logical development of his construction and expounding Calvin's teaching more formally under the heads of his doctrine of Holy Scripture and his doctrine of the Testimony of the Holy Spirit.

## II. HOLY SCRIPTURE.

First, then, what was Calvin's doctrine of Holy Scripture?

Under the designation of "Scripture" or "the Scriptures" Calvin understood that body of writings which have been transmitted to us as the divinely given rule of faith and life. In this body of writings, that is to say, in "the Canon

<sup>20</sup> Cf. J. Cramer, *Nieuwe Bijdragen op het gebied van Godgeleerdheid en Wijsbegeerte*, III (1881), p. 202: "By the Scripture or the Scriptures he [Calvin] understood the books of the Old and New Testaments which have been transmitted to us by the Church as canonical, as the rule of faith and life. The Apocrypha of the O. T. as they were determined by the Council of Trent, he excludes. They are to him indeed *libri ecclesiastici*, in many respects good and useful to be read; but they are not *libri canonici* 'ad fidem dogmatum faciendam' (*Acta Synodi Tridentinae, cum antidoto*, 1547)." In a later article, *De Roomsche Katholieke en de Oud-protestantsche Schriftbeschouwing*, 1883, p. 36,

of Scripture", he included all the books of the Old Covenant which were recognized by the Jewish Church as of divine gift, and as such handed down to the Christian Church; and all the books of the New Covenant which have been given the Church by the Apostles as its authoritative law-code. Calvin's attitude towards the canon was thus somewhat more conservative than, say, Luther's. He knew of no such distinction as that between Canonical and Deutero-Canonical Books, whether in the Old or the New Testament. The so-called "Apocryphal Books" of the Old Testament, included within the canon by the decrees of Trent, he rejected out of hand: the so-called "Antilegomena" of the New Testament he accepted without exception.<sup>10</sup>

The representations which are sometimes made, to the effect that he felt doubts of the canonicity of some of the canonical books or even was convinced of their uncanonicity,<sup>11</sup> rest on a fundamental misconception of his attitude,

Cramer declares that by the Scriptures, Calvin means "nothing else than the canon, established by the Synods of Hippo and Carthage, and transmitted by the Catholic Church, with the exception of the so-called Apocrypha of the O. T.", etc. Cf. Leipoldt: *Geschichte d. N. T. Kanons*, II, 1908, p. 140: "We obtain the impression that it is only for form's sake that Calvin undertakes to test whether the disputed books are canonical or not. In reality it is already a settled matter with him that they are. Calvin feels himself therefore in the matter of the N. T. canon bound to the mediæval tradition." Cf. also Otto Ritschl, *Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus*, I, 1908, p. 70, to the same effect.

<sup>10</sup>Cf., e. g., J. Pannier *Le témoignage du Saint-Esprit* (1893), pp. 112 sq.: "One fact strikes us at first sight: not only did Calvin not comment on the Apocryphal books, for which he wrote a very short preface, which was ever more and more abridged in the successive editions, but he did not comment on all the Canonical books. And if lack of time may explain the passing over of some of the less important historical books of the Old Testament, it was undoubtedly for a graver reason that he left to one side the three books attributed to Solomon, notably the Song of Songs. 'In the New Testament there is ordinarily mentioned only the Apocalypse, neglected by Calvin undoubtedly for critical or theological motives analogous to those which determined the most of his contemporaries, but it is necessary to note that the two lesser epistles of John are also lacking, and that in speaking of the large epistle Calvin always expresses himself as if it were the only existing one' (Reuss, *Revue de Théologie de Strasbourg*, VI (1853), p. 229). In

and are wrecked on his express assertions. No doubt he has not left us commentaries on all the Biblical Books, and no doubt his omission to write or lecture on certain books is not to be explained merely by lack of time, but involves an act of selection on his part, which was not unaffected by his estimate of the relative importance of the several books or by his own spiritual sympathies.<sup>12</sup> He has also occasionally

effect, at the very time when he was defending particularly the authority of the Scriptures against the Council of Trent, when he was dedicating to Edward VI, the King of England, his Commentaries on the 'Epistles which are accustomed to be called Canonical' (1551), he included in the Canon only the First Epistle of Peter, the First Epistle of John, James and, at the very end, the Second Epistle of Peter and Jude."—Reuss, however, in his *History of the Canon of the Holy Scriptures in the Christian Church* (1862, E. T. 1884), greatly modifies the opinion here quoted from him: "Some have believed it possible to affirm that Calvin rejected the Apocalypse because it was the only book of the N. T., except the two short Epistles of John, on which he wrote no commentary. But that conclusion is too hasty. In the *Institutes*, the Apocalypse is sometimes quoted like the other Apostolic writings, and even under John's name. If there was no commentary, it was simply that the illustrious exegete, wiser in this respect than several of his contemporaries and many of his successors, understood that his vocation called him elsewhere" (p. 318). He adds, indeed, of 2 and 3 John: "It might be said with more probability that Calvin did not acknowledge the canonicity of these two writings. He never quotes them, and he quotes the First Epistle of John in a way to exclude them: *Joannes in sua canonica, Instit.* iii. 2. 24; 3. 23 (*Opp.* ii. 415-453)." But this opinion requires revision, just as that on the Apocalypse did, as we shall see below. Cf. further, in the meantime, Reuss: *Hist. of the Sacred Scriptures of the N. T.*, ii. 347, and S. Berger, *La Bible au Seizième Siècle* (1879), p. 120, who expresses himself most positively: "Calvin expresses no judgment on the lesser Epistles of St. John. But we remark that he never cites them and that he mentions the First in these terms: 'As John says in his canonical.' This word excludes, in the thought of the author, the two other Epistles attributed to this Apostle."

<sup>12</sup>This may have been the case with the Apocalypse, which not only Reuss, as we have seen, but Scaliger thought him wise not to have entered upon; and which he is—perhaps credibly—reported to have said in conversation he did not understand (cf. Leipoldt's *Geschichte des N. T. Kanons*, II, p. 48, note). But how impossible it is to imagine that this implies any doubt of the canonicity or authority of the book will be quickly evident to anyone who will note his frequent citation of it in the same fashion with other Scripture and alongside of other



employed a current expression, such as, for example, "the Canonical Epistle of John",<sup>13</sup> when speaking of 1 John, which, if strictly interpreted, might be thought to imply denial of the genuineness of certain books of the canon,—

Scripture (*e. g.*, *Opp.* I. 736 = II. 500; I. 983 = II. 957; I. 1033 = II. 1063; I. 1148 = II. 521; II. 88, 357, 859. V. 191, 195, 1199, 532. VI. 176. VII. 29, 118, 333. XXXI. 650), sometimes mentioning it by name (VII. 467; I. 733 = II. 497), sometimes by the name of John (I. 715 = II. 492, VIII. 338 [along with 1 John]), sometimes by the name of both 'John' and 'the Apocalypse' (I. 506 = II. 125, VII. 116, XXX. 651, XLVIII. 122, XXIV. 43), and always with reverence and confidence as a Scriptural book. He even expressly cites it under the name of Scripture and explicitly as the dictation of the Spirit: VII. 539, "Fear not, says the Scripture (Eccles. xviii. 22). . . . Again (Rev. xxii. 11) . . . and (John xv. 2)"; I. 624: "Elsewhere also the Spirit testifies . . ." (along with Daniel and Paul). Cf. also such passages as II. 734, "Nor does the Apocalypse which they quote afford them any support . . ."; XLVIII. 238: "I should like to ask the Papists if they think John was so stupid that . . . etc. (Rev. xxii. 8)"; also VI. 369; V. 198.

<sup>13</sup> We use the simple expression "the Epistle of John"; the apparently, but only apparently, stronger and more exclusive, "the Canonical Epistle of John", which Calvin employs, although it would be misleading in our associations, is its exact synonym. Those somewhat numerous writers who have quoted the form "the Canonical Epistle of John" as if its use implied the denial of the *canonicity* of the other epistles of John forget that this was the ordinary designation in the West of the Catholic Epistles—"the Seven Canonical Epistles"—and that they are all currently cited by this title by Western writers. The matter has been set right by A. Lang: *Die Bekehrung Johanns Calvins* (II. 1. of Bonwetch and Seeberg's *Studien zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Kirche* (1897), pp. 26-29). On the title "Canonical Epistles" for the Catholic Epistles, see Lücke, *SK.* 1836, iii. 643-659; Bleek, *Introd. to the N. T.*, § 202 at end; Hilgenfeld, *Einleitung in d. N. T.*, p. 153; Westcott, *Epp. of St. John*, p. xxix; Salmond, *Hastings BD.* I., p. 360. In 1151, Calvin published his *Commentarii in Epistolas Canonicas*—that is on the Catholic Epistles; also his *Commentaire sur l'Épître Canonique de St. Jean*, i. e., on "the Epistle of John"; also his *Commentaire sur l'Épître Canonique de S. Jude*. Calvin does not seem ever to have happened to quote from 2 and 3 John. The reference given in the Index printed in *Opp.* xxii, viz., 3 Jno. 9, *Opp.* 10, part 2, p. 81, occurs in a letter, not by Calvin but by Christof Libertetus to Farel. Cf. J. Leipoldt, *Geschichte des N. T. Kanons* (2nd Part, Leipzig, 1908), p. 148, note 1: "The smaller Johannine Epistles Calvin seems never to have cited. He cites 1 John in *Inst.* III. ii. 21 by the formula: *dicit Johannes in sua canonica*. Nevertheless it is very questionable whether inferences can be drawn from this formula as to Calvin's attitude to 2 and 3 Jno." He adds a reference to Lang as above.

such as 2 and 3 John,—and not merely the momentary or habitual neglect of them; just as the common use of the term “the Apostle” of Paul might be said, if similarly strictly pressed, to imply that there was no other Apostle but he. It is also true that he expresses himself with moderation when adducing the evidence for the canonicity of this book or that, and in his modes of statement quite clearly betrays his recognition that the evidence is more copious or more weighty in some cases than in others. But he represents the evidence as sufficient in all cases and declares with confidence his conclusion in favor of the canonicity of the whole body of books which make up our Bible, and in all his writings and controversies acts firmly on this presupposition. How, for example, is it possible to contend that some grave reason connected with doubts on his part of their canonical authority underlies the failure of Calvin to comment on “the three books attributed to Solomon, particularly the Song of Songs”,<sup>14</sup> in the face of the judgment of the ministers of Geneva with regard to Castellion, which is thus reported by Calvin himself over his signature.<sup>15</sup> “We unanimously judged him one who might be appointed to the functions of the pastor, except for a single obstacle which opposed it. When we asked him, according to custom, whether he was in accord with us on all points of doctrine, he replied that there were two on which he could not share our views: one of them . . . being our inscribing the Song of Solomon in the number of sacred books. . . . We conjured him first of all, not to permit himself the levity of treating as of no account the constant witness of the universal Church; we reminded him that there is no book the authenticity of which is doubtful, about which some discussion has not been raised; that even those to which we now attach an undisputed authen-

<sup>14</sup> Pannier, as cited, p. 113.

<sup>15</sup> *Opera*, xi. 674-676: cf. Buisson, *Castellion* (1892), I. 198-199. Buisson discusses the whole incident and quotes from the minutes of the Council before which Castellion brought the matter: the point of dispute is there briefly expressed thus: “Moss’ Calvin recognizes as holy, and the said Bastian repudiates” the book in question.

ticity were not admitted from the beginning without controversy; that precisely this one is one which has never been openly repudiated. We also exhorted him against trusting unreasonably in his own judgment, especially where nothing was toward which all the world had not been aware of before he was born. . . . All these arguments having no effect on him, we thought it necessary to consider among ourselves what we ought to do. Our unanimous opinion was that it would be dangerous and would set a bad precedent to admit him to the ministry in these circumstances. . . . We should thus condemn ourselves for the future to raise no objection to another, should one present himself and wish similarly to repudiate Ecclesiastes or Proverbs or any other book of the Bible, without being dragged into a debate as to what is and what is not worthy of the Holy Spirit."<sup>16</sup> Not merely the firmness with which Calvin held to the canonicity of all the books of our Bible, but the importance he attached to the acceptance of the canonical Scriptures in their integrity, is made perfectly clear by such an incident; and indeed so also are the grounds on which he accepted these books as canonical.

<sup>16</sup> Calvin employs all these "three books attributed to Solomon" freely as Scripture and deals with them precisely as he does with other Scriptures. As was to be expected, he cites Proverbs most frequently, Canticles least: but he cites them all as Solomon's and as authoritative Scripture. "I have washed my feet" says the believing soul in Solomon . . . " is the way he cites Canticles (*Opp.* i. 778, ii. 589, *cf.* vii. 760). "They make a buckler of a sentence of Solomon's, which is as contrary to them as is no other that is in the Scriptures" (vii. 130) is the way he cites Ecclesiastes. He indeed expressly contrasts Ecclesiastes as genuine Scripture with the Apocryphal books: "As the soul has an origin apart, it has also another preëminence, and this is what Solomon means when he says that at death the body returns to the earth from which it was taken and the soul returns to God who gave it (Eccl. xii. 7). For this reason it is said in the Book of Wisdom (ii. 23) that man is immortal, seeing that he was created in the image of God. This is not an authentic book of Holy Scripture, but it is not improper to avail ourselves of its testimony as of an ancient teacher (*Docteur ancien*)—although the single reason ought to be enough for us that the image of God, as it has been placed in man, can reside only in an immortal soul, etc." (vii. 112, 1544).

These grounds, to speak briefly, were historico-critical. Calvin, we must bear in mind, was a Humanist before he was a Reformer,<sup>17</sup> and was familiar with the whole process of determining the authenticity of ancient documents. If then he received the Scriptures from the hands of the Church, not indulging himself in the levity of treating the constant witness of the universal Church as of no account, he was nevertheless not disposed to take "tradition" uncritically at its face value. His acceptance of the canon of the Church was therefore not a blind but a critically mediated acceptance. Therefore he discarded the Apocrypha: and if he accepted the Antilegomena it was because they commended themselves to his historico-critical judgment as holding of right a place in the canon. The organon of his critical investigation of the canon was in effect twofold. He inquired into the history of the books in question. He inquired into their internal characteristics. Have they come down to us from the Apostolic Church, commanding either unbrokenly or on the whole the suffrages of those best informed or best qualified to judge of their canonical claims? Are they in themselves conformable to the claims made for them of apostolic, which is as much as to say, divine origin? It was by the application of this twofold test that he excluded the Apocrypha of the Old Testament from the canon. They had in all ages been discriminated from the canonical books, and differ from them as the writing of an individual differs from an instrument which has passed under the eye of a notary and been sealed to be received of all.<sup>18</sup> Some fathers, it is true, deemed them

<sup>17</sup> Cf. A. Bossert, *Calvin* (1906), p. 6: "Humanist himself as well as profound theologian . . ." Charles Borgeaud, *Histoire de l'Université de Genève* (1900), p. 21: "Before he was a theologian, Calvin was a Humanist . . ."

<sup>18</sup> Cf. the *Preface* he prefixed to the Apocryphal Books (for the history of which, see *Opera*, ix. 827, note): "These books which are called Apocryphal have in all ages been discriminated from those which are without difficulty shown to be of the Sacred Scriptures. For the ancients, wishing to anticipate the danger that any profane books should be mixed with those which certainly proceeded from the Holy Spirit,

canonical; even Augustine was of that way of thinking, although he had to allow that opinions differed widely upon the matter. Others, however, could admit them to no higher rank than that of "ecclesiastical books", which might be useful to read but could not supply a foundation for doctrine; among such were Jerome and Rufinus.<sup>19</sup> And, when we observe their contents, no sane mind will fail to pass judgment against them.<sup>20</sup> Rome may, indeed, find her interest in defending them, for she may discover support in them for some of her false teachings. But this very fact is their condemnation. "I beg you to observe", he says of the closing words of 2 Maccabees, where the writer sets his hope in his own works: "I beg you to observe how far this con-

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made a roll of these latter which they called 'Canon'; meaning by this word that all that was comprehended under it was the assured rule to which we should attach ourselves. Upon the others they imposed the name of Apocrypha; denoting that they were to be held as private writings and not authenticated, like public documents. Accordingly the difference between the former and latter is the same as that between an instrument, passed before a notary, and sealed to be received by all, and the writing of some particular man. It is true they are not to be despised, seeing that they contain good and useful doctrine. Nevertheless it is only right that what we have been given by the Holy Spirit should have preëminence above all that has come from men." Cf., in his earliest Christian treatise, the *Psychopannychia* of 1534-1542 (*Opp.* v. 182), where, after quoting Ecclus. xvii. 1 and Wisd. ii. 23 as "two sacred writers", he adds: "I would not urge the authority of these writers strongly on our adversaries, did they not oppose them to us. They may be allowed, however, some weight, if not as canonical, yet certainly as ancient, as pious, and as received by the suffrages of many. But let us omit them and let us retain . . ." etc. In the *Psychopannychia* his dealing with Baruch on the other hand is more wavering. On one occasion (p. 205) it is quoted with the formula, "sic enim loquitur propheta", and on another (p. 229), "in prophetia Baruch" corrected in 1542. In the *Institutes* of 1536 he quotes it as Scripture: "alter vero propheta scribit" (*Opp.* i. 82),—referring back to Daniel. This is already corrected in 1539 (i. 906; cf. ii. 632). In 1534-1536, then, he considered Baruch canonical: afterwards not so. His dealing with it in v. 271 (1537), vi. 560 (1545), vi. 638 (1546) is *ad hominem*.

<sup>19</sup> *Acta Synodi Tridentinae, cum Antidoto* (1547).

<sup>20</sup> *Vera ecclesiae reformandae ratio*, p. 613: quae divinitus non esse prodita, sani omnes, saltem ubi moniti fuerint iudicabunt.



fession falls away from the majesty of the Holy Spirit"<sup>21</sup>—that is to say, from the constant teaching of Holy Scripture.

And it was by the application of the same two-fold test that he accredited the *Antilegomena* of the New Testament as integral parts of the canon. In the Preface which he has prefixed to 2 Peter, for example, he notes that Eusebius speaks of some who rejected it. "If it is a question", he adds, "of yielding to the simple authority of men, since Eusebius does not name those who brought the matter into doubt, no necessity seems to be laid on us to credit these unknown people. And, moreover, he adds that afterwards it was generally received without contradiction. . . . It is a matter agreed upon by all, of common accord, that there is nothing in this Epistle unworthy of Saint Peter, but that, on the contrary, from one end of it to the other, there are apparent the force, vehemence and grace of the Spirit with which the Apostles were endowed. . . . Since, then, in all parts of the Epistle the majesty of the Spirit of Christ is clearly manifest, I cannot reject it entirely, although I do not recognize in it the true and natural phrase of Saint Peter."<sup>22</sup> To meet the difficulty arising from the difference of the style from that of 1 Peter, he therefore supposed that the Epistle is indeed certainly Peter's, since otherwise it would be a forgery, a thing inconceivable in a book of its high character,<sup>23</sup> but was dictated in his old age to some one of his disciples, to whom it owes its peculiarities of diction. Here we have an argument conducted on the two grounds of the external witness of the Church and the internal testimony of the contents of the book: and these are the two grounds on which he everywhere depends. Of

<sup>21</sup> *Acta Synodi Tridentinae, cum antidoto*: Quantum, obsecro, a Spiritus Sancti majestati aliena est haec confessio!

<sup>22</sup> This is translated from the French version, ed. Meyrueis, IV. 743. The Latin is the same, though somewhat more concise: nihil Petro indignum, ut vim spiritus apostolici et gratiam ubique appareat: eam prorsus repudiare mihi religio.

<sup>23</sup> Haec fictio indigna esset nimistro Christi, obtendere alienam personam.

the Epistle of Jude he says:<sup>24</sup> "Because the reading of it is very useful, and it contains nothing that is not in accord with the purity of the Apostolic doctrine; because also it has long been held to be authentic by all the best men, for my part, I willingly place it in the number of the other epistles." In other cases the external evidence of the Church is not explicitly mentioned and the stress of the argument is laid on the Apostolic character of the writing as witnessed by its contents. He receives Hebrews among the Apostolic Epistles without difficulty, because nowhere else is the sacrifice of Christ more clearly or simply declared and other evangelical doctrines taught: surely it must have been due to the wiles of Satan that the Western Church so long doubted its canonicity.<sup>25</sup> James seems to him to contain nothing unworthy of an Apostle of Christ, but to be on the contrary full of good teaching, valuable for all departments of Christian living.<sup>26</sup> For the application of this argument he of course takes his start from the Homologoumena, which gave him the norm of Apostolic teaching which he used for testing the other books. It must not be supposed that he received even these books, however, without critico-historical inquiry: but only that the uniform witness of the Church to their authority weighed with him above all grounds of doubt. It was, in a word, on the ground of a purely scientific investigation that Calvin accredited to himself the canon. It had come down to him through the ages, accredited as such by the constant testimony of its proper witnesses: and it accredited itself to critical scrutiny by its contents.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Ed. Meyrueis, IV. 780.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, IV. 362.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, IV. 694. Latin: *mihi ad epistolam hanc recipiendam satis est, quod nihil continet Christi apostolo indignum.*

<sup>27</sup> Cf. J. Cramer, as cited, p. 126: "It was thus, in the first place, as the result of scientific investigations that Calvin fixed the limits of the canon . . . not *a priori*, but *a posteriori*, that he came to the recognition of the canonicity of the Biblical books." But especially see the excellently conceived passage on p. 155, to the following effect: "What great importance Calvin attaches to the question whether a Biblical

The same scientific spirit attended Calvin in his dealing with the text of Scripture. As a Humanist he was familiar with the processes employed in settling the texts of classical authors; and naturally he used the same methods in his determination of the text of the Biblical books. His practice here is marked by a combination of freedom and sobriety; and his decisions, though often wrong, as they could not but be in the state of the knowledge of the transmission of the New Testament text at the time, always man-

book is *apostolic*! If it is not apostolic, he does not recognize it as canonical. To determine its apostolicity, he appeals not merely to the ecclesiastical tradition of its origin, but also and principally to its contents. This is what he does in the case of all the antilegomena. The touchstone for this is found in the homologoumena. That he undertakes no investigation of the apostolic origin of these latter is a matter of course. This, for him and for all his contemporaries, stood irreversibly settled. The touchstone employed by Calvin is a scientific one. The testimonium Spiritus Sancti no doubt made its influence felt. But without the help of the scientific investigation, this internal testimony would not have the power to elevate the book into a canonical book. That Calvin was treading here in the footprints of the ancient Church will be understood. The complaint sometimes brought against the Christians of the earliest centuries is unfounded, that they held all writings canonical in which they found their own dogmatics. No doubt they attached in their criticism great weight to this. But not less to the question whether the origin of the books was traceable back to the apostolical age, and their contents accorded with apostolic doctrine, as it might be learned from the indubitably apostolic writings. So far as science had been developed in their day, they employed it in the formation of the canon . . . " In a later article Cramer says: "In the determination of the compass of Scripture, Calvin, like Luther, took his start from the writings which more than the others communicated the knowledge of Christ in His kingdom and had been recognized always by the Church as genuine and trustworthy. Even if the results of his criticism were more in harmony than was the case with those of the German reformer with the ecclesiastical tradition, he yet walked in the self-same critical pathway. He took over the canon of the Church just as little as its version and its exegesis without scrutiny" (*De Roomsche-Katholieke en de Oud-protestantsche Schriftbeschouwing*, 1883, pp. 31-32). Cramer considers this critical procedure on Calvin's part inconsistent with his doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit, but (p. 38) he recognizes that we cannot speak of it as the nodding of Homer: "It is not here and there, but throughout; not in his exegetical writings alone, but in his dogmatic ones, too, that he walks in this critical path. We never find the faintest trace of hesitation."

ifest good sense, balance and trained judgment. In his remarks on the pericope of the adulteress (Jno. vii. 53-viii. 11), we meet the same circle of ideas with which we are familiar from his remarks on the Antilegomena: "because it has always been received by the Latin Churches and is found in many of the Greek copies and old writers, and contains nothing which would be unworthy of an apostolical spirit, there is no reason why we should refuse to take our profit from it."<sup>28</sup> He accepts the three-witness passage of 1 Jno. v. 7. "Since the Greek codices do not agree with themselves", he says, "I scarcely dare reach a conclusion. Yet, as the context flows most smoothly if this clause is added, and I see that it stands in the best codices and those of the most approved credit, I also willingly adopt it." When puzzled by difficulties, he, quite like the Humanist dealing with a classical text, feels free to suggest that there may be a "mendum in voce". This he does, for example, in Mat. xxiii. 35, where he adduces this possibility among others; and still more instructively in Mat. xxvii. 9, where he just as simply assumes "Jeremiah" to be a corrupt reading<sup>29</sup> as his own editors assume that the "Apius" which occurs in the French version of the *Institutes* in connection with Josephus is due to a slip of his translators, not of his own—remarking: "It is evident that it cannot be Calvin who translated this passage."<sup>30</sup> His assurance that it cannot be the Biblical writer who stumbles leads him similarly to attribute what seems to him a manifest error to the copyists. It is only, however, in such passages as these that he engages formally in textual emendation. Ordinarily he simply follows the current text, although he is, of course, not without an intelligent ground for his confidence in it.<sup>31</sup> As we cursorily read his com-

<sup>28</sup> Comment on John viii. 1 (Meyrueis' ed. of the Commentaries, II. 169).

<sup>29</sup> Quomodo Jeremiae nomen obrepserit, me nescire fateor, nec anxie laboro; certe Jeremiae nomen errore positum esse pro Zacharia res ipsa ostendit; quia nihil tale apud Jeremiam legitur.

<sup>30</sup> *Opera*. III. 100, note 3.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. J. Cramer, as cited, pp. 116-117: "Calvin does not largely busy

mentaries we feel ourselves in the hands of one who is sanely and sagely scrutinizing the text with which he is dealing from the point of view of a scholar accustomed to deal with ancient texts, whose confidence in its general integrity represents the well-grounded conclusion of a trained judgment. His occasional remarks on the text, and his rare suggestion of a corruption, are indicia of the alertness of his general scrutiny of the text and serve to assure us that his acceptance of it as a whole as sound is, not merely inert acquiescence in tradition, but represents the calm judgment of an instructed intelligence.

#### INSPIRATION OF SCRIPTURE.

Now, these sixty-six books of canonical Scriptures handed down to us, in the singular providence of God,<sup>32</sup> in a sound text which meets the test of critical scrutiny, Calvin held to be the very Word of God. This assertion he intended in its simplest and most literal sense. He was far from overlooking the fact that the Scriptures were written by human hands: he expressly declares that, though we have received them from God's own mouth, we have nevertheless received them "through the ministry of men".<sup>33</sup> But he was equally far from conceiving that the relation of their human authors to their divine author resembled in any degree that of free intermediaries, who, after receiving the divine word, could do with it what they listed.<sup>34</sup> On the

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himself with textual criticism. He follows the text which was generally received in his day. It deserves notice only that he exercises a free and independent judgment and recognizes the rights of science." Cramer adduces his treatment of I Jno. v. 7 and proceeds: "He comes forward on scientific grounds against the Vulgate. The decree of Trent that this version must be followed as 'authentic', he finds silly; and reverence for it as if it had fallen down from heaven, ludicrous. 'How can anyone dispute the right to appeal to the original text? And what a bad version this is! There are scarcely three verses in any page well rendered' (*Acta Synod. Trident.*, etc., pp. 414-416)."

<sup>32</sup> *Institutes*, I. vii. 10. Cf. I. vi. 203.

<sup>33</sup> I. vii. 5 *init*: "We have received it from God's own mouth by the ministry of men."

<sup>34</sup> It is quite common to represent Calvin as without a theory, at



contrary, he thought of them rather as notaries (IV. vii. 9), who set down in authentic registers (I. vi. 3) what was dictated to them (*Augumentum in Ev.Joh.*).<sup>35</sup> They wrote, therefore, merely as the organs of the Holy Ghost, and did not speak *ex suo sensu*, not *humano impulsu*, not *sponte sua*, not *arbitrio suo*, but set out only *quae coelitus mandata fuerant*.<sup>36</sup> The diversity of the human authors thus disappears for Calvin before the unity of the Spirit, the sole

least an expressed theory, of the relation of the divine and human authors of Scripture. Thus J. Cramer, as cited, p. 103, says: "How we are to understand the relation of the divine and human activities through which the Scriptures were produced is not exactly defined by Calvin. A precise theory of inspiration such as we meet with in the later dogmaticians is not found in him." Cramer is only sure that Calvin did not hold to the theory which later Protestants upheld: "It is true that Calvin gave the impulse (from which the later dogmatic view of Scripture grew up), more than any other of the Reformers. But we must not forget that here we can speak of nothing more than the impulse. We nowhere find in Calvin such a magical conception of the Bible as we find in the later dogmaticians. It is true he used the term 'dictare' and other expressions which he employs under the influence of the terminology of his day, but on the other hand . . . in how many respects does he recognize the *human* factor in the Scriptures!" (p. 142). Similarly Pannier, as cited, p. 200: "In any case Calvin has not written a single word which can be appealed to in favor of *literal* inspiration. What is divine for him, if there is anything specifically divine beyond the contents, the brightness of which is reflected upon the container, is the *sense* of each book, or at most of each phrase,—never the employment of each word. Calvin would have deplored the petty dogmatics of the *Consensus Helveticus*, which declares the vowel points of the Hebrew text inspired, and the exaggerations of the theopneusty of the nineteenth century." Yet nothing is more certain than that Calvin held both to "verbal inspiration" and to "the inerrancy of Scripture", however he may have conceived the action of God which secured these things.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Otto Ritschl, *Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus*, 1908, I., p. 63: "If we may still entertain doubts whether Bullinger really defended the stricter doctrine of inspiration, it certainly is found in Calvin after 1543. He may have merely taken over from Butzer the expression *Spiritus Sancti amanuenses*; but it is peculiar to him that he conceives both the books of the Old Testament inclusively as contained in the historical enumerations, and those of the New Testament, as arising out of a verbal dictation of the Holy Spirit."

<sup>36</sup> These phrases are brought together by J. Cramer (as cited, pp. 102-3) from the Comments on 2 Tim. iii. 16 and 2 Pet. i. 20.

responsible author of Scripture, which is to him therefore not the *verba Dei*, but emphatically the *verbum Dei*.<sup>37</sup> It is a *Deo* (*Inst.* I. vii. 5); it has "come down to us from the very mouth of God" (I. vii. 5);<sup>38</sup> it has "come down from heaven as if the living words of God themselves were heard in it" (I. vii. 1);<sup>39</sup> and "we owe it therefore the same reverence which we owe to God Himself, since it has proceeded from Him alone, and there is nothing human mixed with it" (*Com.* on 2 Tim. iii. 16).<sup>40</sup> According to this declaration the Scriptures are altogether divine, and in them, as he puts it energetically in another place, "it is God who speaks with us and not mortal men" (*Com.* on 2 Pet. i. 20).<sup>41</sup> Accordingly, he cites Scripture everywhere not as the word of man but as the pure word of God. His "holy word" is "the scepter of God", every statement in which is "a heavenly oracle" which "cannot fail" (*Dedicatory Epistle* to the *Institutes*): in it God "opens His own sacred mouth" to add His direct word to the "voice" of His mute creatures (I. vi. 1). To say "Scripture says" and to say "the Holy Ghost says" is all one. We contradict the Holy Spirit, says Calvin—meaning the Scriptures—when we deny to Christ the name of Jehovah or anything which belongs to the majesty of Jehovah (I. xiii. 23). "The Holy Spirit pronounces", says he, . . . "Paul declares . . . the Scriptures condemns . . . wherefore it is not surprising if the Holy Spirit reject"—all in one running context, meaning ever the same thing (I. v. 13): just as in another context he uses interchangeably the "commandments of

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Pannier, as cited, p. 203: "The Word of God is for him one, *verbum Dei*, and not *verba Dei*. The diversity of authors disappears before the unity of the Spirit."

<sup>38</sup> Ab ipsissimo Dei ore ad nos fluxuissi.

<sup>39</sup> E coelo fluxuissi, acsi vivae ipsae Dei voces illic exaudirentur.

<sup>40</sup> Hoc prius est membrum, eandem scripturae reverentiam deberi quam Deo deferimus, quia ad eo solo manavit, nec quicquam humani habet admixtum.

<sup>41</sup> Justa reverentia inde nascitur, quam statuimus, Deum nobiscum loqui, non homines mortales.

Christ" and the "authority of Scripture" of the same thing. (*Dedicatory letter.*)

It may be that Calvin has nowhere given us a detailed discussion of the mode of the divine operation in giving the Scriptures. He is sure that they owe their origin to the divine gift (I. vi. 1, 2, 3) and that God has so given them that they are emphatically His word, as truly as if we were listening to His living voice speaking from heaven (I. vii. 1): and, as we have seen, he is somewhat addicted to the use of language which, strictly taken, would imply that the mode of their gift was "dictation". The Scriptures are 'public records' (I. vi. 2), their human authors have acted as 'notaries' (IV. viii. 9). who have set down nothing of their own, but only what has been dictated to them, so that there appears no admixture of what is human in their product (on 2 Tim. iii. 16).<sup>42</sup> It is not unfair to urge, how-

<sup>42</sup> The account of Calvin's doctrine of inspiration given by E. Rabaud, *Histoire de la doctrine de l'inspiration . . . dans les pays de langue française* (1883), pp. 52 sq., is worth comparing. Calvin's thought on this subject, he tells us, was more precise and compact than that of the other Reformers, although even his conception of inspiration was far from possessing perfectly firm contours or supplying the elements of a really systematic view (52). He was the first, nevertheless, to give the subject of Sacred Scripture a fundamental, theoretic treatment, led thereto not by the pressure of controversy, but by the logic of his systematic thought: for his doctrine of inspiration (not yet distinguished from revelation) is one of the essential bases, if not the very point of departure of his dogmatics (55). To him "the Bible is manifestly the word of God, in which he reveals himself to men", and as such "proceeds from God". "But" (pp. 56 sq.) "the action of God does not, in Calvin's view, transform the sacred authors into machines. Jewish verbalism, Scriptural materialism, may be present in germ in the ideas of the *Institutes*—and the cold intellects of certain doctors of the Protestant scholasticism of the next century developed them—but they are very remote from the thought of the Reformer. Chosen and ordained by God, the Biblical writers were subject to a higher impulse; they received a divine illumination which increased the energy of their natural faculties; they understood the Revelation better and transmitted it more faithfully. It was scarcely requisite for this, however, that they should be passive instruments, simple secretaries, pens moved by the Holy Spirit. Appointed but intelligent organs of the divine thought, far from being subject to a dictation, in complete obedience to the immediate will of God, they acted under the impulsion of a personal

ever, that this language is figurative; and that what Calvin has in mind is not to insist that the mode of inspiration was dictation, but that the result of inspiration is as if it were by dictation, viz., the production of a pure word of God free from all human admixtures. The term "dictation" was no doubt in current use at the time to express rather the effects than the mode of inspiration.<sup>43</sup> This being allowed,

faith which God communicated to them. 'Now, whether God was manifested to men by visions or oracles, what is called celestial witness, or ordained men as His ministers who taught their successors by tradition, it is in every case certain that He impressed on their hearts such a certitude of the doctrine, that they were persuaded and convinced that what had been revealed and preached to them proceeded from the true God: for He always ratified His word so as to secure for it a credit above all human opinion. Finally, that the truth might uninterruptedly remain continually in vigor from age to age, and be known in the world, He willed that the revelations which He had committed to the hands of the Fathers as a deposit, should be put on record: and it was with this design that He had the Law published, to which he afterwards added the Prophets as its expositors' (*Institutes*, I. vi. 2). These few lines resume in summary form the very substance of Calvin's doctrine of inspiration. We may conclude from it that he did not give himself to the elaboration of this dogma, with the tenacity and logical rigor which his clear and above all practical genius employed in the study and systematization of other points of the new doctrine. We shall seek in vain a precise declaration on the mode of revelation, on the extent and intensity of inspiration, on the relation of the book and the doctrine. None of these questions, as we have already had occasion to remark, had as yet been raised: the doctors gave themselves to what was urgent and did not undertake to prove or discuss what was not yet either under discussion or attacked. The principle which was laid down sufficed them. God had spoken—this was the faith which every consciousness of the time received without repugnance, and against which no mind raised an objection. To search out how He did it was wholly useless: to undertake to prove it, no less so" (p. 58). There is evident in this passage a desire to minimize Calvin's view of the divinity of Scripture; the use of the passage from I. vi. 2 as the basis of an exposition of his doctrine of inspiration is indicative of this—whereas it obviously is a very admirable account of how God has made known His will to men and preserved the knowledge of it through time. The double currents of desire to be true to Calvin's own exposition of his doctrine and yet to withhold his *imprimatur* from what the author believes to be an overstrained doctrine, produces some strange confusion in his further exposition.

<sup>43</sup>Cf. J. Cramer, as cited, p. 114: "How Calvin conceives of this

it is all the more unfair to urge that, Calvin's language being in this sense figurative, he is not to be understood as teaching that the effect of inspiration was the production of a pure word of God, free from all admixture of human error. This, on the contrary, is precisely what Calvin does teach, and that with the greatest strenuousness. He everywhere asserts that the effects of inspiration are such that God alone is the responsible author of the inspired product, that we owe the same reverence to it as to Him Himself, and should esteem the words as purely His as if we heard them proclaimed with His living voice from heaven; and that there is nothing human mixed with them. And he everywhere deals with them on that assumption. It is true that men have sought to discover in Calvin, particularly in his *Harmony of the Gospels*, acknowledgments of the presence of human errors in the fabric of Scripture.<sup>44</sup> But

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*dictare* by the Holy Ghost it is difficult to say. He borrowed it from the current ecclesiastical usage, which employed it of the *auctor primarius* of Scripture, as indeed also of tradition. Thus the Council of Trent uses the expression *dictante Spiritu Sancto* of the unwritten tradition inspired by the Holy Spirit." Otto Ritschl, *Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus*, I, 1908, p. 59, argues for taking the term strictly in Calvin. It is employed, it is true, in contemporary usage in the figurative sense, of the deliverances of the natural conscience, for example; and some Reformed writers use it of the internal testimony of the Spirit. Calvin also himself speaks as if he employed it of Scripture only figuratively,—e. g., *Corpus Ref.* xxix, p. 632: *verba quodammodo dictante Christi Spiritu*. Nevertheless, on the whole Ritschl thinks he meant it in the literal sense.

"Cf., e. g., J. Cramer, as cited, pp. 114-116, whose instances are followed in the remarks which succeed. Cf. also p. 125. How widespread this effort to discover in Calvin some acknowledgment of errors in Scripture has become may be seen by consulting the citations made by Dunlop Moore, *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, 1893, p. 60: he cites Cremer, van Oosterzee, Farrar. Cf. even A. H. Strong, *Syst. Theol.*, ed. 1907, vol. I, p. 217, whose list of "theological writers who admit the errancy of Scripture writers as to some matters unessential to their moral and spiritual teaching" requires drastic revision. Leipoldt (*Geschichte d. N. T. Kanons*, II, p. 169) says: "Fundamentally Calvin holds fast to the old doctrine of verbal inspiration. His sound historical sense leads him, here and there, it is true, to break through the bonds of this doctrine. In his harmony of the Gospels (*Commentarii*



these attempts rest on very crass misapprehensions of Calvin's efforts precisely to show that there are no such errors in the fabric of Scripture. When he explains, for example, that the purpose "of the Evangelists"—or "of the Holy Spirit", for he significantly uses these designations as synonyms—was not to write a chronologically exact record, but to present the general essence of things, this is not to allow that the Scriptures err humanly in their record of the sequences of time, but to assert that they intend to give no sequences of time and therefore cannot err in this regard. When again he suggests that an "error" has found its way into the text of Mat. xxvii. 9 or possibly into Mat. xxiii. 35, he is not speaking of the original, but of the transmitted text;<sup>45</sup> and it would be hard if he were not permitted to make such excursions into the region of textual criticism without laying himself open to the charge of denying his most assured conviction that nothing human is mixed with Scripture. In point of fact, Calvin not only asserts the freedom of Scripture as given by God from all error, but never in his detailed dealing with Scripture allows that such errors exist in it.<sup>45a</sup>

*in harmoniam ex Mat. et Lk. compositam*, 1555), *e. g.*, Calvin shows that the letters are not sacred to him; he moves much more freely here than Martin Chemnitz. But in other cases again Calvin draws strict consequences from the doctrine of verbal inspiration. He ascribes, *e. g.*, to all four Gospels precisely similar authority, although he (with Luther and Zwingli) considers John's gospel the most beautiful of them all."

<sup>45</sup> This is solidly shown, *e. g.*, by Dunlop Moore, as cited, pp. 61-62: also for Acts vii. 16.

<sup>45a</sup> Despite his tendency to lower Calvin's doctrine of inspiration with respect to its effects, J. Cramer in the following passage (as cited, pp. 120-121) gives in general a very fair statement of it: "We have seen that Calvin, although he has not given us a completed theory of inspiration, yet firmly believed in the inspiration of the entirety of Scripture. It is true we do not find in him the crass expressions of the later Reformed, as well as Lutheran, theologians. But the foundation on which they subsequently built—though somewhat onesidedly—is here. We cannot infer much from such expressions as 'from God', 'came from God', 'flowed from God'. Just as in Zwingli, these expressions were sometimes in Calvin synonyms of 'true'. Thus, at Titus ii. 12, he says

If we ask for the ground on which he asserts this high doctrine of inspiration, we do not see that any other reply can be given than that it was on the ground of the teaching of Scripture itself. The Scriptures were understood by Calvin to claim to be in this high sense the word of God; and a critical scrutiny of their contents brought to him nothing which seemed to him to negative this claim. There were other grounds on which he might and did base a firm confidence in the divine origin of the Scriptures and the trustworthiness of their teaching as a revelation from God. But there were no other grounds on which he could or did rest his conviction that these Scriptures are so from God that there is nothing human mixed with them, and their every affirmation is to be received with the deference which is due to the living voice of God speaking from heaven. On

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he cannot understand why so many are unwilling to draw upon profane writers,—‘for, since all truth is from God (*a Deo*), if anything has been said well and truly by profane men, it ought not to be rejected, for it has come from God (*a Deo est profectum*)’. More significant are such expressions as, ‘nothing human is mixed with Scripture’, ‘we owe to them the same reverence as to God’, God ‘is the author of Scripture’ and as such has ‘dictated’ (*dictavit*) all that the Apostles and Prophets have written, so that we must not depart from the word of God in even the smallest particular’, etc. All this applies not only to the Scriptures as a whole, not merely to their fundamental ideas and chief contents, but to all the sixty-six books severally. In contradistinction from the Apocrypha, they have been given by the Holy Spirit (*Préface mise en tête des livres apocryphes de l’Ancien Test.: Corp. Ref.* ix. 827). The book of Acts ‘beyond question is the product of the Holy Spirit Himself’, Mark ‘wrote nothing but what the Holy Spirit gave him to write’, etc. To think here merely of a providential direction by God, in the sense that God took care that His people should lack nothing of a Scriptural record of His revelation—is impossible. For, however often Calvin may have directed attention to such a ‘*singularis providentiae cura*’ (*Inst.*, V. vi. 2, *cf.* I. viii. 10; *Argument in Joh.*) with respect to Scripture, he yet saw something over and above this in the production of the sacred books. He looked upon them as the writings of God Himself, who, through an extraordinary operation of His Spirit, guarded His amanuenses from *all* error as well when they transmitted histories as when they propounded the doctrine of Christ. Thus to him Scripture (naturally in its original text) was a complete work of God, to which nothing could be added and from which nothing could be taken away.”

these other grounds Calvin was led to trust the teaching of the Scriptures as a divine revelation: and he therefore naturally trusted their teaching as to their own nature and inspiration.

Such, then, are the Scriptures as conceived by Calvin: sixty-six sacred books, "dictated" by God to His "notaries" that they might, in this "public record", stand as a perpetual special revelation of Himself to His people, to supplement or to supersede in their case the general revelation which he gives of Himself in His works and deeds, but which is rendered ineffective by the sin-bred disabilities of the human soul. For this, according to Calvin, is the account to give of the origin of Scripture, and this the account to give of the function it serves in the world. It was because man in His sinful imbecility was unable to profit by the general revelation which God has spread before all eyes, so that they are all without excuse (I. vi. 1), that God in His goodness gave to "those whom He intended to unite in a more close and familiar connection with Himself", a special revelation in open speech (I. vi. 1). And it was because of the mutability of the human mind, prone to errors of all kinds, corrupting the truth, that He committed this His special revelation to writing, that it might never be inaccessible to "those to whom He determined to make His instructions effectual" (I. vi. 3). In Calvin's view, therefore, the Scriptures are a documentation of God's special revelation of Himself unto salvation (I. v. 1, *ad init.*); but a documentation cared for by God Himself, so that they are, in fine, themselves the special revelation of God unto salvation in documentary form (I. vi. 2, 3). The necessity for the revelation documented in them arises from the blindness of men in their sin: the necessity for the documentation of this revelation arises from the instability of men, even when taught of God. We must conceive of special revelation, and of the Scriptures as just its documentation, therefore, as not precisely a cure, but rather an assistance to man dulled in his sight so as not to be able to perceive God in His

general revelation. "For", says Calvin, "as persons who are old, or whose eyes have somehow become dim, if you show them the most beautiful book, though they perceive that something is written there, can scarcely read two words together, yet by the aid of spectacles will begin to read distinctly,—so the Scripture . . . " etc. (I. vi. 1). The function of Scripture thus, as special revelation documented, is to serve as spiritual spectacles to enable those of dulled spiritual sight to see God.

Of course, the Scriptures do more than this. They not only reveal the God of Nature more brightly to the sin-darkened eye; they reveal also the God of Grace, who may not be found in nature. Calvin does not overlook this wider revelation embodied in them: he particularly adverts to it (I. vi. 1). But he turns from it for the moment as less directly germane to his present object, which is to show that without the "spectacles" of Scripture, sinful man would not be able to attain to a sound knowledge of even God the Creator. It is on this, therefore, that he now insists. It was only because God revealed Himself in this special, supernatural way to them, that our first fathers—"Adam, Noah, Abraham and the rest of the patriarchs"—were able to retain him in their knowledge (I. vi. 1). It was only through this special revelation, whether renewed to them by God, or handed down in tradition, "by the ministry of men", that their posterity continued in the knowledge of God (I. vi. 2). "At length, that the truth might remain in the world in a continual course of instruction to all ages, God determined that the same oracles which He deposited with the patriarchs, should be committed to public records"—first the Law, then the Prophets, and then the books of the New Covenant (I. vi. 2, 3). It is now, therefore, only through these Scriptures that man can attain to a true knowledge of God. The revelation of God in His works is not useless: it makes all men without excuse; it provides an additional though lower and less certain revelation of God to His people—to a consideration of which all should

seriously apply themselves, though they should principally attend to the Word (I. vi. 2). But experience shows that without the Word the sinful human mind is too weak to reach a sound knowledge of God, and therefore without it men wander in vanity and error. Calvin seems to speak sometimes almost as if the Scriptures, that is special revelation, wholly superseded general revelation (I. v. 12 *ad fin.*; vi. 2 *ad fin.*; 4 *ad fin.*). More closely scrutinized it becomes evident, however, that he means only that in the absence of Scripture, that is of special revelation, the general revelation of God is ineffective to preserve any sound knowledge of Him in the world: but in the presence of Scripture, general revelation is not set aside, but rather brought back to its proper validity. (The real relation between general and special revelation, as the matter lay in Calvin's mind, thus proves to be, not that the one supersedes the other, but that special revelation supplements general revelation indeed, but in the first instance rather repeats and by repeating vivifies and vitalizes general revelation, and flows confluent in with it to the one end of both, the knowledge of God (I. vi. 2).) What special revelation is, therefore,—and the Scriptures as its documentation—is very precisely represented by the figure of the spectacles. It is aid to the dulled vision of sinful man, to enable it to see God.

The question forcibly presents itself, however, whether "spectacles" will serve the purpose here. Has not Calvin painted the sin-bred blindness of men too blackly to encourage us to think it can be corrected by such an aid to any remainders of natural vision which may be accredited to them? The answer must be in the affirmative. But this only opens the way to point out that Calvin does not present special revelation, or the Scriptures as special revelation documented, as the entire cure, but places by the side of it the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti*. Special revelation, or Scripture as its documented form, provides in point of fact, in the view of Calvin, only the objective side of the cure he finds has been provided by God. The subjective side



is provided by the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti*. The spectacles are provided by the Scriptures: the eyes are opened that they may see even through these spectacles, only by the witness of the Spirit in the heart. We perceive, then, that in Calvin's view the figure of the spectacles is a perfectly just one. He means to intimate that special revelation alone will not produce a knowledge of God in the human soul: that something more than external aid is needed before it can see: and to leave the way open to proceed to point out what further is required that sinful man may see God. Sinful man, we say again: for the whole crux lies there. Had there been no sin, there would have been no need of even special revelation. In the light of the splendid revelation of Himself which God has displayed in the theatre of nature, man with his native endowment of instinctive knowledge of God would have bloomed out into a full and sound knowledge of Him. But with sinful man, the matter is wholly different. He needs more light and he needs something more than light—he needs the power of sight.<sup>46</sup> That we may apprehend Calvin's thought, therefore, we must turn to the consideration of his doctrine of the Testimony of the Spirit.

### III. THE TESTIMONY OF THE SPIRIT.

What is Calvin's doctrine of the Testimony of the Spirit?

The particular question which Calvin addresses himself

<sup>46</sup> In I. vi. 14 Calvin says that the Apostle in Heb. xi. 3, 'By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God' wishes to intimate that "the invisible divinity *was represented* indeed by such displays of His power, but that we have no eyes *to perceive it* unless they are illuminated through faith by the inner revelation of God" (*Invisibilem divinitatem representari quidem talibus spectaculis, sed ad eam perspicendam non esse nobis oculos, nisi interiore Dei revelatione per fidem illuminatur*). Here he distinguishes between the external, objective representation, and the internal, subjective preparation to perceive this representation. God is objectively revealed in His works: man in his sins is blind to this revelation: the interior operation of God is an opening of man's eyes: man then sees. The operation of God is therefore a palingenesis. This passage is already in ed. 1539 (I. 291); the last clause (*nisi . . .*) is not, however, reproduced in the French versions of either 1541 or 1560 (III. 60).

to when he turns to the consideration of what he calls the testimony of the Spirit concerns the accrediting of Scripture, not the assimilation of its revelatory contents. The reader cannot fail to experience some disappointment at this. The whole development of the discussion hitherto undoubtedly fosters the expectation, not, indeed, of an exclusive treatment of the assimilation of special revelation by sinful man—for both problems are raised by it and the two problems are at bottom one and their solution one—but certainly of some formal treatment of it, and indeed of such a treatment of the double problem that the stress should be laid on this. Calvin, however, is preoccupied with the problem of the accrediting of Scripture. This is due in part, doubtless, to its logical priority: as he himself remarks, we cannot “be established in the belief of the doctrine, till we are indubitably persuaded that God is its Author” (I. vii. 4 *init.*). But it was rendered almost inevitable by the state of the controversy with Rome, who intrenched herself in the position that the Protestant appeal to Scripture as over against the Church was inoperative, seeing that it is only by the Church that the Scriptures can be established in authority: for who but the Church can assure us that these Scriptures are from God, or indeed what books enter into the fabric of Scripture, or whether they have come down to us uncorrupted? As a practical man writing to practical men for a practical purpose, Calvin could not fail, perhaps, to give his primary attention to the aspect of the problem he had raised which was most immediately pressing. But this scarcely prepares us for the almost total neglect of its other aspect, with the effect that the construction of his general doctrine is left with a certain appearance of incompleteness. Not really incomplete; for the solution of the one problem is, as we have already suggested, the solution of the other also; and even the cursory reader—or perhaps we may say especially the cursory reader—may well be trusted to feel this as he is led on through the discussion, particularly as there are not lacking repeated suggestions of

it, and the discussion closes with a direct reference to it and a formal postponement of the particular discussion of the other aspect of the double problem to a later portion of the treatise. "I pass over many things for the present", says Calvin, "because this subject will present itself for discussion in another place. Only, let it be known here that that alone is true faith which the Spirit of God seals in our hearts. And with this one reason every reader of docility and modesty will be satisfied" (I. vii. 5, near the end). That is as much as to say, This whole subject is only one application of the general doctrine of faith; and as the general doctrine of faith is fully discussed at another place in this treatise, we may content ourselves here with the somewhat incomplete remarks we have made upon this special application of that doctrine; we only need to remind the reader that there is no true faith except that which is begotten in the soul by the Holy Spirit.

We can scarcely wonder that Calvin contents himself with this simple reference of the topic now engaging his attention, as a specific case, to the generic doctrine of faith, when we pause to realize how nearly this simple reference of it, as a species to its genus, comes to a sufficient exposition of it. We shall stop now to signalize only two points which are involved in this reference, the noting of which will greatly facilitate our apprehension of Calvin's precise meaning in his doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit to the divinity of Scripture. This doctrine is no isolated doctrine with Calvin, standing out of relation with the other doctrines of his system: it is but one application of his general doctrine of faith; or to be more specific, one application of his general doctrine of the function of the Holy Spirit in the production of faith. Given Calvin's general doctrine of the work of the Holy Spirit in applying salvation, and his specific doctrine of the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* in the attestation of Scripture, and in the applying of its doctrine as well, was inevitable. It is but one application of the general doctrine that there is no true faith except that which

the Spirit of God seals in our hearts. For Calvin in this doctrine—and this is the second point we wish to signalize—has in mind specifically “true faith”. He is not asking here how the Scriptures may be proved to be from God. If that had been the question he was asking, he would not have hesitated to say that the testimony of the Church is conclusive of the fact. He does say so. “The universal judgment of the Church” (I. vii. 3, *fin.*) he represents as a very useful argument, “the consent of the Church” (I. viii. 12, *init.*) as a very important consideration, in establishing the divine origin of the Scriptures: although, of course, he does not conceive the Church as lending her authority to Scripture “when she receives and seals it with her suffrage”, but rather as performing a duty of piety to herself in recognizing what is true apart from her authentication, and treating it with due veneration (I. vii. 2, *ad fin.*). For what is more her duty than “obediently to embrace what is from God as the sheep hear the voice of the shepherd”?<sup>47</sup> Were it a matter of proving the Scriptures to be the Word of God, Calvin would, again, have been at no loss for rational arguments which he was ready to pronounce irresistible. He does adduce such arguments and he does pronounce them irresistible. He devotes a whole chapter to the adduction of these arguments (ch. viii),—such arguments as these: the dignity of the subject-matter of Scripture—the heavenliness of its doctrine and the consent of all its parts— (§ 1), the majesty of its style (§ 2), the antiquity of its teaching (§ 3), the sincerity of its narrative (§ 4), its miraculous accompaniment, circumstantially confirmed (§§ 5, 6), its predictive contents authenticated by fulfilment

<sup>47</sup> In his response to the Augsburg Interim (*Vera Ecclesiae reformationae ratio*, 1548) he allows it to be the *proprium ecclesiae officium* to *scripturas veras a suppositis discernere*; but only that *obedienter amplectitur, quicquid Dei est*, as the sheep hear the voice of the shepherd. It is nevertheless *sacrilega impietas ecclesiae iudicio submittere sacrasancta Dei oracula*. See J. Cramer, as cited, p. 104, note 3. Cramer remarks in expounding Calvin's view: “By the approbation she gives to them”—the books of Scripture—“the Church does not make them authentic, but only yields her homage to the truth of God.”

(§§ 7, 8), its continuous use through so many ages (§§ 9-12), its sealing by martyr blood (§ 13): and these arguments he is so far from considering weak and inconclusive (I. viii. 13 *med.*) that he represents them rather as capable of completely vindicating the Scriptures against all the subtleties of their calumniators (*ibid.*). Nay, he declares that the proofs of the divine origin of the Scriptures are so cogent, as "certainly to evince, if there is a God in heaven, that He is the author of the Law, and the Prophecies, and the Gospel" (I. vii. 4, near the beginning); as to extort with certainty from all who are not wholly lost to shame, the confession of the divine gift of the Scriptures (*ibid.*).<sup>48</sup> "Though I am far from possessing any peculiar dexterity" in argument "or eloquence", he says, "yet were I to contend with the most subtle despisers of God, who are ambitious to display their wit and their skill in weakening the authority of Scripture, I trust I should be able without difficulty to silence their obstreperous clamor" (*ibid.*). But objective proofs—whether the conclusive testimony of witnesses, or the overwhelming evidence of rational considerations,—be they never so cogent,<sup>49</sup> he does not consider of themselves capable of producing "true faith". And it is "true faith",

<sup>48</sup> It would require that we should be wholly hardened (*nisi ad perditam impudentiam obdurerint*) that we should not perceive that the doctrine of Scripture is heavenly, that we should not have the confession wrung from us that there are manifest signs in Scripture that it is God who speaks in and through it (*extorquebitur illis haec confessio, manifesta signa loquentis Dei conspici in Scriptura ex quibus pateat coelestem esse ejus doctrinam*)—I. vii. 4.

<sup>49</sup> The exact relations of the "proofs" to the divinity of Scripture, which Calvin teaches, was sufficiently clear to be caught by his successors. It is admirably stated in the Westminster Confession of Faith, I. v. And we may add that the same conception is stated also very precisely by Quenstedt: "These motives, as well internal as external, by which we are led to the knowledge of the authority of Scripture, make the theopneusty of Sacred Scripture probable, and produce a certitude which is not merely conjectural but moral: they do not make the divinity of Scripture infallible and altogether indubitable." That is to say, they are not of the nature of *demonstration*, but nevertheless give moral certitude: the testimony of the Spirit is equivalent to demonstration,—as is the deliverance of any simply acting sense.



we repeat, that Calvin has in mind in his doctrine of the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*. If it seemed to him a small matter that man should know that God is if he did not know what God is, it equally seemed to him a small matter that man should know what God is, in the paradigms of the intellect, if he did not really know this God in the intimacy of communion which that phrase imports. And equally it seemed to him utterly unimportant that a man should be convinced by stress of rational evidence that the Scriptures are the Word of God, unless he practically embraced these Scriptures as the Word of God and stayed his soul upon them. The knowledge of God which Calvin has in mind in this whole discussion is, thus, a vital and vitalizing knowledge of God, and the attestation of Scripture which he is seeking is not an attestation merely to the intelligence of men, compelling from them perhaps a reluctant judgment of the intellect alone (since those convinced against their will, as the proverb has it, are very apt to remain of the same opinion still), but such an attestation as takes hold of the whole man in the roots of his activities and controls all the movements of his soul.

This is so important a consideration for the exact apprehension of Calvin's doctrine that it may become us to pause and assure ourselves of the simple matter of fact from the language which Calvin employs of it in the course of the discussion. We shall recall that from the introduction of the topic of special revelation he has in mind and keeps before his readers' mind its destination for the people of God alone. The provisions for producing a knowledge of God, consequent on the inefficiency of natural revelation, Calvin is careful to explain, are not for all men, but for "the elect" (I. vi. 1), or, as they are more fully described, "those whom God intends to unite in a more close and familiar connection with Himself" (*ibid.*), "those to whom He determines to make His instructions effectual" (I. vi. 3). From the first provisions of His supernatural dealings, therefore, He "intends to make His instructions effectual".

More pointedly still he speaks of the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* as an act in which "God deigns to confer a singular power on His elect, whom He distinguishes from the rest of mankind" (I. vii. 5).<sup>50</sup> This singular power, now, is nothing else but "saving faith", and Calvin speaks of it in all the synonymy of "saving faith". He calls it "true faith" (I. vi. 5), "sound faith" (I. vii. 4), "firm faith" (I. viii. 13), "the faith of the pious" (I. vii. 3), "the certainty of the pious" (I. vii. 3), "that assurance which is essential to true piety" (I. vii. 4), "saving knowledge" (I. viii. 13), "a solid assurance of eternal life" (I. vii. 1). It is the thing which is naturally described by this synonymy which Calvin declares is not produced in the soul except by the testimony of the Holy Spirit. This obviously is nothing more than to declare that that faith which lays hold of Christ unto eternal life is the product of the Holy Spirit in the heart, and that it is one of the exercises of this faith to lay hold of the revelation of this Christ in the Scriptures with assured confidence, so that it is only he who is led by the Spirit who embraces these Scriptures with "sound faith", that is, "with that assurance which is essential to true piety" (I. vii. 4). What Calvin has in mind, in a word, is simply an extended comment on Paul's words: "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God . . . but he that is spiritual judgeth all things" (1 Cor. ii. 14, 15).<sup>51</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Pannier, as cited, pp. 257-8: "We see that this understanding of the Scriptures, this capacity to receive the testimony of the Spirit, is not, according to Calvin, possible for all; and that, less and less . . . He continually emphasises more and more the incapacity of man to persuade another of it, without the aid of God; but he emphasises still more progressively the impossibility of obtaining this aid if God does not accord it first. 1550 (I. viii, at end): 'Those who wish to prove to unbelievers by arguments that the Scriptures are from God are inconsiderate; for this is known *only to faith*.' 1559 (I. vii. *in fine*): The mysteries of God are not understood, *except by those to whom it is given* . . . It is quite certain that the witness of the Spirit does not make itself felt except to believers, and is not *in itself* an apologetic means with respect to unbelievers . . . The *natural* man receiveth not spiritual things."

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Pannier, as cited, pp. 195-6: "First let us recall this,—for

Calvin does not leave us, however, to gather from general remarks referring it to its class or to infer from its general effects, what he means by the testimony of the Spirit of God to the divinity of Scripture, but describes for us its nature and indicates the mode of its operation and specific effects with great exactitude.<sup>52</sup> He tells us that it is a

Calvin this testimony of the Holy Spirit is only one act of the great drama which is enacted in the entire soul of the religious man, and in which the Holy Spirit holds always the principal rôle. While the later dogmatists make the Holy Spirit, so to speak, function mechanically, at a given moment, in the pen of the prophets or in the brain of the readers, Calvin sees the Holy Spirit constantly active in the man whom He wishes to sanctify, and the fact that He leads him to recognize the divinity and the canonicity of the sacred books is only one manifestation,—a very important one, no doubt, but only a particular one,—of His general work." It is only, of course, the Lutheran and Rationalizing dogmatists who, constructively, subject the action of the Spirit to the direction of man—whether by making it rest on the application of the "means of grace" or on the action of the human will. Calvin and his followers—the Reformed—make the act of man depend on the free and sovereign action of the Spirit.

<sup>52</sup>J. Cramer, as cited, pp. 122-3, somewhat understates this, but in the main catches Calvin's meaning: "Calvin does not, it is true, tell us in so many words precisely what this *testimonium sp. s.* is, but it is easy to gather it from the whole discussion. He is thinking of the Holy Spirit, who, as the Spirit of our adoption as children, leads us to say Amen to the Word which the Father speaks in the Holy Scriptures to His children. He even says expressly in *Inst.* I. vii. 4: 'As if the Spirit was not called "seal" and "earnest" just because He confers faith on the pious.' But more plainly still, and indeed so that no doubt can remain, we find it in Beza, the most beloved and talented pupil of Calvin, who assuredly also in his conception of Scripture was the most thoroughly imbued with the spirit of his teacher. In his reply to Castellion, Beza says: 'The testimony of the Spirit of adoption does not lie properly in this, that we believe to be true what the Scriptures testify (for this is known also to the devils and to many of the lost), but rather in this,—that each applies to himself the promise of salvation in Christ of which Paul speaks in Rom. viii. 15, 16.' Accordingly a few lines further down he speaks of a 'testimony of adoption and free justification in Christ'. In the essence of the matter Calvin will have meant just this by his testimony of the Holy Spirit." . . . Beza's words are in his *Ad defensiones et reprehensiones Seb. Castellionis* (*Th. Bezae Vezelii Opera*, i, Geneva, 1582, p. 503): *Testimonium Spiritus adoptionis non in eo proprie positum est ut credamus verum esse quod Scriptura testatur (nam hoc ipsum quoque sciunt diaboli et reprobi multi), sed in eo potius ut quisque sibi salutis in Christo*

"secret" (I. vii. 4), "internal" (I. vii. 13), "inward" (I. vii. 5) action of the Holy Spirit on the soul, by which the soul is "illuminated" (I. vii. 3, 4, 5), so as to perceive their true quality in the Scriptures as a divine book. We may call this "an inward teaching" of the Spirit which produces "entire acquiescence in the Scriptures", so that they are self-authenticating to the mind and heart (I. vii. 5); or we may call it a "secret testimony of the Spirit", by which our minds and hearts are convinced with a firmness superior to all reason that the Scriptures are from God (I. vii. 4). In both instances we are using figurative language. Precisely what is produced by the hidden internal operation of the Spirit on the soul is a new spiritual sense (*sensus*, I. vii. 5, near end), by which the divinity of Scripture is perceived as by an intuitive perception. "For the Scripture exhibits as clear evidence of its truth, as white and black things do of their color, and sweet and bitter things of their taste" (I. vii. 2, end): and we need only a sense to discern its divine quality to be convinced of it with the same immediacy and finality as we are convinced by their mere perception of light or darkness, of whiteness or blackness, of sweetness

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promissionem applicet, de qua re agit Paulus, Rom. viii. 15, 16." . . . That it was generally understood in the first age that this was the precise nature of the witness of the Spirit is shown by its definition in this sense not only by the Reformed, but by the Lutherans. For example, Hollaz defines thus: "The testimony of the Holy Spirit is the supernatural act (*actus supernaturalis*) of the Holy Spirit by means of the Word of God attentively read or heard (His own divine power having been communicated to the Scriptures) by which the heart of man is moved, opened, illuminated, turned to the obedience of faith, so that the illuminated man out of these internal spiritual movements truly perceives the Word which is propounded to him to have proceeded from God, and gives it therefore his unwavering assent." The Lutheranism of this definition resides in the clauses: "By means of the Word of God" . . . "His own divine power having been communicated to the Scriptures" . . . which make the action of the Holy Spirit to be from out of the Word, in which He dwells *intrinsicus*. But the nature of the testimony of the Spirit is purely conceived as an act of the Holy Spirit by which the heart of man is renewed to spiritual perception, in the employment of which he perceives the divine quality of Scripture.

or bitterness (*ibid.*). No conclusions based on "reasoning" or "proofs" or founded on human judgment can compare in clearness or force with such a conviction, which is instinctive and immediate, and finds its ultimate ground and sanction in the Holy Spirit who has wrought in the heart this spiritual sense which so functions in recognizing the divine quality of Scripture. Illuminated by the Spirit of God, we believe, therefore, not on the ground of our own judgment, or on the ground of the judgment of others, but with a certainty above all human judgment, by a spiritual intuition.<sup>53</sup> With the utmost explicitness Calvin so describes this instinctive conviction in a passage of great vigor: "It is, therefore", says he, "such a persuasion as requires no reasons; such a knowledge as is supported by the highest reason and in which the mind rests with greater security and constancy than in any reasons; in fine, such a sense as cannot be produced but by a revelation from heaven" (I. vii. 5).<sup>54</sup> Here we are told that it is a *persuasio*, or rather a *notitia*, or rather a *sensus*. It is a persuasion which does not require reasons,—that is to say, it is a state of conviction not induced by arguments, but by direct perception: it is, that is to say, a knowledge, a direct perception in accord with the highest reason, in which the mind rests, with an assurance not attainable by reasoning; or to be more explicit still, it is a sense which comes only from divine gift. As we have implanted in us by nature a sense which distinguishes between light and darkness, a sense which distinguishes between sweet and bitter, and the verdict of these senses is immediate and final; so we have planted in us by the creative action of the Holy Spirit a sense for the divine, and its verdict, too, is immediate and

<sup>53</sup> *Supra humanum iudicium, certo certius constituimus (non secus ac si ipsius Dei numen illic intueremur) hominum ministerio, ab ipsissimo Dei ore ad nos fluxisse* (I. vii. 5).

<sup>54</sup> *Talis ergo est persuasio quae rationes non requirat; talis notitia, cui optima ratio constet: nempe in qua securius constantiusque mens quiescit quam in ullis rationibus; talis denique sensus, qui nisi ex coelesti revelatione nasci nequeat* (I. vii. 5).



final: the spiritual man discerneth all things. Such, in briefest outline, is Calvin's famous doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit.

#### MODE OF THIS TESTIMONY.

Certain further elucidations of its real meaning and bearing appear, however, to be necessary, to guard against misapprehension of it. When we speak of an internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, it is evident that we must conceive it as presenting itself in one of three ways. It may be conceived as of the nature of an immediate revelation to each man to whom it is given. It may be conceived as of the nature of a blind conviction produced in the minds of its recipients. It may be conceived as of the nature of a grounded conviction, formed in their minds by the Spirit, by an act which rather terminates immediately on the faculties, enabling and effectively persuading them to reach a conviction on grounds presented to them, than produces the conviction itself, apart from or without grounds. In which of these ways did Calvin conceive the testimony of the Spirit as presenting itself? As revelation, or as ungrounded faith, or as grounded faith?

Certainly not the first. The testimony of the Spirit was not to Calvin of the nature of a propositional "revelation" to its recipients. Of this he speaks perfectly explicitly, and indeed in his polemic against Anabaptist mysticism insistently. He does indeed connect the term "revelation" with the testimony of the Spirit, declaring it, for example, such a sense (*sensus*) as can be produced by nothing short of "a revelation from heaven" (I. vii. 5, near end). But his purpose in the employment of this language is not to describe it according to its nature, but to claim for it with emphasis a heavenly source: he means merely to assert that it is not earth-born, but God-wrought, while at the same time he intimates that in its nature it is not a propositional revelation, but an instinctive "sense". That he did not conceive of it as a propositional revelation is made perfectly

clear by his explicit assertions at the opening of the discussion (I. vii. 1, *init.*), that we "are not favored with daily oracles from heaven", and that the Scriptures constitute the sole body of extant revelations from God. It is not to supersede nor yet to supplement these recorded revelations that the testimony of the Spirit is given us, he insists, but to confirm them (I. ix. 3): or, as he puts it in his polemic against the Anabaptists, "The office of the Spirit which is promised us is not to feign new and unheard of revelations, or to coin a new system of doctrine, which would seduce us from the received doctrine of the Gospel, but to seal to our minds the same doctrine which the Gospel delivers" (I. ix. 1 *init.*).

In this polemic against the Anabaptists (ch. ix) he gives us an especially well-balanced account of the relations which in his view obtain between the revelation of God and the witness of the Spirit. If he holds that the revelation of God is ineffective without the testimony of the Spirit, he holds equally that the testimony of the Spirit is inconceivable without the revelation of God embodied in the Word. He even declares that the Spirit is no more the agent by which the Word is impressed on the heart than the Word is the means by which the illumination of the Spirit takes effect. "If apart from the Spirit of God we are utterly destitute of the light of truth", he says (I. ix. 3, *ad fin.*), "equally the Word is the instrument by which the Lord dispenses to believers the illumination of the Spirit." So far as the knowledge of the truth is concerned, we are as helpless, then, without the Word as we are without the Spirit, for the whole function of the Spirit with respect to the truth is, not to reveal to us the truth anew, much less to reveal to us new truth, but efficaciously to confirm the Word, revealed in the Scriptures, to us, and efficaciously to impress it on our hearts (I. ix. 3). This Calvin makes superabundantly plain by an illustration and a didactic statement of great clearness. The illustration (I. ix. 3) is drawn from our Lord's dealings with His two disciples with whom after

His rising He walked to Emmaus. "He opened their understandings", Calvin explains, "not that rejecting the Scriptures they might be wise of themselves, but that they might understand the Scriptures." Such also, he says, is the testimony of the Spirit to-day: for what is it—and this is the didactic statement to which we have referred—but an enabling of us by the light of the Spirit to behold the divine countenance in the Scriptures that so our minds may be filled with a solid reverence for the Word (I. ix. 3)? Here we have the nature of the testimony of the Spirit, and its manner of working and its effects, announced to us in a single clause. It is an illumination of our minds, by which we are enabled to see God in the Scriptures, so that we may reverence them as from Him.

Other effect that this Calvin explicitly denies to the testimony of the Spirit and defends his denial from the charge of inconsistency with the stress he has previously laid upon the necessity of this testimony (I. ix. 3). It is not to deny the necessity of this work of the Spirit, he argues, to confine it to the express confirmation of the Word and of the revelation contained therein. Nor is it derogatory to the Spirit to confine His operations now to the confirmation of the revealed Word. While on the other hand to attribute to Him repeated or new revelations to each of the children of God, as the mystics do, is derogatory to the Word, which is His inspired product. To lay claim to the possession of such a Spirit as this, he declares, is to lay claim to the possession of a different Spirit from that which dwelt in Christ and the Apostles—for their Spirit honored the Word—and a different spirit from that which was promised by Christ to His disciples—for this Spirit was "not to speak of Himself". It is to lay claim to a Spirit for whose divine mission and character, moreover, we lack all criterion—for how can we know that the Spirit that speaks in us is from God, save as He honors the Word of God (I. ix. 1 and 2)? From all which it is perfectly plain not only that Calvin did not conceive the testimony

of the Spirit as taking effect in the form of propositional revelations, but that he did conceive it as an operation of God the Holy Spirit in the heart of man which is so connected with the revelation of God in His Word, that it manifests itself only in conjunction with that revelation.

Calvin's formula here is, The Word and Spirit.<sup>55</sup> Only in the conjunction of the two can an effective revelation be made to the sin-darkened mind of man.<sup>56</sup> The Word supplies the objective factor; the Spirit the subjective factor: and only in the union of the objective and subjective factors is the result accomplished. The whole objective revelation of God lies, thus, in the Word. But the whole subjective capacitating for the reception of this revelation lies in the will of the Spirit. Either, by itself, is wholly ineffective to the result aimed at—the production of knowledge in the human mind. But when they unite, knowledge is not only rendered possible to man: it is rendered certain. And therefore it is that Calvin represents the provision for the knowledge of God both in the objective revelation in the Word and in the subjective testimony of the Spirit as destined by God not for men at large, but specifically for His

<sup>55</sup> Köstlin, as cited, p. 412-13, esp. 413, note a, adverts to this with a reference to Dorner, *Gesch. d. protest. Theologie*, 379, who makes it characteristic of Calvin in distinction from Zwingli to draw the outer and inner Word more closely together. The justice of Dorner's view, which would seem to assign to Calvin in his doctrine of the Word as a means of grace a position somewhere between Zwingli and Luther, may well be doubted. According to Dorner, Calvin "modified the looser connection between the outward and inward Word held by Zwingli and connected the two sides more closely together." "In reference, therefore, to the principle of the Reformation", he continues, "with its two sides, Calvin is still more than Zwingli, of one mind and spirit with the Lutheran Reformation" (E. T., I, p. 387). Again (I. 390): "The double form of the *Verbum Dei externum* and *internum*, held by Zwingli, gives place indeed in Calvin to a more inward connecting of the two sides; the Scriptures are according to him not merely the sign of an absent thing, but have in themselves divine matter and breath, which makes itself actively felt." We do not find that Calvin and Zwingli differ in this matter appreciably.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. his response to Sadolet (1539), *Op.* V. 393: *tuo igitur experimento disce non minus importunum esse spiritum jactare sine verbo, quam futurum sit, sine verbo ipsum obtendere.*

people, His elect, those "to whom He determined to make His instructions effectual" (I. vi. 3). The Calvinism of Calvin's doctrine of religious knowledge comes to clear manifestation here; and that not merely because of its implication of the doctrine of election, but also because of its implication of Calvin's specific doctrine of the means of grace. Already in his doctrine of religious knowledge, we find Calvin teaching that God is known not by those who choose to know Him, but by those by whom He chooses to be known: and this simply because the knowledge of God is God-given, and is therefore given to whom He will. Men do not wring the knowledge of God from a Deity reluctant to be known: God imparts the knowledge of Himself to men reluctant to know Him: and therefore none know Him save those to whom He efficaciously imparts, by His Word and Spirit, the knowledge of Himself. "By His Word and Spirit",—therein is expressed already the fundamental formula of the Calvinistic doctrine of the "means of grace". In that doctrine the Spirit is not, with the Lutherans, conceived as in the Word, conveyed and applied wherever the Word goes: nor is the Word, with the mystics, conceived as in the Spirit always essentially present wherever He is present in His power as a Spirit of revelation and truth. The two are severally contemplated, as separable factors, in the one work of God in producing the knowledge of Himself which is eternal life in the souls of His people; separable factors which must both, however, be present if this knowledge of God is to be produced. For it is the function of the Word to set before the soul the object to be believed; and it is the function of the Spirit to quicken in the soul belief in this object: and neither performs the work of the other or its own work apart from the other.

It still remains, however, to inquire precisely how Calvin conceived the Spirit to operate in bringing the soul to a hearty faith in the Word as a revelation from God. Are we to understand him as teaching that the Holy Spirit by His almighty power creates, in the souls of those whom God



has set upon to bring to a knowledge of Him, an entirely ungrounded faith in the divinity of the Scriptures and the truth of their contents, so that the soul embraces them and their contents with firm confidence as a revelation from God wholly apart from and in the absence of all *indicia* of their divinity or of the truth of their contents? So it has come to be very widely believed; and indeed it may even be said that it has become the prevalent representation that Calvin taught that believers have within themselves a witness of the Spirit by which they are assured of the divinity of Scripture and the truth of its contents quite apart from all other evidence. The very term, "the testimony of the Spirit", is adduced in support of this representation, as setting a divine witness to the divinity of Scripture over against other sources of evidence, and of course superseding them: and appeal is made along with this to Calvin's strong assertions of the uselessness and even folly of plying men with "the proofs" of the divine origin of Scripture, seeing that, it is said, in the absence of the testimony of the Spirit such "proofs" must needs be ineffective, and in the presence of that effective testimony they cannot but be adjudged unnecessary. What can he mean, then, it is asked, but that the testimony of the Holy Spirit is sufficient to assure us of the divinity of Scripture apart from all *indicia*, and does its work entirely independently of them?

The sufficient answer to this question is that he can mean—and in point of fact does mean—that the *indicia* are wholly insufficient to assure us of the divinity of Scripture apart from the testimony of the Spirit; and effect no result independently of it. This is quite a different proposition and gives rise to quite a different series of corollaries. Calvin's dealing with the *indicia* of the divinity of Scripture has already attracted our attention in one of its aspects, and it is quite worthy of renewed scrutiny. We have seen that he devotes a whole chapter to their exposition (ch. viii) and strongly asserts their objective conclusiveness to the fact of the divine origin of Scripture (I. vii. 4). Nor does he

doubt their usefulness whether to the believer or the unbeliever. The fulness and force of his exposition of them is the index to his sense of their value to the believer: for he adduces them distinctly as confirmations of believers in their faith in the Scriptures (I. viii. 1, 13), and betrays in every line of their treatment the high significance he attaches to them as such. And he explicitly declares that they not only maintain in the minds of the pious the native dignity and authority of Scripture, but completely vindicate it against all the subtleties of calumniators (I. viii. 13). No man of sound mind can fail to confess on their basis that it is God who speaks in Scripture and its doctrine is divine (I. vii. 4). It is a complete misapprehension of Calvin's meaning, then, when it is suggested that he represents the *indicia* of the divinity of Scripture as inconclusive or even as ineffective.<sup>57</sup> Their conclusiveness could not be

<sup>57</sup> There is a certain misapprehension involved, also, in speaking of Calvin *subordinating* the *indicia* to the witness of the Spirit, as if he conceived them on the same plane, but occupying relatively lower and higher positions on this plane. The witness of the Spirit and the *indicia* move in different orbits. We find Köstlin, as cited, 413, accordingly speaking not quite to the point, when he says: "He subordinated to the power of this one, immediate, divine testimony, all those several criteria by the pious and thoughtful consideration of which our faith in the Scriptures and their contents may and should be further mediated. Even miracles, as Niedner has rightly remarked (*Philosophie- und Theologiegeschichte*, 341, note 2), take among the evidences for the divinity of the Biblical revelation, 'nothing more than a coördinate' place: we add in passing that Calvin introduces them here only in the edition of 1550, and then enlarges the section which treats of them in the edition of 1559. He does not, however, put a low estimate on such criteria; he would trust himself—as he says in an addition made in the edition of 1559 (xxx. 59)—to silence with them even stiff-necked opponents; but this certainty which faith should have, can never be attained, says he, by disputation, but can be wrought only by the testimony of the Spirit." The question between the testimony of the Spirit and the *indicia* is not a question of which gives the strongest evidence; it is a question of what each is fitted to do. The *indicia* are supreme in their sphere: they and they alone give objective evidence. But objective evidence is inoperative when the subjective condition is such that it cannot penetrate and affect the mind. All objective evidence is in this sense subordinate to the subjective change wrought by the Spirit: but considered as objective evidence it is supreme in its own

asserted with more energy than he asserts it: nor indeed could their effectiveness—their effectiveness in extorting from the unbeliever the confession of the divinity of Scripture and in rendering him without excuse in refusing the homage of his mind and heart to it—in a word, will he, nill he, convincing his intellect of its divinity; their effectiveness also in confirming the believer in his faith and maintaining his confidence intact. This prevalent misapprehension of Calvin's meaning is due to neglect to observe the precise thing for which he affirms the *indicia* to be ineffective and the precise reason he assigns for this ineffectiveness. There is only one thing which he says they cannot do: that is to produce "sound faith" (I. vii. 4), "firm faith" (I. viii. 13),—that assurance which is essential to "true piety" (I. vii. 4). And their failure to produce "sound faith" is due solely to the subjective condition of man, which is such that a creative operation of the Holy Spirit on the soul is requisite before he can exercise "sound faith" (I. vi.

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sphere. The term "subordinate" is accordingly misleading here. For the rest, it is true that Calvin places the miracles by which the giving of Scripture was accompanied rather among the objective evidences of their divinity than at their apex: but this is due not to an underestimation of the value of miracles as evidence, but to the very high estimate he placed on the internal criteria of divinity, by which the Scriptures evidence themselves to be divine. And above all we must not be misled into supposing that he places miracles below the testimony of the Spirit in importance. Such a comparison is outside his argument: miracles are part of the objective evidence of the deity of Scripture; the testimony of the Spirit is the subjective preparation of the heart to receive the objective evidence in a sympathetic embrace. He would have said, of course,—he does say,—that no miracle, and no body of miracles, could or can produce "true faith": the internal creative operation of the Spirit is necessary for that. And in that sense the evidence of miracles is subordinated to the testimony of the Spirit. But this is not because of any depreciation of the evidential value of miracles; but because of the full appreciation of the deadness of the human soul in sin. The evidential value of miracles, and their place in the objective evidences of the divine origin of the Scriptures, are wholly unaffected by the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit; and the strongest assertions of their valuelessness in the production of faith, apart from the testimony of the Spirit, do not in the least affect the estimate we put on them, as objective evidences.

4; viii. 1, 13). It is the attempt to produce this "sound faith" in the heart of man, not renewed for believing by the creative operation of the Holy Spirit, which Calvin pronounces preposterous and foolish. "It is acting a preposterous part", he says, "to endeavor to produce *sound faith* in the Scriptures by disputations": objections may be silenced by such disputations, "but this will not fix in men's hearts *that assurance which is essential to true piety*"; for religion is not a matter of mere opinion, but a fundamental change of attitude towards God (I. vii. 4). It betrays, therefore, great folly to wish to demonstrate to infidels that the Scriptures are the Word of God, he repeats in another place, obviously with no other meaning, "since this cannot be known without faith", that is, as the context shows, without the internal working of the Spirit of God (I. viii. 13, end).

That Calvin should thus teach that the *indicia* are incapable of producing "firm faith" in the human heart, disabled by sin, is a matter of course: and therefore it is a matter of course that he should teach that the *indicia* are ineffective for the production of "sound faith" apart from the internal operation of the Spirit correcting the sin-bred disabilities of man, that is to say, apart from the testimony of the Spirit. But what about the *indicia* in conjunction with the testimony of the Spirit? It would seem to be evident that, on Calvin's ground, they would have their full part to play here, and that we must say that, when the soul is renewed by the Holy Spirit to a sense for the divinity of Scripture, it is through the *indicia* of that divinity that it is brought into its proper confidence in the divinity of Scripture. In treating of the *indicia*, Calvin does not, however, declare this in so many words. He sometimes even appears to speak of them rather as if they lay side by side with the testimony of the Spirit than acted along with it as co-factors in the production of the supreme effect. He speaks of their ineffectiveness in producing sound faith in the unbeliever: and of their value as corroboratives to the believer: and his language would

sometimes seem to suggest that therefore it were just as well not to employ them until after faith had formed itself under the testimony of the Spirit (I. viii. 1, 13). Of their part in forming faith under the operation of the testimony of the Spirit he does not appear explicitly to speak.<sup>58</sup>

Nevertheless, there are not lacking convincing hints that

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Köstlin, as cited, pp. 413-14: "We find in Calvin the aforementioned several criteria set alongside of this witness of the Spirit, and indeed especially those which are internal to the Scriptures themselves, such as their elevation above all merely human products, which cannot fail to impress every reader, etc. It would certainly be desirable to trace an inner connection between this impression made by the character, by the style of speech, by the contents of Scripture, and that supreme immediate testimony of the Spirit for it. Assuredly God Himself, the Author of Scripture, works upon us also in such impressions, which we analyse in our reflecting human consideration, and in our debates strive to set before opponents; and we feel, on the other side, a need to analyse, as far as is possible for us, even the supreme witness of the Spirit, in spite of its immediacy, and to relate it with our other experiences and observations with respect to Scripture, so as to become conscious of the course by which God passes from one to the other. Calvin, however, does not enter into this; he sets the two side by side and over against one another: 'Although (Scripture) conciliates reverence to itself by its own supreme majesty, it does not seriously affect us, until it is sealed to our hearts by the Spirit' (xxix. 295; xxx. 60; ed. 3. I. 7. 5): he does not show the inner relation of one to the other. He does not do this even in the edition of 1559, where he with great eloquence speaks more fully of the power with which the Word of the New Testament witnesses manifests its divine majesty. The witness of the Spirit comes forward with Calvin thus somewhat abruptly. By means of it the Spirit works true faith, which the Scripture, even through its internal criteria, cannot establish in divine certainty; and indeed He does not work it in the case of all those—and has no intention of working it in the case of all those—to whom the Scripture is conveyed with its criteria, but, as the section on Predestination further shows, only in the case of those who have been elected thereto from all eternity. Here we are already passing over into the relation of the Calvinistic conception of the Formal Principle or the Authority of Scripture, to its conception of the means of grace. In this matter the Lutheran doctrine stands in conflict with it. But with reference to what we have been discussing, we do not find that the Lutheran dogmaticians, when they come to occupy themselves more particularly with the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* to the Scriptures, dealt more vitally with its relation to the operation of these criteria on the human spirit. No doubt, in Luther's own conception this was more the case: but he gave no scientific elaboration of it."



there was lying in his mind all the time the implicit understanding that it is through these *indicia* of the divinity of Scripture that the soul, under the operation of the testimony of the Spirit, reaches its sound faith in Scripture, and that he has been withheld from more explicitly stating this only by the warmth of his zeal for the necessity of the testimony of the Spirit which has led him to a constant contrasting of this divine with those human "testimonies". Thus we find him repeatedly affirming that these *indicia* will produce no fruit *until* they be confirmed by the internal testimony of the Spirit (I. vii. 4, 5; viii. 1, 13): "Our reverence may be conciliated by the internal majesty of Scripture, but it never seriously affects us, *till* it is confirmed by the Spirit in our hearts" (I. vii. 5). "*Without this certainty*, in vain will the authority of Scripture be either defended by arguments or established by the consent of the Church, or of any other supports: since without the foundation be laid, it remains in perpetual suspense" (I. viii. 1). The *indicia* "*are alone* not sufficient to produce firm faith in the Scriptures, *till* the heavenly Father, discovering His own power therein, places its authority above all controversy" (I. viii. 13). It is, however, in his general teaching as to the formation of sound faith in the divinity of Scripture that we find the surest indication that he thought of the *indicia* as co-working with the testimony of the Spirit to this result. This is already given, indeed, in his strenuous insistence that the work of the Spirit is not of the nature of a revelation, but of a confirmation of the revelation deposited in the Scriptures, especially when this is taken in connection with his teaching that Scripture is self-authenticating. What the Spirit of God imparts to us, he says, is a *sense* of divinity: such a sense discovers divinity only where divinity is and only by a perception of it,—a perception which of course rests on its proper *indicia*. It is because Scripture "exhibits the plainest evidence that it is God who speaks in it" that the newly awakened *sense* of divinity quickened in the soul, recognizes it as divine (I. vii. 4). The senses do not dis-

tinguish light from darkness, white from black, sweet from bitter,—to use Calvin's own illustration (I. vii. 2),—save by the mediation of those *indicia* of light and darkness, whiteness and blackness, sweetness and bitterness, by which these qualities manifest themselves to the natural senses: and by parity of reasoning we must accredit Calvin as thinking of the newly implanted spiritual sense discerning the divinity of Scripture only through the mediation of the *indicia* of divinity manifested in Scripture. To taste and see that the Scriptures are divine is to recognize a divinity actually present in Scripture; and of course recognition implies perception of *indicia*, not attribution of a divinity not recognized as inherent. Meanwhile it must be admitted that Calvin has not at this point developed this side of his subject with the fulness which might be wished, but has left it to the general implications of the argument.

#### OBJECT TESTIFIED TO.

Closely connected with the question of the mode in which Calvin conceived the testimony of the Spirit to be delivered, is the further question of the matters for which he conceived that testimony to be available. On the face of it it would seem that he conceived it directly available solely for the divinity of the Scriptures and therefore for the revelatory character of their contents. So he seems to imply throughout the discussion, and, indeed, to assert repeatedly. Nevertheless, there is a widespread impression abroad that he appealed to it to determine the canon of Scripture too,<sup>59</sup>

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Köstlin, as cited, p. 417: "The certainty that the Scriptures really possess such authority, rests for us not on the authority of the Church, but just on this testimony of the Spirit. Calvin's reference here is even to the several books of Scripture: he is aware that the opponents ask how, without a decree of the Church, we are to be convinced what book should be received with reverence, what should be excluded from the canon; he himself adduces in opposition to this, even here, nothing else except the *testimonium Spiritus*: the entirety of Scripture seems to him to be equally, so to say, *en bloc*, divinely legitimated by this." So also Pannier, as cited, p. 252: "The question of canonicity never presented itself to the thought of Calvin, except in the second

and indeed also to establish the integrity of its text. This impression is generally, though not always, connected with the view that Calvin conceived the mode of delivery of the testimony of the Spirit to be the creation in the soul of a blind faith, unmotivated by reasons and without rooting in grounds; and it has been much exploited of late years in the interests of a so-called "free" attitude towards Scripture, which announces itself as following Calvin when it refuses to acknowledge as authoritative Scripture any portion of or element in the traditionally transmitted Scriptures which does not spontaneously commend itself to the immediate place as a corollary of the problem of the divinity (I. vii. 1). If the Holy Spirit attests to us that a given book is divine, He in that very act attests that it forms a part of the rule of faith, that it is canonical. Nowhere has Calvin permitted, as his successors have done, a primary place to be taken by a theological doctrine which became less capable of resisting the assaults of adversaries when isolated from the practical question. Perhaps, moreover, he did not render as exact an account as we are able to render after the lapse of two centuries, of the wholly new situation in which the Reformation found itself with respect to the canon, or of the new way in which he personally resolved the question." Accordingly, at an earlier point Pannier says: "It is true that the faculty of recognizing the Word of God under the human forms included for Calvin, and especially according to the Confession of Faith of 1559, the faculty of determining the canonicity of the books. This is a consequence secondary but natural, and so long as they maintained the principle, the Reformed doctors placed themselves in a false position when they showed themselves disposed to abandon the consequences to the criticisms of their opponents" (p. 164)). Cf. J. Cramer, *Nieuwe Bijdragen*, III. 140: "But you must not think of an *immediate* witness of the Spirit to the particular parts of the Holy Scriptures. The old theologians did not think of that. They conceived the matter thus: The *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* gives witness *directly* to the religious-moral contents of Scripture only. Since, however, the religious-moral contents must necessarily have a particular form, and the dogmatic content is closely bound up with the historical, neither the chronological nor the topographical element can be separated out, etc. . . . therefore the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* gives to the total content of Scripture witness that it is from God." This, after all, then, is not to appeal to the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*, directly to authenticate the canon; but to construct a canon on the basis of a testimony of the Spirit given solely to the divinity of Scripture, the movement of thought being this: All Scripture given by inspiration of God is profitable; this Scripture is given by inspiration of God; accordingly this Scripture belongs to the category of profitable Scripture, that is to the canon.

religious judgment as divine. Undoubtedly this is to reverse the attitude of Calvin towards the traditionally transmitted Scriptures, and it is difficult to believe that two such diametrically contradictory attitudes towards the Scriptures can be outgrowths of the same principal root. In point of fact, moreover, as we have already seen, not only does Calvin not conceive the mode of the delivery of the testimony of the Spirit to be by the creation of a blind and unmotivated faith, but, to come at once to the matter more particularly in hand, he does not depend on the testimony of the Spirit for the determination of canonicity or for the establishment of the integrity of the text of Scripture. So far from discarding the *via rationalis* here, he determines the limits of the canon and establishes the integrity of the transmission of Scripture distinctly on scientific, that is to say, historico-critical grounds. In no case of his frequent discussion of such subjects does he appeal to the testimony of the Spirit and set aside the employment of rational and historical argumentation as invalid or inconclusive; always, on the contrary, he adduces the evidence of valid tradition and apostolicity of contents as conclusive of the fact. It is hard to believe that such a consequent mind could have lived unconsciously in such an inconsistent attitude towards a question so vital to him and his cause.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>60</sup> Reuss, in the 16th chapter of his *History of the Canon of the Holy Scriptures* (E. T. 1884), expounds Calvin, with his usual learning and persuasiveness, as basing the determination of the canon solely on the testimony of the Spirit. But the exposition falls into two confusions: a confusion of the authority of Scripture with its canonicity, and a confusion of the divine with the apostolic origin of Scripture. Of course, Calvin repelled the Romish conception that the authority of Scripture rests on its authentication by the Church and its tradition (p. 294), but that did not deter him from seeking by a historical investigation to discover what especial books had been committed by the apostles to the Church as authoritative. Of course, he founded the sure conviction of the divine origin of the Scriptures on the witness of the Spirit of God by and with them in the heart, but that did not prevent his appealing to history to determine what these Scriptures which were so witnessed were in their compass. Accordingly even Reuss has to admit that it is exceedingly difficult to carry through his

So far as support for the impression that Calvin looked to the testimony of the Spirit to determine for him the canon of Scripture and to assure him of its integrity is derived from his writings, it rests on a manifest misapprehension of a single passage in the *Institutes*, and what seems to be a misassignment to him of a passage in the old French Confession of Faith.

The passage in the *Institutes* is a portion of the paragraphs which are devoted to repelling the Romish contention that "the Scriptures have only so much weight as is conceded to them by the suffrages of the Church; as though the eternal and inviolable truth of God depended on the arbitrary will of men" (I. vii. 1). "For thus", Calvin says—and this is the passage which is appealed to—"For thus, dealing with the Holy Spirit as a mere laughing stock (*ludibrium*), they ask, Who shall give us confidence that these [Scriptures] have come from God,—who assure us that they have reached our time safe and intact,—who persuade us that one book should be received reverently, another expunged from the number (*numero*)—if the Church should not prescribe a certain rule for all these things? It depends, therefore, they say, on the Church, both what reverence is due to Scripture, and what books should be inscribed (*censendi sint*) in its catalogue (*in ejus catalogo*)" (I. vii. 1). This passage certainly shows that the Romish controversialists in endeavoring to prove that the authority of Scripture is dependent on the Church's suffrage, argued that it is only by the Church that we can be assured even of

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theory of Calvin's theoretical procedure consistently with Calvin's observed practice. In point of fact, the Reformers, and Calvin among them, did not separate the Apocrypha from the O. T. on the sole basis of the testimony of the Spirit: they appealed to the evidence of the Jewish Church (p. 312). Nor did they determine the question of the New Testament antilegomena on this principle: this, too, was with them "a simple question of historical criticism" (p. 316)—although Reuss here (p. 318) confuses Calvin's appeal to the internal evidence of apostolicity with appeal to "religious intuition". In a word, Reuss' exposition of Calvin's procedure in determining the canon rests on a fundamental misconception of that procedure.



the contents of Scripture and of its integrity,—that its very canon and text rest on the Church's determination. But how can it be inferred that Calvin's response to this argument would take the form: No, of these things we can be assured by the immediate testimony of the Spirit? In point of fact, he says nothing of the kind, and the inference does not lie in the argument. What he says is that the Romish method of arguing is as absurd as it is blasphemous, a mere cavil (I. vii. 2), as well as derogatory to the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit, he says, assures us that in the Scriptures God speaks to us. To bid us pause on the ground that it is only the Church who can assure us that this or that book belongs to the body of the Scriptures, that the text has been preserved to us intact and the like, is to interpose frivolous objections, and can have no other end than to glorify the Church at the expense of souls. Accordingly, he remarks that these objectors are without concern what logical difficulties they may cast themselves into: they wish only to prevent men taking their comfort out of the direct assurance by the Spirit of the divinity of the Scriptures. He repudiates, in a word, the entire Romish argument: but we can scarcely infer from this, that his response to it would be that the immediate witness of the Spirit provides us with direct answers to their carping questions. It is at least equally likely from the mere fact that he speaks of these objections as cavils (I. vii. 2) and girds at the logic of the Romish controversialists as absurd, that his response would be that the testimony of the Spirit for which he was contending had no direct concernment with questions of canon and text.

The passage in the Confession of La Rochelle, on the other hand, does certainly attribute the discrimination of the canonical books in some sense—in what sense may admit of debate—to the testimony of the Spirit. In the third article of this Confession there is given a list of the canonical books.<sup>61</sup> The fourth article, then, runs as follows:

<sup>61</sup> "All this Holy Scripture is comprised in the canonical books of the

"We recognize these books to be canonical and the very certain rule of our faith, not so much by the common accord and consent of the Church, as by the inward witness and persuasion of the Holy Spirit, who makes us distinguish them from the other ecclesiastical books, upon which, though they may be useful, no article of faith can be founded." This article, however, was not the composition of Calvin, but was among those added by the Synod of Paris to the draft submitted by Calvin.<sup>62</sup> Calvin's own article "On the Books of Holy Scripture", which was expanded by the Synod into several, reads only: "This doctrine does not derive its authority from men, nor from angels, but from God alone; we believe, too (seeing that it is a thing surpassing all human sense to discern that it is God who speaks), that He Himself gives the certitude of it to His elect, and seals it in their hearts by His Spirit."<sup>63</sup> In this fine statement we find the very essence of the teaching of the *Institutes* on this subject; the ideas and even the phraseology of which are reproduced.

We may learn, therefore, at most, from the Confession of La Rochelle, not that Calvin, but that some of his immediate followers attributed in some sense the discrimination of the canonical books to the witness of the Spirit. Other evidences of this fact are not lacking. The Belgian Confession, for example, much like that of La Rochelle, declares of the Scriptural books, just enumerated (Art. 5): "We receive all these books alone, as holy and canonical, for the regulation, foundation and establishment of our faith, and we fully believe all that they contain, not so much because the Church receives and approves them, but principally because the Spirit gives witness to them in our hearts that they are from God, and also because they are approved Old and New Testaments, the number (*le nombre*) of which is as follows" . . . the list ensuing.

<sup>62</sup> *Opp.* ix. *prolg.*, pp. lvii-lx: cf. Dieterlen, *Le Synode général de Paris* (1873), pp. 77, 89; Pannier, as cited, p. 127; and for a brief précis, Müller, *Bekenntnisschriften der reform. Kirche* (1903), p. xxxiii.

<sup>63</sup> *Opp.* ix. 741.

by themselves; for the very blind can perceive that the things come to pass which they predict." Perhaps, however, we may find a more instructive instance still in the words of one of the Protestant disputants in a conference held at Paris in 1566 between two Protestant ministers and two doctors of the Sorbonne.<sup>64</sup> To the inquiry, How do you know that some books are canonical and others apocryphal, the Protestant disputant (M. Lespine) answers: "By the Spirit of God which is a Spirit of discrimination, by whom all those to whom He is communicated are illuminated, so as to be made capable of judging and discerning spiritual things and of recognizing (*cognoistre*) and apprehending the truth (when it is proposed to them), by the witness and assurance which He gives to them in their hearts. And as we discriminate light and darkness by the faculty of sight which is in the eye; so, we can easily separate and recognize (*recognoistre*) truth from falsehood, and from all things in general which can be false, absurd, doubtful or indifferent, when we are invested with the Spirit of God and guided by the light which He lights in our hearts." M. Lespine had evidently read his Calvin; though there is a certain lack of crisp exactness in his language which may raise doubt whether he has necessarily reproduced him with precision. Clearly his idea is that the Spirit of God in His creative operation on the hearts of Christ's people has implanted in them—or quickened in them—a spiritual sense, which recognizes the stamp of divinity upon the Books which God has given to the Church, and so separates them out from all others and thus constitutes the canon. This is to attribute the discrimination of the canonical books to the witness of the Spirit not directly but indirectly, namely, through the intermediation of the determination of the books which are of divine origin, which,

<sup>64</sup> *Actes de la dispute et conference tenue à Paris és mois de juillet et aoust 1566* (Strasbourg, 1566), printed in the *Biblioth. de la Soc. de l'Hist. du Prot. franc.* We draw from the account of it in Pannier, as cited, pp. 141 sq.

then, being gathered together, constitute the canon, or divinely given rule of our faith and life. This conception of the movement of the mind in this matter became very common, and was given very clear expression, for example, by Jurieu,<sup>65</sup> in a context which bears as evident marks of reminiscences of Calvin as do M. Lespine's remarks. "That grace which produces faith in a soul", says he, "does not begin by persuading it that a given book is canonical. This persuasion comes only afterwards and as a consequence. It gives to the consciousness a taste for the truth: it applies this truth to the mind and heart; it proceeds from this subsequently that the believer believes that a given book is canonical, because the truths which 'find' him are found in it. In a word, we do not believe that which is contained in a book to be divine because this book is canonical. But we believe that a given book is canonical because we have perceived that what it contains is divine. And we have perceived this as we perceive the light when we look on the fire, sweetness and bitterness when we eat." Whether we are to attribute this movement of thought, however, to Calvin, is another question.<sup>66</sup> There is no hint of it in his writings.

It is not even obvious that this precise movement of thought is the conception which lay in the mind of the authors of the additional articles in the Confession of La

<sup>65</sup> *Le vray systeme de l'Eglise et la véritable analyse de la foy*, III. ii. 450. (Pannier, p. 168).

<sup>66</sup> As we have seen, it is attributed to Calvin by both Pannier and Cramer. Pannier (203) remarks that "if Calvin was not able to appreciate in all its purity" the new situation with regard to the canon into which the Reformation brought men, "it was even less incumbent on him to render account of the personal attitude which he himself took up with reference to it". "It is his successors only who, in adopting his conclusions (except that they apply them more *or less*), have asked themselves how they reached them, and have reconstructed the reasoning which no doubt Calvin himself had unconsciously followed." Is not this a confession that after all the view in question was not Calvin's own view? At least not consciously to himself? But Pannier would say, no doubt, either this was Calvin's view or he appealed to the testimony of the Spirit *directly* to authenticate the canon.

Rochelle and of the similar statement in the Belgian Confession. The interpretation of these articles is particularly interesting, as they both undoubtedly came under the eye of Calvin and their doctrine was never disavowed by him. It is not, however, altogether easy, because of a certain ambiguity in the use of the term "canonical". It is on account of the ambiguity which attends the use of this term that in speaking of their teaching we have guardedly said that they appear to suspend the canonicity of the Scriptural books in some sense directly on the testimony of the Spirit. This ambiguity may be brought sharply before us by placing in juxtaposition two sentences from Quenstedt in which the term "canonical" is employed, obviously, in two differing senses. "We deny", says he, "that the catalogue of canonical books is an article of faith, superadded to the others [articles of faith] contained in Scripture. Many have faith and may attain salvation who do not hold the number of canonical books. If the word 'canon' be understood of the *number* of the books, we concede that such a catalogue is not contained in Scripture." "These are two different questions", says he again, "whether the Gospel of Matthew is canonical, and whether it was written by Matthew. The former belongs to saving faith; the latter to historical knowledge. For if the Gospel which has come down to us under the name of Matthew had been written by Philip or Bartholomew, it would make no difference to saving faith." In the former extract the question of canonicity is removed from the category of articles of faith; in the latter it is made an integral element of saving faith. The contradiction is glaring—unless there be an undistributed middle. And this is what there really is. In the former passage, where Quenstedt is engaged in repelling the contention that there are articles of faith that must be accepted by all, which are not contained in Scripture—in defending, in a word, the Protestant doctrine of the sufficiency or perfection of Scripture—he uses the terms 'canon', 'canonical' in the purely technical sense of the extent of Scripture. In the latter



passage, where he is insisting that the authority of Scripture as the Word of God hangs on its divine, not on its human, author, he uses the term 'canonical' in the sense of "divinely given". The term "canonical" was current, then, in the two senses of 'belonging to the list of authoritative Scriptures', 'entering into the body of the Scriptures', and 'God-given', 'divine'. In which of these two senses is it used in the Gallican and Belgian Confessions? If in the former, then these Confessions teach that the testimony of the Spirit is available directly for the determination of the canon: if in the latter, then they teach no such thing, but only that it is on the testimony of the Spirit that we are assured of the divine origin and character of these books.

That the Gallican Confession employs the term in the latter of these senses, seems at least possible when once attention is called to it, although regard for the last clause of the statement: "who makes us distinguish them from the other ecclesiastical books", etc., prevents the representation of this interpretation as certain. Its declaration, succeeding the catalogue of the books given in the third section, is obviously intended to affirm something that is true of them already as a definite body of books before the mind. "We recognize *these* books", it says, "to be canonical and the very certain rule of our faith". That is to say, to this body of books we ascribe the quality of canonicity and recognize their regulative character. What would seem, then, to be in question is a quality belonging to a list of books already determined and in the mind of the framer of the statement as a whole. The same may be said of the Belgian Confession. It, too, has already given a list of the canonical books, and now proceeds to affirm something that is true of "all of these books and them only". The thing affirmed is that they are "holy and canonical", where the collocation suggests that "canonical" expresses a quality which ranges with "holy". We cannot help suspecting, then, that these early confessions use the term "canonical" not quantitatively but qualitatively, not extensively but intensively; and in that

sense it is the equivalent of "divine".<sup>67</sup> Even the inference back from them to Calvin that he may have supposed that the testimony of the Spirit is available to determine the canon becomes therefore doubtful: and no other reason exists why we should attribute this view to him. We cannot affirm that the movement of his thought was never from the divinity of Scripture, assured to us by the testimony of the Spirit, to the determination of the limits of the canon: but

<sup>67</sup> The following is the account of the treatment of the question of the canon in these creeds, given by J. Cramer (*De Roomsche-Katholieke en de Oud-protestantsche Schrifbeschouwing*, 1883, pp. 48 sq.): "And on what now, does that authority rest? This question, too, is amply discussed in the Reformed Confessions, and that, as concerns the principal matter, wholly in the spirit of Calvin. Only, more value is ascribed to the testimony of the Church. No doubt the authority of the Scriptures is not made to rest on it; but it is permitted an important voice in the question of the canon. When it is said that 'all that is said in the Holy Scriptures' is to be believed *not so much* because the Church receives them and holds them as canonical, but especially because the Holy Spirit bears witness to them in our heart that they are from God', a certain weight is attributed to the judgment of the church. This appears particularly from the way in which the canonical books are spoken of in distinction from the Apocryphal books. In enumerating the Bible books, the Belgian Confession prefixes the words: 'Against which nothing can be said' (art. IV). By this apparently is meant, that against the canonicity of these books, from a historical standpoint, with the eye on the witness of the Church, nothing can be alleged (a thing not to be said of the Apocrypha). In the same spirit the Anglican Articles, when speaking of the books of the O. and N. Testaments, says that 'Of their authority there has never been any doubt in the Church'. I will not raise the question here how that can be affirmed with the eye on the Antilegomena. It shows, however, certainly that much importance is attached to the ecclesiastical tradition. The fundamental ground, however, why the Scriptures of the O. and N. Testaments are to be held to be the Word of God is sought in the Scriptures themselves, and, assuredly, in the testimony which the Holy Spirit bears to their divinity in the hearts of believers. Like Calvin, the Confessions suppose that thus they have given an immovable foundation to the divine authority of the Scriptures, and have taken an impregnable position over against Rome, which appealed to the witness of the Catholic Church." . . . Calvin, however, allowed as much to the testimony of the Church—external evidence—as is here allowed, and the very adduction of its testimony shows that sole dependence was not placed on the testimony of the Spirit for the canonicity of a book: what it is appealed to for is the divinity of the canonical books.

we have no reason to ascribe this movement of thought to him except that it was adopted by some of his successors.

On the other hand, Calvin constantly speaks as if the only thing which the testimony of the Spirit assures us of in the case of the Scriptures is the divinity of their origin and contents: and he always treats Scripture when so speaking of it as a definite entity, held before his mind as a whole.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>68</sup> So even Köstlin perceives, as cited, p. 417: "The entirety of Scripture appeared to him divinely legitimated by the *testimonium Spiritus*, altogether, so to say, *en bloc*. . . . The declarations of Calvin as to the Word spoken by the prophets and apostles, which they rightly asserted to be God's Word, pass without hesitation over into declarations as to the Holy Scriptures, as such, and that in their entirety; with the proposition 'the Law and the Prophets and the Gospel have emanated from God' is interchanged the proposition 'the Scripture is from God',—and the witness of the Spirit assures us of it." So also Pannier (II. 203): "Everything goes back to his considering things not in detail but *en bloc*. The word of God is for him one, *verbum Dei*, not *verba Dei*. The diversity of the authors disappears before the unity of the Spirit. The same reasoning applies to each single book as to the whole collection. All the verses hold together; and if one introduces us to the knowledge of salvation we may conclude that the book is canonical. Given the collection, it is enough in practice, since all the parts are of a sort, to establish the value of one of them to guarantee the value of all the others. It is certain that the critical theologian and the simple believer even yet proceed somewhat differently in this matter; the simplest and surest method is that of the humble saint, and Calvin was very right not to range himself among the theologians at this point. 'The just shall live by faith.' This affirmation seemed to him a revealed truth: he concluded from it that the whole epistle to the Romans is inspired; some remarks of this kind in other passages of the Epistles, of the Gospels, and the canonicity of the New Testament is established. The same for the Old Testament. The Second Epistle of Peter and the Song of Songs. The human testimonies, internal and external criteria, useful for confirming the other parts of a book of which a passage has been recognized as inspired, are insufficient to expel from the canon a book which the witness of the Spirit has not recognized as opposed to the doctrine of salvation." We quote the whole passage to give Pannier's whole thought: but what we adduce it for is at present merely to signalize the admission it contains that Calvin dealt with the Scriptures in the matter of the testimony of the Spirit, so to speak, "in the lump"—as a whole. Pannier cites apparently as similar to Calvin's view, Gaussen, *Canon*, ii. 10: "This testimony, which every Christian has recognized when he has read his Bible with vital efficacy, may be recognized by him only in a single page; but this page

In these circumstances his own practice in dealing with the question of canonicity and text, makes it sufficiently clear that he held their settlement to depend on scientific investigation, and appealed to the testimony of the Spirit only to accredit the divine origin of the concrete volume thus put into his hands. The movement of his thought was therefore along this course: first, the ascertainment, on scientific grounds, of the body of books handed down from the Apostles as the rule of faith and practice; secondly, the vindication, on the same class of grounds, of the integrity of their transmission; thirdly, the accrediting of them as divine on the testimony of the Spirit. It is not involved in this that he is to be considered to have supposed that a man must be a scholar before he can be a Christian. He supposed we become Christians not by scholarship but by the testimony of the Spirit in the heart, and he had no inclination to demand scholarship as the basis of our Christianity. It is only involved in the position we ascribe to him that he must be credited with recognizing that questions of scholarship are for scholars and questions of religion only for Christians as such. He would have said—he does say—that he in whose heart the Spirit bears His testimony will recognize the Scriptures whenever presented to his contemplation as divine, will depend on them with sound trust and will embrace with true faith all that they propound to him.

is enough to spread over the book which contains it an incomparable brightness." That is, Calvin, like the simple believer, has a definite book—the Bible—in his hands and treats it as all of a piece—of course, in Calvin's case, not without reasonable grounds for treating it as all of a piece: in other words, the canon was already determined for him before he appealed to the testimony of the Spirit to attest its divinity. Cf. Cramer, p. 140, as quoted above. Cramer is quite right *so far*, therefore, when he says (p. 156): "Although we determine securely by means of the historical-critical method what must be carried back to the apostolical age and what accords with the apostolical doctrine, we have not yet proved the divine authority of these writings. This hangs on this,—whether the Holy Spirit gives us His witness to them. On this witness alone rests our assurance of faith, not on the force of a historical-critical demonstration." This, so far as appears, was Calvin's method.

He would doubtless have said that this act of faith logically implicates the determination of the 'canon'. But he would also have said—he does in effect say—that this determination of the canon is a separable act and is to be prosecuted on its own appropriate grounds of scientific evidence. It involves indeed a fundamental misapprehension of Calvin's whole attitude to attribute to him the view that the testimony of the Spirit determines immediately such scientific questions as those of the canon and text of Scripture. The testimony of the Spirit was to him emphatically an operation of the Spirit of God on the heart, which produced distinctively a spiritual effect: it was directed to making men Christians,<sup>69</sup> not to making them theologians. The testimony of the Spirit was, in effect, in his view, just what we in modern times have learned to call "regeneration" considered in its noëtic effects. That "regeneration" has noëtic effects he is explicit and iterative in affirming: but that these noëtic effects of "regeneration" could supersede the necessity of scientific investigation in questions which rest for their determination on matters of fact,—Calvin would be the last to imagine. He who recognized that the conviction of the divinity of Scripture wrought by the testimony of the Spirit rests as its ground on the *indicia* of the divinity of Scripture spiritually discerned in their true weight, could not imagine that the determination of the canon of Scripture or the establishment of its text could be wholly separated from their proper basis in evidence and grounded solely in a blind testimony of the Spirit alone: which indeed in that case would be fundamentally indistinguishable from that "revelation" which he rebuked the Anabaptists for claiming to be the recipients of.

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<sup>69</sup> Calvin would certainly have subscribed to these words of Pannier, as cited, p. 164: The most of the Catholics "have always strangely misapprehended the illumination which, according to the Reformed, the least of believers is capable of receiving and of applying to the reading of the Bible. It is a question, not as they suppose, of becoming theologians, but of becoming believers, of having not the plenitude of knowledge, but the certitude of faith".



## THE TESTIMONY AND THE RELIGIOUS LIFE.

When we clearly apprehend the essence of Calvin's doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit to the divinity of Scripture to be the noëtic effects of "regeneration" we shall know what estimate to place upon the criticism which is sometimes passed upon him that he has insufficiently correlated his doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit with the inner<sup>70</sup>

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Köstlin, as cited, p. 415.—After raising the question of the relation of the witness of the Spirit to the inner experience of the Christian, and the relative priority of the two,—and remarking that in case the vital process is conceived as preceding the witness of the Spirit to the divinity of the Scriptures, it will be hard not to allow to the Christianized heart the right and duty of criticism of the Scriptures (where the fault in reasoning lies in the term *process*), Köstlin continues: "We touch here on the relation between the formal and material sides of the fundamental evangelical principle. And we think at once of the relation in which they stood to one another in Luther's representation, by which his well-known critical attitude, with respect, say, to the Epistle of James, was rendered possible. Calvin, too, now has no wish to speak of a witness of the Spirit merely with reference to the Scriptures, and is far from desiring to isolate that witness of the Spirit for the Scriptures. He comes back to it subsequently, when speaking of faith in the saving content of the Gospel, declaring that the Spirit seals the contents of the Word in our hearts (1539, xxix. 456 sq., 468 sq.; further in 1559, III. 2). He also inserted in the section on the Holy Scriptures and the witness of the Spirit to them, in 1550, an additional special sentence, in which he expressly refers to his intention to speak further on such a witness of the Spirit in a later portion of the treatise, and declares of faith in general, that there belongs to it a sealing of the divine Spirit (XXIX. 296 [1559, I. vii. 5 near end]). In any event he must have recurred to such a Spiritual testimony for the assurance of individual Christians of their personal election. But in the first instance—and this again is precisely what is characteristic for Calvin—he nevertheless treats of the doctrine of the divine origin and the divine authority of the Scriptures, and of the witness of the Spirit for them, wholly apart. The presentation proceeds with him in such a manner, that the Spirit first of all fully produces faith in this character of the Scriptures, and only then the Bible-believing Christian has to receive from the Scriptures its contents, in all its several parts, as divinely true,—though, no doubt, this reception and this faith in the several elements of the truth are by no means matters of human thought, but are rather to be performed under the progressive illumination and the progressive sealing of these contents in the heart by the Holy Spirit. Even though he, meanwhile, calls that the 'truth' of the Scriptures, which we come to feel in the power of the Spirit, he means

religious life of the Christian, has given too separate a place to the Spirit's witness to Scripture, and thus has overestimated the formal principle of Protestantism in comparison with the material principle,<sup>71</sup> with the effect of giving a hard, dry and legalistic aspect to Christianity as expounded by him. With Luther, it is said, everything is made of Justification and the liberty of the Christian man fills the horizon of thought; and this is because his mind is set on the "faith" out of which all good things flow and by which everything—Scripture itself—is dominated. With Calvin,

by this in the section before us, an absolute truth-character, which must from the start be attributed to the Scriptures as a whole, and will be experienced in and with the divinity of the Scriptures in general. So the matter already stands in the edition of 1539. . . . (XXIX. 292 sq.)." Accordingly Calvin teaches that the Scriptures in all their parts are of indefectible authority, and should be met in all their prescriptions with unlimited obedience (p. 418), because it is just God who speaks in them. Then: "With Dorner (*Geschichte der protest.-Theologie*, 380)—and even more decisively than he does it—we must remark on all this: 'The formal side of the protestant principle remains with Calvin with an over-emphasis, in comparison with the material, and with this is connected that he sees in the Holy Scriptures above all else the revelation of the will of God which he has dictated to man through the sacred writers.' And this tendency came ever more strongly forward with him in the successive revisions of the *Institutes*. His conception of the formal principle thus left no room for such a criticism as Luther employed on the several parts of the canon." Later Lutheranism, however, Köstlin concludes by saying, adopted Calvin's point of view here and even exaggerated it.

<sup>71</sup> "The formal side of the Protestant principle retains with Calvin the ascendancy over the material; and with this is connected the fact that he sees in the Holy Scriptures chiefly the revelation of the will of God, which he has prescribed to men through the sacred writers."—Dorner, *Hist. of Protest. Theology*, I. 390. Cf. p. 397: "The formal principle is according to him the norm and source of dogma, whilst he does not treat faith, in the same way as Luther, as a source of knowledge for the dogmatical structure, that is to say, as the mediative principle of knowledge." Hence Dorner complains (p. 390) of the more restricted freedom which Calvin left "for the free productions of the faith of the Church in legislation and dogma", and instances his treatment of "the Apostolic Church as normative for all times, even for questions of Church constitution", and the little room he left for destructive Biblical criticism. Cf. what is said above of Calvin's adoption of "the Puritan principle" (p. 229).

on the other hand, with his primary emphasis on the authority of Scripture, accredited to us by a distinct act of the Holy Spirit, the watchword becomes obedience; and the horizon of thought is filled with a sense of obligation and legalistic anxiety as to conduct.

How Calvin could have failed to correlate sufficiently closely the testimony of the Spirit with the inner Christian life, or could have emphasized the formal principle of Protestantism at the expense of the material, when he conceived of the witness of the Spirit as just one of the effects of "regeneration", it is difficult to see. So to conceive the testimony of the Spirit is on the contrary to make the formal principle of Protestantism just an outgrowth of the material. It is only because our spirits have been renewed by the Holy Spirit that we see with convincing clearness the *indicia* of God in Scripture, that is, have the Scriptures sealed to us by the Spirit as divine. It is quite possible that Calvin may have particularly emphasized the obligations which grow out of our renewal by the Holy Spirit and the implantation in us of the Spirit of Adoption whereby we become the sons of God—obligations to comport ourselves as the sons of God and to govern ourselves by the law of God's house as given us in His Word; while Luther may have emphasized more the liberty of the Christian man who is emancipated from the law as a condition of salvation and is ushered into the freedom of life which belongs to the children of God. And it is quite possible that in this difference we may find a fundamental distinction between the two types of Protestantism—Lutheran and Reformed—by virtue of which the Reformed have always been characterized by a strong ethical tendency—in thought and in practice. But it is misleading to represent this as due to an insufficient correlation on Calvin's part of the testimony of the Spirit to the divinity of Scripture with the inner Christian life. It would be more exact to say that Calvin in this correlation thinks especially of what in our modern nomenclature we call "regeneration", while the mind of his Lutheran critics is

set more upon justification and that "faith" which is connected with justification. With Calvin, at all events, the recognition of the Scriptures as divine and the hearty adoption of them as the divine rule of our faith and life is just one of the effects of the gracious operation of the Spirit of God on the heart, renewing it into spiritual life, or, what comes to the same thing, one of the gracious activities into which the newly implanted spiritual life effloresces.

Whether we should say also that it was with him the first effect of the creative operation of the Spirit on the heart, the first act of the newly renewed soul, requires some discrimination. If we mean logically first, there is a sense in which we should probably answer this question also in the affirmative. Calvin would doubtless have said that it is in the Scriptures that Christ is proposed to our faith, or, to put it more broadly, that Christ is the very substance of the special revelation documented in the Scriptures, and that the laying hold of Christ by faith presupposes therefore confidence in the revelation the substance of which He is,—which is as much as to say the embracing of the Scriptures in firm faith as a revelation from God. If the Word is the vehicle through which the knowledge of Christ is brought to the soul, it follows of itself that it is only when our minds are filled with a solid reverence for the Word, when by the light of the Spirit we are enabled and prevalently led to see Christ therein, that we can embrace Christ with a sound faith: so that it may truly be said that no man can have the least true and sound knowledge of Christ without learning from Scripture (*cf.* I. ix. 3; I. vi. 2). In this sense Calvin would certainly have said that our faith in Christ presupposes faith in the Scriptures, rather than that we believe in the Scriptures for Christ's sake. But if our minds are set on chronological sequences, the response to the question which is raised is more doubtful. Faith in the revelation the substance of which is Christ and faith in Christ the substance of this revelation are logical implicates which involve one another: and we should probably be nearest to

Calvin's thought if, without raising questions of chronological succession, we should recognize them as arising together in the soul. The real difference between Calvin's and the ordinary Lutheran conception at this point lies in the greater profundity of Calvin's insight and the greater exactness of his analysis. The Lutheran is prone to begin with faith, which is naturally conceived at its apex, as faith in Jesus Christ our Redeemer; and to make everything else flow from this faith as its ultimate root. For what comes before faith, out of which faith itself flows, he has little impulse accurately to inquire. Calvin penetrates behind faith to the creative action of the Holy Spirit on the heart and the new creature which results therefrom, whose act faith is; and is therefore compelled by an impulse derived from the matter itself to consider the relations in which the several activities of this new creature stand to one another and to analyse the faith itself which holds the primacy among them (for trust is the essence of religion, ch. ii), into its several movements. The effect of this is that "efficacious grace"—what we call in modern speech "regeneration"—takes the place of fundamental principle in Calvin's soteriology and he becomes pre-eminently the theologian of the Holy Spirit. In point of fact it is from him accordingly that the effective study of the work of the Holy Spirit takes its rise, and it is only in the channels cut by him and at the hands of thinkers taught by him that the theology of the Holy Spirit has been richly developed.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Cf. the Introduction to the English Translation of Kuyper's *The Work of the Holy Spirit*. Cf. what Pannier, pp. 102-4, says of Calvin's general doctrine of the work of the Spirit and the relation borne to it by his particular doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit to Scripture. "If we pass beyond the two particular chapters whose contents we have been analysing and seek in the *Institutes* from 1536 to 1560 for other passages relating to the Holy Spirit, we shall see Calvin insisting ever more and more and on all occasions,—as in the *Commentaries*,—upon these diverse manifestations of the Holy Spirit, and presenting them all more or less as *testimonies*. He constantly recurs to the natural incapacity of man and the necessity of divine illumination in his mind, and especially in his heart, for the act of faith. It is from this point of view that he brings together the ideas of the Spirit and the Word of God



It is his profound sense of the supernatural origin of all that is good in the manifestations of human life which constitutes the characteristic mark of Calvin's thinking: and it is this which lies at the bottom of and determines his doctrine of the witness of the Holy Spirit. He did not doubt that the act of faith by which the child of God embraces the Scriptures as a revelation of God is his own act and the expression of his innermost consciousness. But neither did he doubt that this consciousness is itself the expression of a creative act of the Spirit of God. And it was on this account that he represented to himself the act of faith performed as resting ultimately on "the testimony

in the definition of faith: 'It is a firm and certain knowledge of the good will of God towards us: which, being grounded in the free promise given in Jesus Christ, is revealed to our heart by the Holy Spirit.' He introduces the same ideas in his introductory remarks on the Apostles' Creed, and they lie at the basis of the explication he gives of the Third Article in all its forms, . . . *e. g.*, in the ed. of 1560: 'In sum, He is set before us as the sole fountain from which all the celestial riches flow down to us. . . . For it is by His inspiration that we are regenerated into celestial life, so as no longer to govern or guide ourselves, but to be ruled by His movement and operation; so that if there is any good in us, it is only the fruit of His grace. . . . But since faith is His prime master-piece, the most of what we read in the Scriptures of His virtue and operation relates itself to this faith, by which He brings us to the brightness of the Gospel, in a manner which justifies calling Him the King by whom the treasures of the kingdom of heaven are offered to us, and His illumination may be called the longing of our souls.' From these quotations it is made plain that the witness of the Holy Spirit which at the opening of the *Institutes* in 1539 appeared as the *means of knowledge*, was thenceforward nevertheless considered, in the progress of the work, as the *means of grace*, and that taking his start from this point of view, Calvin discovered ever more widely extending horizons, so as at the end to speak particularly of the Holy Spirit in at least four different connections, but always—even in the first—in direct and constant relation to faith, with respect to its origin, and with respect to its consequences; and by no means almost exclusively with respect to assurance of the authority of the Scriptures." The progress which Pannier supposes he traces in Calvin's doctrine of the work of the Spirit seems illusory: the general doctrine of the work of the Spirit is already pretty fully outlined in 1536. But the relating of the testimony of the Spirit to Scripture to Calvin's general doctrine of faith as the product of the Spirit is exact and important for the understanding of his teaching. From beginning to end, Calvin

of the Spirit". Its supernatural origin was to him the most certain thing about it. That language very much resembling his own might be employed in a naturalistic sense was, no doubt, made startlingly plain in his own day by the teaching of Castellion. Out of his pantheising rationalism Castellion found it possible to speak almost in Calvin's words. "It is evident", says he, "that the intention and secret counsels of God, hidden in the Scriptures, are revealed only to believers, the humble, the pious, who fear God and have the Spirit of God." If the wicked have sometimes spoken like prophets, they have nevertheless not really understood what they said, but are like magpies in a cage going through the forms of speech without inner apprehension of its meaning.<sup>73</sup> But Castellion meant by this nothing more than that sympathy is requisite to understanding. Since his day multitudes more have employed Calvin's language to express little more than this; and have even represented Calvin's own meaning as nothing more than that the human consciousness acquires by association with God in Christ the power of discriminating the truth of God from falsehood. Nothing could more fundamentally subvert Calvin's whole teaching. The very nerve of his thought is, that the confidence of the Christian in the divine origin and authority

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conceived the confidence of the Christian in Scripture, wrought by the Holy Spirit, as one of the exercises of saving faith. Calvin is ever insistent that all that is good in man comes from the Spirit—whether in the sphere of thought, feeling or act. "It is a notion of the natural man", he says on John xvi. 17 (1553: ix. 47. 33), "to despise all that the Sacred Scriptures say of the Holy Spirit, depending rather on his own reason, and to reject the celestial illumination. . . . For ourselves, feeling our penury, we know that all we have of sound knowledge comes from no other fountain. Nevertheless the words of the Lord Jesus show clearly that nothing can be known of what concerns the Holy Spirit by human sense, but He is known only by the experience of faith". "No one", says he again (*Institutes* of 1543, I. 330), "should hesitate to confess that he attains the knowledge of the mysteries of God only so far as he has been illuminated by God's grace. He that attributes more knowledge to himself is only the more blind that he does not recognize his blindness."

<sup>73</sup> *Opp. Calvini*, xiv. 727-737 (Pannier, as cited, p. 120).

of Scripture and the revelatory nature of its contents is of distinctively supernatural origin, is God-wrought. The testimony of the Spirit may be delivered through the forms of our consciousness, but it remains distinctively the testimony of God the Holy Spirit and is not to be confused with the testimony of our consciousness.<sup>73a</sup> Resting on the language of Rom. viii. 16, from which the term 'testimony of the Spirit' was derived, he conceived it as a co-witness along with the witness of our spirit indeed, but on that very account distinguishable from the witness of our spirit. This particular point is nowhere discussed by him at large, but Calvin's general sense is perfectly plain. That there is a double testimony he is entirely sure—the testimony of our own spirit and that of the Holy Spirit: that these are though distinguishable yet inseparable, he is equally clear: his conception is therefore that this double testimony runs confluent together into one. This is only as much as to say afresh that the testimony of the Holy Spirit is not delivered to us in a propositional revelation, nor by the creating in us of a blind conviction, but along the lines of our own consciousness. In its essence, the act of the Spirit in delivering His testimony, terminates on our nature, or faculties, quickening them so that we feel, judge and act differently from what we otherwise should.

<sup>73a</sup> The classical instance of this confusion is supplied by the teaching of Claude Pajon (1626-1685), who, in accordance with his general doctrine that "without any other grace than that of the Word, God changes the whole man, from his intellect to his passions", explained the "testimony of the Spirit" as nothing else than the effect of the *indicia* of divinity in Scripture on the mind. The effect of these "marks" is a divine effect, because it is wrought in prearranged circumstances prepared for this effect: *facit per alium facit per se*. The conception is essentially deistic. It is no small testimony to the cardinal place which the doctrine of "the testimony of the Spirit" held in the Reformed system of the seventeenth century that Pajon still taught it: and it is no small testimony to its current conception as just "regeneration" that Pajon too identified it with regeneration, explained, of course, in accordance with his fundamental principle that all that God works He works through means. See on the whole matter Jurieu, *Traité de la Nature et de la Grace*, 1688, pp. 25, 26, who quotes alike from Pajon and his followers.

In this sense, the testimony of the Spirit coalesces with our consciousness. We cannot separate it out as a factor in our conclusions, judgments, feelings, actions, consciously experienced as coming from without. But we function differently from before: we recognize God where before we did not perceive Him; we trust and love Him where before we feared and hated Him; we firmly embrace Him in His Word where before we turned indifferently away. This change needs accounting for. We account for it by the action of the Holy Spirit on our hearts: and we call this His "testimony". But we cannot separate His action from our recognition of God, our turning in trust and love to Him and the like. For this is the very form in which the testimony of the Spirit takes effect, into which it flows, by which it is recognized. We are profoundly conscious that of ourselves we never would have seen thus, and that our seeing thus can never find its account in anything in us by nature. We are sure, therefore, that there has come upon us a revolutionary influence from without: and we are sure that this is the act of God. Calvin would certainly have cried as one of his most eloquent disciples cries to-day: "The Holy Spirit is God, and not we ourselves. What we are speaking of is a Spirit which illuminates our spirit, which purifies our spirit, which strives against our spirit, which triumphs over our spirit. And you say this Spirit is nothing but our spirit? By no means. The Holy Spirit, the Spirit of God,—this is God coming into us, not coming from us."<sup>74</sup> It is with equal energy that Calvin declares the supernaturalness of the testimony of the Spirit and repels every attempt to confound it with the human consciousness through which it works. To him this testimony is just God Himself in His intimate working in the human heart, opening it to the light of the truth, that by this illumination it may see things as they really are and so recognize God in the Scriptures with the same directness and surety as men

<sup>74</sup> Doumergue, *Le Problème Protestant* (1892), p. 46 (Pannier, as cited, p. 192).

recognize sweetness in what is sweet and brightness in what is bright. Here indeed lies the very hinge of his doctrine.<sup>75</sup>

It has seemed desirable to enter into some detail with respect to Calvin's doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit, not only because of its intrinsic interest, but also because of its importance for understanding Calvin's doctrine of the knowledge of God and indeed his whole system of truth, and for a proper estimate of his place in the history of

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<sup>75</sup> Pannier, as cited, pp. 188 sq., is quite right in insisting on this. After quoting D. H. Meyer (*De la place et rôle de l'Apologétique dans la théologie protestante* in the *Revue de théologie et des quest. relig.*, Jan., 1893, p. 1) to the effect that "the witness of the Holy Spirit in the heart of Christians is not a subjective phenomenon: it is an objective thing and comes from God",—he continues: "Now this objective character of the witness of the Holy Spirit is precisely what appears to make it 'incomprehensible' to our modern theologians (so A. E. Martin, *La Polemique de R. Simon et J. Le Clerc*, 1880, p. 29: 'This intervention of the Holy Spirit distinct from the individual consciousness appears to us incomprehensible'). We are not speaking of those who venture to pretend that Calvin identifies the witness of the Holy Spirit with 'the intimate feeling' of each Christian. When one takes his place by the side of Castellion he may lawfully say, For me as for him 'the inspiration of the Holy Ghost confounds itself with consciousness; these revelations made to the humble are nothing more than the intuitions of a moral and religious sense fortified by meditation' (Buisson, *Castellion*, I. 304, cf. 201: 'Castellion placed above the tradition of the universal Church his own sense, his own reason, or rather, let us say it all at once, for it is the foundation of the debate, his consciousness'). But when one invokes the real fathers of the real Reformation, ah, please do not take for their's the very opinions they combat. To make of the testimony of the Holy Spirit the equivalent of the testimony of the human spirit, of the individual consciousness, is to deny the real existence and the distinct rôle of the Holy Spirit, is to show that we have nothing in common with the faith expounded by Calvin so clearly, and defended through a century against the attacks of the Catholics as one of the essential bases of the Reformed theology and piety." Again, Pannier is quite right in his declaration (p. 214): "What we deny is that our reason—moral consciousness, religious consciousness, the term is of no importance—can, of itself, *make us see* the divinity of the Scriptures. It is this which *sees* it; but it is the Holy Spirit which *makes us see it*. He is not the inner eye for seeing the truth which is outside of us, but the supernatural hand which comes to open the eye of our consciousness—an eye which is, no doubt, divine in the sense that it too was created by God, but which has been blinded by the consequences of sin."



thought. His doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit is the keystone of his doctrine of the knowledge of God. Men endowed by nature with an ineradicable *sensus deitatis*, which is quickened into action and informed by a rich revelation of God spread upon His works and embodied in His deeds, are yet held back from attaining a sound knowledge of God by the corruption of their hearts, which dulls their instinctive sense of God and blinds them to His revelation in works and deeds. That His people may know Him, therefore, God lovingly intervenes by an objective revelation of Himself in His Word, and a subjective correction of their sin-bred dullness of apprehension of Him through the operation of His Spirit in their hearts, which Calvin calls the Testimony of the Holy Spirit. Obviously it is only through this testimony of the Holy Spirit that the revelation of God, whether in works or Word, is given efficacy: it is God, then, who, through His Spirit, reveals Himself to His people, and they know Him only as taught by Himself. But also on this very account the knowledge they have of Him is trustworthy in its character and complete for its purpose: being God-given, it is safeguarded to us by the dreadful sanction of deity itself. This being made clear, Calvin has laid a foundation for the theological structure—the scientific statement and elaboration of the knowledge of God—than which nothing could be conceived more firm. There remained nothing more for him to do before proceeding at once to draw out the elements of the knowledge of God as they lie in the revelation so assured to us, except to elucidate the *indicia* by which the Christian under the influence of the testimony of the Spirit is strengthened in his confidence that the Scriptures are the very Word of God, and to repudiate the tendency to neglect these Scriptures so authenticated to us in favor of fancied continuous revelations of the Spirit. The former he does in a chapter (ch. viii) of considerable length and great eloquence, which constitutes one of the fullest and most powerful expositions of the evidence for the divine origin of the Scriptures.

which have come down to us from the Reformation age. The latter he does in a briefer chapter (ch. ix), of crisp polemic quality, the upshot of which is to leave it strongly impressed on the reader's mind that the whole knowledge of God available to us, as the whole knowledge of God needful for us, lies objectively displayed in the pages of Scripture, which, therefore, becomes the sole source of a sound exposition of the knowledge of God.

This strong statement is not intended, however, to imply that the Spirit-led man can learn nothing from the more general revelation of God in His works and deeds. Calvin is so far from denying the possibility of a "Natural Theology", in this sense of the word, that he devotes a whole chapter (ch. v) to vindicating the rich revelation of God made in His works and deeds: though, of course, he does deny that any theology worthy of the name can be derived from this natural revelation by the "natural man", that is, by the man the eyes of whose mind and heart are not opened by the Spirit of God,—who is not under the influence of the testimony of the Spirit; and in this sense he denies the possibility of a "Natural Theology". What the strong statement in question is intended to convey is that there is nothing to be derived from natural revelation which is not also to be found in Scripture, whether as necessary presupposition, involved implication or clear statement; and that beside that documented in Scripture there is no supernatural revelation accessible to men. The work of the Spirit of God is not to supplement the revelation made in Scripture, far less to supersede it, but distinctively to authenticate it. It remains true, then, that the whole matter of a sound theology lies objectively revealed to us in the pages of Scripture: and this is the main result to which his whole discussion tends. But side by side with it requires to be placed as a result of his discussion secondary only to this, this further conclusion, directly given in his doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit,—that only a Christian man can profitably theologize. It is in the union of these two great principles that we find

Calvin's view of the bases of a true theology. This he conceives as the product of the systematic investigation and logical elaboration of the contents of Scripture by a mind quickened to the apprehension of these contents through the inward operations of the Spirit of God. It is on this basis and in this spirit that Calvin undertakes his task as a theologian; and what he professes to give us in his *Institutes* is thus, to put it simply, just a Christian man's reading of the Scriptures of God.

The Protestantism of this conception of the task of the theologian is apparent on the face of it. It is probably, however, still worth while to point out that its Protestantism does not lie solely or chiefly in the postulate that the Scriptures are the sole authoritative source of the knowledge of God,—“formal principle” of the Reformation though that postulate be, and true, therefore, as Chillingworth's famous declaration that “the Bible and the Bible only is the religion of Protestants” would be, if only Chillingworth had kept it to this sense. It lies more fundamentally still in the postulate that these Scriptures are accredited to us as the revelation of God solely by the testimony of the Holy Spirit,—that without this testimony they lie before us inert and without effect on our hearts and minds, while with it they become not merely the power of God unto ~~salvation~~, but also the vitalizing source of all our knowledge of God. There is embodied in this the true Protestant principle, superior to both the so-called formal and the so-called material principles—both of which are in point of fact but corollaries of it. For it takes the soul completely and forcibly out of the hands of the Church and from under its domination, and casts it wholly upon the grace of God. In its formulation Calvin gave to Protestantism for the first time, accordingly, logical stability and an inward sense of security. Men were no more puzzled by the polemics of Rome when they were asked, You rest on Scripture alone, you say: but on what does your Scripture rest? Calvin's development of the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit

provided them with their sufficient answer: "On the testimony of the Spirit of God in the heart." Here we see the historical importance of Calvin's formulation of this doctrine. And here we see the explanation of the two great facts which reveal its historical importance, the facts, to wit, that Calvin had no predecessors in the formulation of the doctrine, and that at once upon his formulation of it it became the common doctrine of universal Protestantism.

#### IV. HISTORICAL RELATIONS.

The search for anticipations of the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit among the Fathers and Scholastics<sup>76</sup> reveals only such sporadic assertions of the dependence of man on the inward teaching of the Holy Spirit for the knowledge or the saving knowledge of God as could not fail in the speech of a series of Christian men who had read their Bibles. A sentence of this kind from Justin Martyr,<sup>77</sup> another from Chrysostom,<sup>78</sup> two or three from Hilary of Poitiers,<sup>79</sup> almost exhaust what the first age yields. It is

<sup>76</sup> See especially P. Du Moulin, *Le Iuge des Controverses*, 1636, pp. 294 sq., and cf. Pannier, as cited, pp. 64-68.

<sup>77</sup> Dialogue with Trypho 7 (*Opp.* ed. Otto, I. 32): οὐ γὰρ συνοπτὰ οὐδὲ συννοητὰ πᾶσιν ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ τῷ θεῷ δῶ συνίέναι, καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς αὐτοῦ: "these things cannot be perceived or understood by all, but only by the man to whom God and His Christ have given it to understand them."

<sup>78</sup> In Genes. V. homil. xxi (Migne, liii. 175): Διάτοι τοῦτο προσήκει ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνωθεν χάριτος ὁδηγομένους, καὶ τὴν παρὰ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος ἐλλαμπὴν δεξαμένους οὕτως ἐπιέναι τὰ θεῖα λόγια. "For we must be led by the grace from above, and must receive the illumination of the Holy Spirit, to approach the divine oracles; for it is not human wisdom but the revelation of the Holy Spirit that is needed for understanding the Holy Scriptures." It will be perceived that it is more distinctly the understanding of the Scriptures than the reception of them as from God which is in question with both Justin and Chrysostom.

<sup>79</sup> *De Trinitate*, ii. 34: Animus humanus, nisi per fidem donum Spiritus hauserit, habebit quidem naturam Deum intelligendi, sed lumen scientiae non habebit; iii. 24: non enim concipiunt imperfecta perfectum, neque quod ex alio subsistit, absolute vel auctoris sui potest intelligentiam obtinere, vel propriam; v. 21: neque enim nobis ea natura est, ut se in coelestem cognitionem suis viribus efferat. A Deo descendum est quid de Deo intelligendum sit; quia non nisi se auctore cognoscitur. . . . Loquendum ergo non aliter de Deo est, quam ut ipse ad intelligentiam

different with Augustine. With his profound sense of dependence on God and his vital conviction of the necessity of grace for all that is good in man, in the whole circle of his activities, he could not fail to work out a general doctrine of the knowledge of God in all essentials the same as Calvin's. In point of fact, as we have already pointed out, he did so. There remain, however, some very interesting and some very significant differences between the two.<sup>80</sup> It is interesting to note, for instance, that where Calvin speaks of an innate *sensus deitatis* in man, as lying at the root of all his knowledge of God, Augustine, with a more profound ontology of this knowledge, as at least made explicit in the statement, speaks of a continuous reflection of a knowledge of Himself by God in the human mind.<sup>81</sup> There is here, however, probably only a difference in fulness of statement, or at most only of emphasized aspect. On the other hand, it is highly significant that, instead of Calvin's doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit, Augustine, in conformity with the stress he laid upon the "Church" and the "means of grace" in the conference of grace, speaks of the knowledge of God as attainable only "in the Church".<sup>82</sup> Accordingly, in him also and his successors there are to be found only such anticipations specifically of the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit as are afforded by the increased frequency of their references to the dependence of man for all knowledge of God and divine things on grace and the inward teaching of the heavenly Instructor. The

nostram de se locutus est. Hilary certainly teaches that for such creatures as men there can be no knowledge of God except it be God-taught: but it is not so clear that he teaches that for sinful creatures there must be a special illapse of the Spirit that such as they may know God—may perceive Him in His Word and so recognize that Word as from Him and derive a true knowledge of Him from it. It is this soteriological doctrine which is Calvin's doctrine of the Holy Spirit's testimony: not that ontological one.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. article: *Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and Authority*, in THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW for July and October, 1907.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 360 sq.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 571 sq.



voice of men may assail our ears, says Augustine, for instance, but those remain untaught "to whom that inward unction does not speak, whom the Holy Spirit does not inwardly teach": for "He who teaches the heart has His seat in heaven".<sup>83</sup> Moses himself, yea, even if he spoke to us not in Hebrew but in our own tongue, could convey to us only the knowledge of what he said: of the truth of what he said, only the Truth Himself, speaking within us, in the secret chamber of our thought, can assure us though He speaks neither in Hebrew nor in Greek nor in Latin, nor yet in any tongue of the barbarians, but without organs of voice or tongue and with no least syllabic sound.<sup>84</sup> Further than this men did not get before the Reformation:<sup>85</sup> nor did the first Reformers themselves get further. No doubt they discerned the voice of the Spirit in the Scriptures, as the Fathers did before them; and in a single sentence, written, however, after the *Institutes* of 1539 (viz., in 1555), Melanchthon notes with the Fathers that the mind is "aided in giving its assent" to divine things "by the Holy Spirit".<sup>86</sup> Zwingli here stands on the same plane with his brethren.

<sup>83</sup> *Tract. iii. in Ep. Joan. ad Parthos*, ii. 13 (Migne xxxv. 200 sq.). Again: "There is, then, I say, a Master within that teacheth: Christ teacheth; His inspiration teacheth. Where His inspiration and His unction are not, in vain do words make a noise from without."

<sup>84</sup> *Conf. xi. 3* (Migne. xxxii. 811). Cf. vi. 5 (Migne. xxxii. 723).

<sup>85</sup> Pannier, *loc cit.*, says: "The whole of the testimony of the Holy Spirit is not yet here. Only once is the Holy Spirit Himself named [in these passages from Augustine] in a formal way. But Augustine has the intuition of a mysterious work wrought in the soul of the Christian, of an understanding of the Bible which comes not from man but from a power exterior and superior to him; and he sets forth the rôle which this direct correspondence between the book and the reader may play in the foundation of Christian certitude. In this, as in so many other points, Augustine was the precursor of the Reformation, and a precursor without immediate followers: for except a couple of very vague and isolated hints in Salvianus (*De Provid.*, iii. 1) and Gregory the Great (†604, Homil. in Ezek. I. x), nothing further is found on this subject through ten centuries: it comes into view again at the approach of the new age, when thought aspired to free itself from the Scholastic ruts, with Biel († 1495, *Lib. iii. Sent. dist. 25, dub. 3*) and Cajetan († 1534, *Opera. II. i. 1*)."

<sup>86</sup> *Loci*, ed. 1555 (*Corpus Ref. xxi. 605*).

He strongly repels the Romish establishment of confidence in the Scriptures on the *ipse dixit* of the Church, indeed: and asserts that those who sincerely search the Scriptures are taught by God, and even that none acquire faith in the Word except as drawn by the Father, admonished by the Spirit, taught by the unction,—as, says he, all pious men have found.<sup>87</sup> But such occasional remarks as this could not fail wherever the Augustinian conception of grace was vitally felt; and show only that the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit was always implicit in that doctrine.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>87</sup> *De vera et falsa religione*: Cum constet verbo nusquam fidem haberi quam ubi Pater traxit, Spiritus monuit, unctio docuit . . . hanc rem solae piae mentes norunt. Neque enim ab hominum disceptatione pendet, sed in animis hominum tenacissime sedet. Experientia est, nam pii omnes eam experti sunt. *Articles of 1523* (Niemeyer, *Collectio conf. ref.*, p. 4): Art. 13: Verbo Dei quum auscultant homines pure et sinceriter verbum Dei discunt. Deinde per Spiritum Dei in Deum trahuntur et veluti transformantur. *Von Klarheit und Gewüsse des Worts Gottes* (*Opp.* I. 81): "The Scriptures came from God, not from man; . . . and the God who has shined into them will Himself give you to understand that their speech comes from God": Cf. the interesting biographical account of how he came to depend on the Scriptures only on p. 79.

<sup>88</sup> E. Rabaud, *Hist. de la doct. de l'inspiration*, etc. (1883), pp. 32-33, 42-3, 47 sq., 50, expounds the earlier Reformers as in principle standing on the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit. With respect to the interpretation of Scripture he remarks: "The hermeneutical principle of the witness of the Holy Spirit (if we may speak of it as a principle) is common to all the Reformers. Luther only, without being ignorant of it, makes no use of it. Besides that it responded to the polemic needs, it responded to the aspirations of the faith and of the piety of simple men, better than rational demonstrations" (p. 50, note 4). "In a general way", he remarks, pp. 32-33, "Luther considered the Bible as the sole incontestable and absolute authority. Here is the solid foundation of the edifice, the impregnable citadel in which he shut himself in order to repel all attacks. It is for him, in truth, a religious axiom, a postulate of faith, and not a dogma or a theory; it is revealed to his believing soul independently of all intellectual activity. Thus Luther, trusting in the action of the Holy Spirit, operating through the Scriptures, does not pause to prove its authority, nor to establish it dialectically: it imposes itself; a systematic treatment is not needed. More and more as circumstances demanded it, he gave reasons for his faith and his submission. Poor arguments to modern thinking, but in his times, and commended by his vibrant eloquence and powerful

The same remark applies to the first edition of Calvin's *Institutes* (1536) also, though with a difference. This difference,—that, if we cannot say that the doctrine of the internal testimony of the Spirit to the divinity of the Scriptures is found there already in germ<sup>89</sup> any more than we can say the same of the Augustinian fathers, and the criticism passed<sup>90</sup> on the adduction of Melancthon's single sentence in this reference to the effect that he speaks rather "of the action of the Holy Spirit with reference to the object of faith, that is to say, to the contents of the Word of God" than "with reference to the divinity of the Scriptures themselves", is valid also for Calvin's first edition; yet it is certainly true that the general doctrine of the internal testimony of the Spirit comes much more prominently forward in even the first edition of the *Institutes* than in any preceding treatise of the sort,—that much more is made in it

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personality, possessing a power of persuasion very impressive. . . . It seemed idle to Luther, we may say, to enter into an argument to establish what was evident to him. He did not attempt, therefore, to prove the authority of the Bible,—he asserted it repeatedly in warm words, in passionate declarations, but rarely if ever proceeds by a formal demonstration" (p. 32-33). Raising the question of Zwingli's doctrine of the mode and extent of inspiration (p. 47), he remarks: "No more than the others does Zwingli respond to these questions, which had not yet been raised. God has spoken: the Bible contains His word: that is enough. The divinity of the Bible is once more a fact, an axiom, so much so that he does not dream of establishing it or of defending it."

<sup>89</sup> So Pannier, as cited, p. 63: "Like all the other essential parts of the Reformed Dogmatics, the doctrine of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit is found in germ in the first edition of the *Institutes*, although still without any development. It is almost possible to deny that it exists there, as has been done with predestination. Nevertheless if the doctrine is not yet scientifically formulated, it may yet be perceived to preëxist necessarily as an essential member of the complete body of doctrine which is slowly to grow up." When Pannier comes, however (pp. 72-77), to expound in detail the germs of the doctrine as they lie in the edition of 1536, it turns out that there is not only no full development of the doctrine in that edition, but also no explicit mention of it, as it is applied to the conviction which the Christian has of the divinity of Scripture; so that it preëxists in this edition only as implicit in its general doctrine of the Spirit and His work.

<sup>90</sup> By Pannier, p. 69.

than in any of its predecessors of the poverty of the human spirit and the need and actuality of the prevalent influence of the Spirit of God that man may have—whether in knowledge or act—any good thing. We shall have to go back to Augustine to find anything comparable to the conviction and insight with which even in this his earliest work Calvin urges these things. Calvin's whole thought is already dominated by the conception of the powerlessness of the human soul in its sin in all that belongs to the knowledge of God which is salvation, and its entire dependence on the sovereign operations of the Holy Spirit: and in this sense it may be said that the chapters in the new *Institutes* of 1539 in which he develops this doctrine of the noëtic effects of sin and their cure by objective revelation, documented in Scripture, and subjective illumination wrought by the Holy Spirit, lay implicitly in his doctrine of man's need and its cure by the indwelling Spirit which pervades the *Institutes* of 1536. There he already teaches that the written law was required by the decay of our consciousness of the law written on the heart; that to know God and His will we have need to surpass ourselves; that it is the Spirit dwelling in us that is the source of all our right knowledge of God; and that it is due to the power of the Spirit alone "that we hear the word of the Holy Gospel, that we accept it by faith, and that we abide in this faith" (p. 137). With eminent directness and simplicity he already there tells us that "our Lord first teaches and instructs us by His Word; secondarily confirms us by His sacraments; and thirdly by the light of His Holy Spirit illuminates our understandings and gives entrance into our hearts both to the Word and to the Sacraments, which otherwise would only beat upon our ears and stand before our eyes, without penetrating or operating beneath them" (p. 206). There is, in other words, very rich teaching in the *Institutes* of 1536 of the entire dependence of sinful man on the Spirit of God for every sound religious movement of the soul: but there is no development of the precise doctrine of the testimony of

the Holy Spirit to the divinity of the Scriptures. It is not merely that the term *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* does not occur in this early draft, or occurs only once, and then not in this sense:<sup>91</sup> it is that the thing is not explicated and is present only as implicated in the general doctrine of grace, which is very purely conceived.

It was left, then, to the edition of 1539 to create the whole doctrine at, as it were, a single stroke.<sup>92</sup> For, as we have already had occasion to note, Calvin's whole exposition of the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit to the divinity of Scripture appears all at once in its completeness in the second edition of the *Institutes*, the first edition which he issued as a text-book on theology, that of 1539. This exposition was reproduced without curtailment or alteration in all subsequent editions, and is thereby given the great endorsement of Calvin's permanent approval: while the additions which are made to it in the progressive expansion of the treatise, while large in amount, are rather devoted to guarding it from the misapprehension as if the necessity it asserted for the testimony of the Spirit in any way detracted from the objective value of the *indicia* of the divinity of Scripture, than modify the positive doctrine expounded. The additions within the limits of chapter vii consist essentially of the insertion of the discussion of

<sup>91</sup> Pannier, as cited, p. 77, notes that "the words: *testimonio Spiritus Sancti* occur only a single time, at the end, and in the old sense of—"by the divinely inspired Scriptures". He refers to the ed. of 1536, p. 470, that is, *Opp.* I. 228: and notes that this passage was dropped in the edition of 1559 (*Opp.* IV. 796, note 5). The passage runs: "Thus Hezekiah is praised by the testimony of the Holy Spirit"—that is, obviously, "by the inspired Scriptures"—"for having broken up the brazen serpent which Moses had made by Divine command."

<sup>92</sup> Köstlin, as cited, p. 411, strongly states these facts. The whole of the discussion on the sources and norms of religious truth "is altogether lacking in the original form" of the *Institutes*: "Calvin worked out this section for the first time for the edition of 1539": but it is found here already thoroughly done, "in all its fundamental traits already complete and mature". He adds that the Lutheran dogmatists (as well as the Reformed) at once, however, took up the construction of Calvin and made it their own.



Augustine's doctrine in § 3 and of the caveat with reference to the underestimation of the *indicia* in § 4, while practically the whole of chapter viii—all except the opening sentence—is of later origin. If we will omit the first sentence of chapter vii, the whole of §§ 3 and 4, with the exception of the sentence near the beginning of the latter, which begins: "Now if we wish to consult the true intent of our conscience"—and the beginning and end of § 5, retaining only the central passage beginning: "For though it conciliate our reverence . . . " down to the words: "Superior to the power of any human will or knowledge", and also the two striking sentences, beginning with: "It is such a persuasion" and ending with "a just explication from heaven"—we shall have substantially the text of the edition of 1539, needing only to add the two opening sentences of chapter viii and the major part of chapter ix. It will at once be seen that the edition of 1539 contains the entire positive exposition of the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit as retained by Calvin to the end.

The formulation of this principle of the testimony of the Spirit by Calvin in 1539 had an extraordinary effect both immediate and permanent.<sup>93</sup> Universal Protestantism perceived in it at sight the pure expression of the Protestant principle and the sheet-anchor of its position. The Lutherans as well as the Reformed adopted it at once and made

<sup>93</sup> The history of the doctrine among the Reformed is touched on by A. Schweizer, *Glaubenslehre*, I. § 32; among the old Lutherans by Klaiber, *Die Lehre der altprotestantischen Dogmatiker von dem test. Sp. Sancti in the Jahrbücher für d. Theologie*, 1857, pp. 1-53. Its history among French theologians is traced by Pannier, as cited, Part III, pp. 139-181, cf. 186-193: his notes on the history outside of France (pp. 181-185) are very slight. On pp. 161-163 Pannier essays to gather together, chiefly, as it appears, from the scattered citations in the Protestant controversialists of the seventeenth century (p. 162, note 2), the hints which appear in the Romish writers, mainly Jesuits of the early seventeenth century, of recognition of the internal work of the Holy Spirit illuminating the soul. These bear more or less resemblance to the Protestant doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit. Some of the passages he cites are quite striking, but do not go beyond the common boundaries of universal Christian supernaturalism.

it the basis not only of their reasoned defence of Protestantism, but also of their structure of Christian doctrine and of their confidence in Christian living.<sup>94</sup> To it they both continued to cling so long and so far as they continued faithful to the Protestant principle itself. It has given way only as the structure of Protestantism has itself given way in reaction to the Romish position, or, more widely, as the structure of Christian thought has given way in rationalizing disintegration. No doubt it has undergone at the hands of its various expounders, from time to time, more or less modification, and in its journeyings to the ends of the earth, has suffered now and again some sea-change,—sometimes through sheer misapprehension, sometimes through sheer misrepresentation, sometimes through more or less admixture of both. A spurious revival of the doctrine was, for example, set on foot by Schleiermacher in his strong revulsion from the cold rationalism which had so long reigned in Germany to a more vital religious faith; and sentences may be quoted from his writings which, when removed out of the context of his system of thought, almost give expression to it.<sup>95</sup> But after all, his revival of it was

<sup>94</sup> In his brief remarks on the subject in his *Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus*, I, 1908, p. 178 sq., Otto Ritschl seeks to discriminate between the Reformed and Lutherans in their conception of the testimony of the Spirit; but his discrimination touches rather the application than the essence of the matter.

<sup>95</sup> Some of them are cited, *e. g.*, by Schweizer, as cited, followed, *e. g.*, by Pannier, as cited (p. 186)—such as: "Faith is already presupposed when a peculiar authority is conceded to Scripture"—"The recognition of what is canonical comes into existence only gradually and progressively, since the sense for the truly Apostolic is a gracious gift which grows up only gradually in the Church",—"Faith cannot be established in unbelievers by the Scriptures, so that their divine authority is in the first instance proved from merely rational considerations."—There is much that is true and well said in such remarks, and they enrich the writings of Schleiermacher and his followers with a truly spiritual element. But at bottom the central position occupied is vitiated by the use of "faith" as an "undistributed middle", and the remarks of writers of this type do not so much tend to exalt the place of saving faith as to depress the authority of Scripture, by practically denying the existence or validity of *fides humana*. That attitude towards the Scriptures which

rather the revival of subjectivity in religion than of the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit as the basis of all faith: and it has borne bitter fruit in a widespread subjectivism, the mark of which is that it discards (as "external")

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gladly and heartily recognizes them as the Word of the Living God, and with all delight in them as such, seeks to subject all thought and feeling and action to their direction, certainly is, if not exactly a product of "true faith", yet (as the Westminster Confession defines it) an exercise of true faith, and a product of that inward creative operation of the Holy Spirit from which all true faith comes: that keen taste for the divine which is the outgrowth of the spiritual gift of discrimination—the "distinguishing of things that differ" which Paul gives a place among Christian graces—is assuredly a "gift of grace" which may grow more and more strong as the Christian life effloresces; and such a taste for the divine cannot be awakened in unbelievers by the natural action of the Scriptures or any rational arguments whatever, but requires for its production the work of the Spirit of God *ab extra accidens*. But it is a totally different question whether the peculiarity of Scripture as a divine revelation can call out no intellectual recognition in the minds of inquiring men, but must remain wholly hidden and produce no mental reaction conformable to its nature, until true faith has already been born in the heart: whether there are no valid tests of what is apostolical except a spiritual sense for the truly apostolical which can only gradually grow up in the Church; whether the unbeliever may not be given a well-grounded intellectual conviction of the apostolic origin, the canonical authority and the divine character of Scripture by the presentation to him of rational evidence which, however unwillingly on his part, will compel his assent. The question here is not whether this *fides humana* is of any great use in the spiritual life: the question is whether it is possible and actual. We may argue, if we will, that it is not worth while to awake it—though opinions may differ there: but how can we argue that it is a thing inherently impossible? To say this is not merely to say that reason cannot save, which is what Calvin said and all his followers: it is to say that salvation is intrinsically unreasonable,—which neither Calvin nor any of his true followers could for a moment allow. Sin may harden the heart so that it will not admit, weigh or yield to evidence: but sin, which affects only the heart subjectively, and not the process of reasoning objectively, cannot alter the relations of evidence to conclusions. Sin does not in the least degree affect the cogency of any rightly constructed syllogism. No man, no doubt, was ever reasoned into the kingdom of heaven: it is the Holy Spirit alone who can translate us into the kingdom of God's dear Son. But there are excellent reasons why every man should enter the kingdom of heaven; and these reasons are valid in the forum of every rational mind, and their validity can and should be made manifest to all.

the authority of those very Scriptures to which the testimony of the Spirit is borne. Not in such circles is the continued influence of the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit to be sought or its continued advocacy to be found. If we would see it in its purity in the modern church we must look for it in the hands of true successors of Calvin—in the writings, to name only men of our own time, of William Cunningham<sup>96</sup> and Charles Hodge<sup>97</sup> and Abraham Kuyper<sup>98</sup> and Herman Bavinck.<sup>99</sup>

As we have already had occasion to note, the principle of the testimony of the Spirit as the true basis of our confidence in the Scriptures as the Word of God was almost from the hands of Calvin himself incorporated into the Reformed Creeds. We have already pointed out the sharpness and strength of its expression in the Gallican (1557-1571) and Belgian (1501-1571) Confessions, and it finds at least the expression of suggestion in the Second Helvetic Confession (1562). It was not, however, merely into the Confessions of the Reformation age that it was incorporated. It is given an expression as clear as it is prudent, as decided as it is comprehensive, in that confession of their faith which the persecuted Waldenses issued after the massacres of 1655;<sup>100</sup> and it is incorporated into the Westminster Confession of Faith (1646) in perhaps the best and most balanced statement it has ever received,—the phraseology of which is obviously derived in large part from Calvin, either directly or through the intermediation of George Gillespie,<sup>101</sup> but the substance of which was but the expression

<sup>96</sup> *Theological Lectures*, etc., N. Y., 1878, pp. 317, 320 sq.

<sup>97</sup> *The Way of Life*, 1841; also *Systematic Theology*, as per Index.

<sup>98</sup> *Encyclopædie*, etc., II. 505 sq.

<sup>99</sup> *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, ed. 1, vol. I. 142-5, 420-22, 490-1.

<sup>100</sup> Written, no doubt, by Léger, moderator at the time of "the Table", and preserved for us in his *Histoire générale des églises évangéliques des vallées de Piémont* (1669), I. 112 (cf. 92). See Pannier, as cited, 133.

<sup>101</sup> Dr. A. F. Mitchell (*The Westminster Assembly, its History and Standards*, the Baird Lecture for 1882, ed. 2, 1897, p. 441, note), following Prof. J. S. Candlish (*Brit. and For. Ev. Rev.*, 1877, p. 173), is "very sure" that Gillespie has here left his mark on the Confession". The

of that culminating Confession of the Reformed churches.

"We recognize the divinity of these sacred books", says the Waldensian Confession (ch. iv), "not only through the testimony of the Church, but principally through the eternal and indubitable truth of the doctrine which is contained in them, through the excellence, sublimity and majesty of the pure divinity (*du tout divine*) which are apparent in them, and through the operation of the Holy Spirit which makes us receive with deference the testimony which the Church gives

*Miscellany Questions*, in the XXI of which occurs the passage from Gillespie from which the Confession is supposed to have drawn, was a posthumous work, published in 1649; but a number of the papers of which it is made up have the appearance of being briefs drawn up by Gillespie for his own satisfaction, or as preparations for speeches, or possibly even as papers handed in to committees, during the discussions of the Westminster Assembly. The language in question, however, whether in Gillespie or in the Confession, is so strongly reminiscent of Calvin, that the possibility seems to remain open that the resemblance between Gillespie and the Confession is due to their common relation to Calvin. Here is the passage in Gillespie (*Presbyterian Armoury* ed., pp. 105-106): "The Scripture is known to be indeed the word of God by the beams of divine authority it hath in itself, and by certain distinguishing characters, which do infallibly prove it to be the Word of God; such as the heavenliness of the matter; the majesty of the style; the irresistible power over the conscience; the general scope, to abase man and to exalt God; nothing driven at but God's glory and man's salvation; the extraordinary holiness of the penmen of the Holy Ghost, without respect to any particular interests of their own, or of others of their nearest relations (which is manifest by their writings); the supernatural mysteries recorded therein, which could never have entered into the reason of men; the marvellous consent of all parts and passages (though written by divers and several penmen), even where there is some appearance of difference; the fulfilling of prophecies; the miracles wrought by Christ, by the prophets and apostles; the conservation of the Scriptures against the malice of Satan and fury of persecutors;—these and the like are characters and marks which evidence the Scriptures to be the Word of God; yet all these cannot beget in the soul a full persuasion of faith that the Scriptures are the Word of God; this persuasion is from the Holy Ghost in our hearts. And it hath been the common resolution of sound Protestant writers (though now called in question by the sceptics of this age [the allusion being to "Mr. J. J. Godwin in his Hagiomastix"]) that these arguments and infallible characters in the Scripture itself, which most certainly prove it to be the Word of God, cannot produce a certainty of persuasion in our hearts, but this is done by the Spirit of God



to them, which opens our eyes to receive the rays of the celestial light which shines in the Scriptures, and so corrects our taste that we discern this food by the divine savor which it possesses." The dependence of this fine statement on Calvin's exposition is evident; but what is most striking about it is the clarity with which it conceives and the fulness with which it expounds the exact mode of working of the testimony of the Spirit and its relation to the *indicia* of divinity in Scripture, through which, and not apart from or in opposition to which, it performs its work. So far within us, according to these Scriptures, 1 Cor. ii. 10-15; 1 Thes. i. 5; 1 John ii. 27; v. 6-8, 10; John vi. 45".—Whatever may be the immediate source of the Confessional statement, Calvin is clearly the real source of Gillespie's statement.—For the essence of the matter Gillespie's discussion is notably clear and exact, particularly with reference to the relation of the *indicia* to the testimony of the Spirit, a matter which he strangely declares had not to his knowledge been discussed before. The clarity of his determinations here is doubtless due to the specific topic which he is in this Question investigating, viz., the validity of the argument from marks and fruits of sanctification to our interest in Christ: a parallel question in the broader soteriological sphere to the place of *indicia* in our conviction of the divinity of Scripture, which he therefore uses illustratively for his main problem. "It may be asked", he remarks, "and it is a question worthy to be looked into (though I must confess I have not read it, nor heard it, handled before), How doth the assurance by marks agree with or differ from assurance by the testimony of the Holy Spirit? Has the soul here assurance either way, or must there be a concurrence of both (for I suppose they are not one and the same thing) to make up the assurance?" (105). He proves that they are "not one and the same thing"; and then shows solidly that for assurance there "must be a concurrence of both". "To make no trial by marks", he says, "and to trust an inward testimony, under the notion of the Holy Ghost's testimony, when it is without the least evidence of any true gracious marks, this way (of its nature, and intrinsically, or in itself) is a deluding and ensnaring of conscience" (p. 105). That is to say, a blind confidence and conviction, without cognizable grounds in evidence cannot be trusted. Again and very clearly: "So that, in the business of assurance and full persuasion, the evidences of graces and the testimony of the Spirit, are two concurrent causes or helps, both of them necessary. Without the evidence of graces, it is not a safe nor a well-grounded assurance" (p. 106). It remains only to add that while arguing this out in the wider soteriological sphere, Gillespie appears to take it as a matter of course in the accrediting of the Scriptures as divine—giving that case, in the course of his argument, as an illustration to aid in determining his conclusion.

of the firmly held faith of the whole body of the framers from supposing that the witness of the Spirit is of the nature of a new and independent revelation from heaven or works only a blind faith in us, setting thus aside all evidences of the divinity of Scripture, external and internal alike, this careful statement particularly explains that our faith in the divinity of Scripture rests, under the testimony of the Spirit, on these evidences as its ground, but not on these evidences by themselves, but on them as apprehended by a Spirit-led mind and heart—the work of the Spirit consisting in so dealing with our spirit that these evidences are, under His influence, perceived and felt in their real bearing and full strength.

An even more notable statement of the whole doctrine is that incorporated into the Westminster Confession (I. 4. 5), and in a more compressed form into the Larger Catechism (Q. 4). "The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed", says the Confession, "dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God (who is truth itself) the author thereof; and therefore it is to be received, because it is the Word of God. We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to a high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our heart." In the Larger Catechism this is reduced to the form: "The Scriptures manifest themselves to be the Word of God, by their majesty and purity; by the consent of all the parts,

and the scope of the whole, which is to give all glory to God; by their light and power to convince and convert sinners, to comfort and build up believers unto salvation; but the Spirit of God bearing witness by and with the Scriptures in the heart of man, is alone able fully to persuade it that they are the very Word of God." The fundamental excellence of this remarkable statement (for the full understanding of which what is said of "faith" in chapter xiv of the Confession and Question 72 of the Catechism should be compared with it—just as Calvin referred his readers to his later discussion of 'faith' for further information on the topic of the testimony of the Spirit) is the care with which the several grounds on which we recognize the Scriptures to be from God are noted and their value appraised, and yet the supreme importance of the witness of the Spirit is safeguarded.<sup>102</sup> The external testimony of the Church is noted and its value pointed out: it moves and induces us to a high and reverent esteem for Scripture. The internal testimony of the characteristics of the Scriptures themselves is noted and its higher value pointed out: they "abundantly evidence" or "manifest" the Scriptures "to be the Word of God". The need and place of the testimony of the Spirit is then pointed out in the presence of this "abundant evidencing" or "manifesting": it is not to add new evidence,—which is not needed,—but to secure deeper conviction,—which is needed: and not independently of the Word with its evidencing characteristics, but "by and with the Word" or "the Scriptures". What this evidence of the Spirit does is "*fully* to persuade us" that "the Scriptures are the very Word of God",—to work in us "*full* persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority" of the Word of God. It is a matter of completeness of conviction, not of grounds of conviction: and the testimony of the

<sup>102</sup> For the meaning of the Confession's statement, supported by illustrative excerpts from its authors, see *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, IV. 604-627; and cf. W. Cunningham, *Theological Lectures*, N. Y., 1878, pp. 320 sq, and *The Presbyterian Quarterly*, Jan'y, 1894, p. 22.

Spirit works, therefore, not by adding additional grounds of conviction, but by an inward work on the heart, enabling it to react upon the already "abundant evidence" with a really "full persuasion and assurance". Here we have the very essence of Calvin's doctrine, almost in his own words, and with even more than his own eloquence and precision of statement.

What Calvin has given to the Reformed Churches, therefore, in his formulation of the doctrine of the Testimony of the Spirit is a fundamental doctrine, which has been as such expounded by the whole body of their theologians, and incorporated into the fabric of their public Confessions, so that it has been made and continues to be until to-day the officially declared faith of the Reformed Churches in France and Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Scotland and America, wherever the fundamental Reformed Creeds are still professed.

*Princeton.*

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

# REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

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## PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS. Edited by JAMES HASTINGS, M.A., D.D., Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute; Member of the Council of the Palestine Exploration Fund; Editor of *Dictionary of the Bible*, and *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*. With the Assistance of JOHN A. SELBIE, M.A., and other scholars. VOLUME I: A—ART. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1908. Imperial 8vo.; pp. xxii, 903, double columns; with illustrations and plates. Price, \$7.00 net, cloth; \$9.00, half morocco. (Sold only in sets: ten to twelve volumes.)

The first volume of Dr. Hastings' new encyclopædia makes a very handsome appearance. The type and the column are apparently the same as in the *Dictionary of the Bible* and the *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*; and we are sorry to say we cannot commend this type, which seems to make a singularly severe demand upon the eyes. But by the omission of the ruling around the page and an increase in the width of the margin, and above all by a change in the paper, a much clearer and more attractive page is secured than in the earlier *Dictionaries*. More is done also to render the use of the *Encyclopædia* convenient. The list of authors who have contributed to the volume contains an intimation of the articles written by each. This is an excellent innovation. A still more excellent innovation is the printing of a page (p. xv) of topic-headings, which do not occur in the *Encyclopædia*, but the topics represented by which are treated under other heads. This will enable the reader to find 'Aben Ezra', for example (under 'Ibn Ezra'), or 'Adventism' (under 'Chiliasm'), or 'Affinity' (under 'Blood Relationship'), and not hastily conclude that the *Encyclopædia* has overlooked such topics. The articles are ordinarily, moreover, divided into numbered sections, with headings in black type; and sometimes a summary of their contents is given at the outset in a sort of 'table of contents'. These expedients place the substance of the articles more readily at the command of the reader.

The cosmopolitanism of scholarship is illustrated anew by the list of writers whom Dr. Hastings has called to his aid in the preparation of the matter of the volume. Nearly two hundred have been engaged on the work. About a sixth of these are Americans (some 33); about a



tenth Germans (some 25); something over a twelfth Frenchmen (some 14); while a few more are derived from still other foreign sources—two or three each are Dutchmen, Belgians, Finns, Scandinavians, Hindoos; and there are also Armenians, Japs, and even an Apache Indian. It belongs also to the emancipation of scholarship from conventional bonds that we meet in this list of presumable authorities on questions of religious and moral erudition such names as Mrs. Rhys Davids, Catherine Julia Gaskell, Mary Alicia Owen, Mary Mills Patrick, Bertha Maud Horack Shamburgh, Florence Melian Stawell. *Place aux dames!* It is a principle Dr. Hastings seems to have acted on when he gave Miss Shambaugh twenty-one columns in which to tell about the "Amana Society"—a type of religious thought the influence of which is apparently confined within the narrow limits of 1800 souls. Dr. Hastings in his Preface offers no doubt an explanation of this generous allotment of space to an insignificant movement; but it is questionable if the explanation will not read to most of us more as an apology than as a justification.

The question of the proportionate distribution of space in a book like this is to be sure one of the most difficult which confronts an editor. It certainly is not a simple question. There are many other things which have to be considered besides the relative importance of the topics; and all judgments of the relative importance of the topics are not likely to agree. For the critic to object to the editor's assignment of space commonly means little more, therefore, than that he and the editor think differently in the matter. Even so, however, it is not unfair to say that Dr. Hastings' assignments of space seem sometimes bewildering. There are few greater topics than Art, and there is a great deal that is very important said in the two great articles 'Architecture', 'Art', in this volume. But the volume, which covers nearly the whole of the letter A, has only 900 pages in it; and nearly 205 of these—nearly one-quarter of the whole—are given to these two topics 'Architecture' and 'Art'. In an encyclopedia specifically of religion and ethics, that strikes us as excessive. This is not the only instance in which the special character of the encyclopædia seems to be lost sight of. Here is an article—a most excellent article—for example, on 'A Priori', extending to sixteen columns, much of it cast into fine type. There are applications of the *a priori*, no doubt, both to ethics and religion: but does the article itself, or the topic itself, fall naturally into either category? And here is an admirable article on 'Aristotle, Aristotelianism', one of the shorter articles—shorter, though one of them is on 'Arianism' and another on 'Arminianism', both of which, if they do not deserve well of religion, yet loom largely in the history of that religion which we call Christianity—which seem to keep 'Architecture' and 'Art' from running into each other and absorbing the volume. Aristotelianism also has certainly played a great part in the history of that same religion: but we hear nothing of that here, though, to be sure, we are bidden to look for 'Scholasticism', where no doubt the story will be told. Aristotle, too, had an ethical system, which is very appropriately (and

finely) outlined here, but not as if it were the main matter of concernment. In short, the article is just what an article on 'Aristotle, Aristotelianism' ought to be—in a general Encyclopædia, or an Encyclopædia of Philosophy or of Classical Biography. It has no particular adjustment to this special encyclopædia. And here is a good short article on 'Anæsthesia': we have profited from reading it—but we have looked in vain in it for any allusion to or connection with ethics or religion. The editor, it will be seen, has interpreted the scope of the *Encyclopædia* broadly. This has its advantages,—and its disadvantages. We get much more in the book than the title gives us right to expect,—much of which, perhaps, as it was not to be looked for in this *Encyclopædia*, will possibly not be looked for in it. But, as a consequence, we get perhaps less than the title might lead us to expect,—the articles more properly falling in its special field being unduly compressed to make room for those which possibly might just as well be reserved for another place.

Among the topics which seem out of place in this encyclopædia are those on the technical terms of evolutionary speculation—unless, indeed, we are to conceive 'Evolution' a religion. Such articles are those on 'Accommodation', 'Adaptation'—even 'Abiogenesis' (to which are given *two* articles of the same general import, with an additional cross-reference to yet a third, 'Biogenesis', which must cover again much the same ground). Both authors who write on 'Abiogenesis' would apparently commend it to us as the formula for the origin of life, Prof. J. A. Thompson with caution and scientific hesitancy, Mr. Edward Clodd with bold assertiveness. Mr. Clodd does not indeed tell us, as another recent writer does, with unconscious repetition of the Greek myth, that the atmosphere quickened the sea and begot life,—and prove it, as the author in question does, by a chemical analysis of the alleged parents. "The elements contained in sea-water", we read in this remarkable statement, "are sodium, calcium, magnesium, potassium, chlorine, sulphur, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and iron. The composition of the air is nitrogen, oxygen, and carbon. *The elements contained in living matter are these identical things.* In the heavy carbonated air above, and in the solvent water on the land beneath, there lay in mobile contiguity the essential elements of living matter." "We see, then, for there is no other way out of it, that not only did the air and water at the beginning of things contain in contiguity the elements of living matter, but that these elements did naturally unite to form this living matter." Mr. Edward Clodd, on the contrary, contents himself with the broad declaration, as one "generally accepted by biologists", that "in its passage from the nebulous to the more or less solid state, our globe reached a temperature and general conditions which made possible the evolution of the organic from the inorganic". It would be interesting to know what this temperature was, and what were these "general conditions". But though "the inter-relation between living and lifeless matter is a fundamental canon of the theory of evolution, which recognizes no

break in continuity", it has apparently no evidence for it as yet available, except the theory of evolution itself. This freedom of speculative construction is not confined, however, to evolutionary biology. It has invaded history and archæology as well. How little the declarations of the Scriptures can stand against it may be observed from such articles as those on 'Adam', 'Antediluvians', 'Ark'. Professor Kennett, who writes the last of these, thinks he knows what was in the Ark much better than so late a writer as the Deuteronomist. It was the brazen-serpent! The Ark was originally the box in which a snake was kept, which the Israelites worshipped, and there was subsequently substituted for it "the bronze seraph, or, to call it by the name by which it is generally known, the brazen serpent." It was, in a word, the shrine of the serpent—the god of fertility. These be thy gods, O Israel! Fortunately, Professor Kennett's pseudo-scientific speculations are no more authoritative than Mr. Clodd's: there is no more reason for believing that the Ark was the shrine of the serpent than that life is the product of "a certain temperature" and "certain general conditions".

It gives the reader an odd impression; we may remark in passing, to turn over a few pages and read the article 'Adaptation' in close conjunction with these on 'Abiogenesis'. Evolution, we learn, is simply a process of 'Adaptation'. The fittest in every generation survives; that is to say, there is a constant progress towards more perfect adaptation. Why, then, one may well ask, has there not been a tolerable adaptation attained long ago? Or, remembering 'abiogenesis', we may rather ask, Why was there not a perfect adaptation from the beginning? If the living organism is in the first instance the spontaneous production of the 'environment' it is inconceivable that it should not begin by being in perfect adaptation to it. How could the environment produce an organization out of adaptation to itself? And starting thus in perfect adaptation to its environment, how could the living organism ever get out of this adaptation to the environment of which it is not only at the start but throughout merely the expression? From start to finish the 'environment' is but the mold in which the organism is cast, and the cast surely must repeat the features of the mold. If the mold changes the cast changes with it, that is all: and it is not so much a question of 'adaptation' which implies a certain independence of mold and cast, as of simple reproduction. The evolutionary idea here resembles very closely what we read of Alice in the Looking Glass, who, we remember, had to run with all her might just to keep standing still. And here another difficulty faces us. This living organism which is in the first instance the spontaneous product of its environment and must therefore begin in perfect adaptation to its environment—of which it is indeed but the expression; and which continues ever but the product of its environment and should therefore steadily express its environment and change only as it changes that it may abide in complete adaptation to it—does nothing of the sort. On the contrary, it from the beginning spurns the slime (of which it is just the expression)

and soars upwards and advances steadily to higher and higher things! That is what has happened. The law of development of organic forms has not been to ever closer and closer adaptation to the environment. They began ('abiogenesis' being postulated) in perfect adaptation to the environment. The law of their development has been to ever fuller, richer, more elevated manifestations of what looks very much like a new thing with forces all its own, which struggles with its environment and conquers it; which ends, indeed, by adapting its environment to itself. This is not the behaviour of crystals, say, which form themselves in pools of evaporating sea-water; and dissolve again and reform afresh as the water is alternately diluted by the rain or wasted by the sun—but never stand over against the mother-water and insist on going their own way. It is all very puzzling—on the postulates of the thoroughgoing evolutionism of Mr. Clodd, which Mr. Clodd tells us is the doctrine (unuttered or expressed, we may suppose) of all biologists.

Let us return, however, to our *Encyclopædia*, which goes out of its way to teach these puzzling things. The mass of the articles, of course, are those which one would naturally look for in an encyclopædia of religion and ethics, and so far as can be judged the vocabulary is very full. Nearly every name of importance in the history of religion and ethics will be found here, either the subject of a separate article or referred to in more general discussions: and if an index of names is supplied the *Encyclopædia* will be a very full guide to the leaders of religious and ethical thought. The major topics of religious and ethical import are all treated: and, what is more noticeable, a place has been found for a wealth of minor topics—down even to such as 'Accidie' and 'Action Sermon'. There are some unexpected omissions, however, among these minor topics: for example, our eye catches the heading 'Accommodation', and in an *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* we naturally expect to find it a discussion of the ethics of so-called 'accommodation' in teaching. It proves to treat, however, only of evolutionary and psychological 'accommodation'. We wonder whether, when 'Economy' comes to be dealt with, it will be only a 'political' (or perhaps 'household') economy, to the exclusion of ethical, that will be touched on?

We have been ourselves, naturally, interested particularly in the articles which deal with topics belonging to the history of the Christian religion, and especially to the history of Christian thought. There are many of these, some comprehensive and some more particular, and in the main they are sufficiently careful and full, although as a class they do not show a very firm grasp of either the substance or the development of doctrine. Two of them we have already mentioned, as among the shorter articles somewhat in danger of being crushed out of sight between the great articles, 'Architecture', 'Art'—those on 'Arianism' and 'Arminianism'. These are very fair samples of all of their class. 'Arianism' is dealt with quite externally, in the main correctly enough, but without insight. No one could derive from the article any real



comprehension of the place of Arianism in the history of Christian thought, or of the internal development of the doctrine. Arminianism, on the other hand, is, from the point of view of a convinced Arminian, very fairly presented. The article is rambling, not to say repetitious, and not very exact in its statements, but, on the whole, leaves on the mind a generally clear view of the nature of Arminianism. It opens, to be sure, with an amazing account of the Calvinistic doctrine of the decree. Dr. Lindsay, in the article on 'Amyraldianism', had already spoken of this, if not wisely yet not altogether without prudence. But here we hear of the "decree of salvation" being "antecedent to the Fall" (not to the decree of the Fall); and of this being a party position, that is, Supralapsarian; while the characteristic of Infralapsarianism is the "connecting the Fall with the permission of God, instead of His foreordination". Confusion could not easily be more confounded. Of course, no Calvinist imagines that a decree of God was made subsequent to any event in time; and all Calvinists hold that the Fall was permitted, and that it was also foreordained. The difference between Supralapsarianism and Infralapsarianism was (and is) merely whether in the order of thought the foreordination of the Fall (which both teach) as a thing permitted to occur (which both teach) precedes or follows the foreordination of some men to life and some men to death (which both teach). Why will men persist in writing on such themes so mechanically that they do not even consider the meaning of the terms they employ? The language elsewhere in the article and that even in matters of the first significance is often very misleading. Thus, for example, we read: "The Remonstrance is first negative, stating the five Calvinist articles in order to reject them." "*The five Calvinist articles*",—by no means. What was stated was five articles selected by the Remonstrants from the Calvinistic doctrinal sum, to be attacked by them. Proceeding, we read that the Synod of Dort "promulgated five heads of doctrines of its own". What was done by the Synod was to set forth clearly its own doctrine with respect to the five points of Calvinistic teaching brought into dispute by the Remonstrants. Not only are the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England claimed as almost Arminian, but it looks as if even the Lambeth Articles were represented as substantially Arminian: at least the sentence referring to them (p. 811, at bottom) is ambiguous. It is allowed that Arminianism has no definite theological distinctness, and yet Arminius is ranged by the side of Athanasius and Augustine as one of the three greatest leaders in theological definition (p. 809, top). Athanasius, it seems, has determined the doctrine of God; Augustine, the doctrine of man; Arminius, the essential relations between God and man!

The article on 'Abelard' is informing and appreciative—too appreciative. That on 'Anselm' (by the same writer) is brief and sketchy, and in its remarks on the *Cur Deus Homo* is dominated by prejudice. No adequate understanding of the doctrine of Satisfaction is shown; though it is rightly denied that it owes its form to the influence of Teutonic law. The Atonement seems to have proved a thorny subject



to the contributors to this *Encyclopædia*. For example, the otherwise very excellent brief article on 'Acceptilatio' sharply criticises Turretine for the phrase: "We admit no Socinian acceptilatio." Turretine is, however, quite within his rights in this phrase: the Socinian doctrine of the Atonement, which holds that God forgives sinners their debt without any payment at all being precisely described by the term 'acceptilatio'. It may be another matter whether Socinus himself employs the term 'acceptilatio' to describe his doctrine. Grotius says he does (but not in ch. 3 of his *Defensio*, as is here stated, but in ch. 6), and the author of the article, following Crell, says he does not. We have not looked the matter up. But in any event Grotius does not misrepresent Socinus' meaning, but quite accurately defines the meaning of 'acceptilatio' (Amsterdam ed. of 1679, p. 390a),—telling us that 'acceptilatio' is used even where no payment precedes, is opposed to some payment, and is figuratively defined as an imaginary payment. It would be difficult to catch Grotius napping in the matter of significance of law-terms, whatever we may think of his own doctrine of the Atonement. It is not the Socinian but the Scottist doctrine of the Atonement which is abusively described by the term 'acceptilatio', as our author tells us, and ought thereby have been saved from his mistaken criticism of Grotius and Turretine.

Among the best of the articles of the class we are speaking of is that on Thomas Aquinas, although its encomium is somewhat excessive. The same must be said of the estimate of Origen in the excellent comprehensive article on 'Alexandrian Theology', by the side of which the equally excellent one on 'Antiochian Theology' must be placed. The article on the 'Albigenses' is thoroughly good, and that on the 'Anabaptists' is also very satisfactory. There are very few articles in this volume on specifically doctrinal points. Among them perhaps those on the 'Anger' or 'Wrath' of God and on 'Annihilation' are perhaps the most outstanding. The former is, however, a carefully rather than profoundly thought article, though it has much in it that is suggestive. Among articles of another class, we have not been attracted to that on 'Agnosticism'; and still less to that on 'Absolute', which seems to us a little pretentious. The article on 'Apologetics' does not appear to us to be quite adapted to its place in the *Encyclopædia*. Most readers would expect to find in it an account of 'Apologetics', its idea and place in the theological encyclopædia, method, history. Instead it is an attempt to outline a system of apologetics,—an attempt sure to prove unsatisfactory, if for no other reason than the limitations of space.

A notice of a work of this kind as it passes from article to article may easily run to an inordinate length. We have probably said enough to suggest the general features of the volume before us. It is comprehensive, learned and, so far as we have been able to test it, interestingly written. It is to be followed by nine or eleven more, and it is already evident that the completed work will be a welcome and valuable addition to our encyclopædic literature.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

## APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION. By FRANK BYRON JEVONS, Principal of Bishop Hatfield's Hall, Durham University, Durham, England. 8vo.; pp. xxx, 283. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. Price \$1.50 net.

"The Hartford-Lamson Lectures on 'The Religions of the World' are delivered at Hartford Theological Seminary in connection with the Lamson Fund, which was established by a group of friends in honor of the late Charles M. Lamson, D.D., sometime President of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, to assist in preparing students for the foreign missionary field. The lectures are designed primarily to give to such students a good knowledge of the religious history, beliefs, and customs of the people among whom they expect to labor. As they are delivered by scholars of the first rank, who are authorities in their respective fields, it is expected that in published form they will prove to be of value to students generally."

This expectation will be abundantly fulfilled, if the volume before us, the first of the series, is a sample of what its successors will be. The author, Principal Jevons, is preëminent in his department, and is, perhaps, the first evangelical scholar to become so in the broad and comparatively unexplored field of the science of religion. His large "Introduction to the History of Religion" is by far the most satisfactory treatise on the subject. It will be remembered as having been somewhat exhaustively and most favorably reviewed in *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, Vol. IX, No. 33.

In the present course of lectures Principal Jevons regards religion as "the worship of the gods of a community by the community for the good of the community", and he uses the science of religion to prove that "Christianity is the highest manifestation of the religious spirit". Thus the belief in the communion of spirits and the desire for such communion is universal; and "Christianity alone of the religions of the world teaches that self-sacrifice is the way to life eternal". So, too, magic, because of its anti-social aim, is the great enemy of religion; but it is precisely this anti-social tendency which is most opposed by the spirit of Christianity. The same is true of fetichism. "The cult of a fetich is conducted by an individual for his private ends; and the most important function of a fetich is to work evil against those members of the community who have incurred the fetich-owner's resentment." "Thus religion"—and specially Christianity—"is directed to ends not merely different from but antagonistic to fetichism." Again: "Prayer is the essence of religion"; but 'Our Lord's Prayer in its revelation of the spirit which is both human and divine is a fact which the theory of evolution is unable to account for or explain', and Christianity alone of all religions recognizes and harmonizes the universal need of an absolute God and of "a fellow struggler at our side". Once more, 'the rite of sacrifice had from the beginning in it the potentiality whereby communion with God might be attained, and so became the means

whereby, through Christ, all men might be brought to God'. So also morality demands a religious foundation, and this Christianity supplies in its doctrine that the will of God is the ground and norm of right. In conclusion, "Christianity claims to be 'final', not in the chronological sense, but in that it alone finds the true basis and the only end of society in the love of God. The Christian theory of society again differs from all other theories in that it not only regards the individuals composing it as continuing to exist after death, but teaches that the society of which the individual is truly a member, though it manifests itself in this world, is realized in the next".

This discussion is characterized by all the excellencies which we noted in the author's earlier and larger work—the same command of facts, the same fairness in interpreting them, the same skill in inductive reasoning, the same caution and reserve in the statement of conclusions; and yet we think that we detect, as would not be unlikely in this later book, an even firmer grasp of principles and an even more confident mastery of his position.

We congratulate Principal Jevons on this volume; and we congratulate yet more Hartford Seminary, both on the institution of the Hartford-Lamson Lectureship, and on the singularly high character of its initial course of lectures.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

MY BELIEF. Answers to Certain Religious Difficulties. By ROBERT F. HORTON, M.A., D.D., formerly Fellow of New College, Oxford. 8vo., pp. 295. Fleming H. Revell Company, New York: Chicago: Toronto. 1908.

The writer of this volume "proposes to deal with fifteen of the questions which confront the modern mind in the search for religious truth". These questions are the following: "Is Religion Necessary?" "Is Christianity the Best Religion?" "The Claims of Rome"; "Unitarianism"; "Can We Believe the Bible?" "Is the Christian Faith Identical with the Belief in Miracles?" "The Changed Universe"; "How to regard Prayer"; "The After Life"; "The Difficulty Arising from the Variety of Religious Opinions"; "The Absence of a Certain Religious Experience"; "The Social Anarchy"; "The Return to Paganism"; "The Old Problem of Suffering and Sin"; "Atonement". The discussion of these vital questions is always interesting, usually clear, and, in the case of many of them, often helpful. Just because of these attractive qualities, however, it is positively dangerous in view of the fact that the Christianity which it undertakes to vindicate, so far from being what has been and is commonly accepted as Christianity, is the contradiction of it. For example, Paul says (Eph. 2. 12) that 'to be without Christ is to have no hope and to be without God in the world'; but Dr. Horton writes that we never dream of saying that heathenism, 'though without Christ, is without God'. Again, "to Calvin every part of the Bible was equally true, equally authoritative"; but for Dr.

Horton criticism has overthrown "the dogma of infallibility". Once more, our Lord appealed to his miracles as attesting his divine mission on the ground that they were and must be due to the immediate exercise of God's power: but Dr. Horton questions whether his miracles are historically established; and he would see in them, if they were, only the wonderful, at most "the superhuman", never the supernatural. That is to say, the Christianity which Dr. Horton defends is Christianity without its essence. For it is precisely that it is a supernatural intervention that differentiates it from all other religions and makes it the absolute religion. We wish that we might go no further. Fairness, however, compels us to add that here and there the discussion is marred by exaggeration and ignorance which are without excuse. For example, on page 114 we read, with reference to Rev. xxii. 18, 19, "this may be said to be the only evidence ever adduced for the infallibility of the Bible". Again (on p. 60) we read, "No Christian with the modern temper would venture to say that Christianity is the final revelation, or to refuse truth which would surpass Christian truth. All that he would say is this, that Christianity is the best we know". This last quotation is the true key to the whole discussion, especially when it is explained and justified by the words of the author on p. 163, "The truths of morality and religion may be only relative or provisional, but by them we have to live".

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE BELIEFS OF UNBELIEF. *Studies in the Alternatives to Faith.* By W. H. FITCHETT, B.A., LL.D., Author of *How England Saved Europe, The Unrealized Logic of Religion, Wesley and His Century*, etc. 8vo.; pp. vi, 293. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 1907.

"These papers are an attempt to define and assess what may be called the positives of doubt; the strange beliefs which lurk under the mask of unbelief. Faith suffers—and rightly suffers—inconstant challenge for its credentials. But let us stop for a moment to consider what are the credentials of doubt. The fight has hitherto raged round the evidences of religion; it is surely time to ask what are the 'evidences' of irreligion. The Christian faith has its difficulties, it may be frankly admitted; but let the question be seriously considered: What are the difficulties of the alternatives to that faith?"

To this question the author confines himself rigorously, and his discussion is convincing and even brilliant. He shows, that "where theism has difficulties its alternatives", as atheism, pantheism, and agnosticism, "have incredibilities, not to say impossibilities"; that while the Gospel of Christ may seem "a tale incredible", its alternatives, as that "Christ never existed" or that he was "an impostor" or that he was "only a myth" are, every one of them, "an offense to plain reason"; that while there are difficulties and apparent mistakes in the Bible, the alternative belief, as that the Bible is "a forgery", or that it is "only one of the

sacred books of the race", or that it is "a book of dreams", is "the last of incredibilities"; and that these "beliefs of unbelief" are followed by ethical results which would condemn them, even if they were not in themselves absurd.

It will be seen at once that this line of thought is not unlike that of Mr. Ballard's great book, *The Miracles of Unbelief*. Indeed, they both represent the same style, and the most effective style, of apologetics. They might also well be used together. Our author might fittingly introduce the doubter to Ballard's more exhaustive and scientific discussion.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

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## EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

BIBLE CHRONOLOGY FROM ABRAHAM TO THE CHRISTIAN ERA. By W. S. AUCHINCLOSS, C.E., author of the "Book of Daniel Unlocked." New York: For sale by D. Van Nostrand Company, Scientific Book Publishers, 23 Murray Street, 1905. Pp. 17. Also by the same author, TO CANAAN IN ONE YEAR, with Map of Route. 1906. Pp. 15. HOW TO READ JOSEPHUS. 1906. Pp. 15. CHRISTIAN ERA: an Extract from The Book of Daniel Unlocked. 1906. Pp. 121-133.

Along with some preliminary material these pamphlets have been republished, without essential modification, under the title: AUCHINCLOSS' CHRONOLOGY OF THE HOLY BIBLE. Introduction by A. H. SAYCE, LL.D., Professor of Assyriology, Queen's College, Oxford, England. New York: For sale by D. Van Nostrand Company. 1908. Pp. 97.

The scheme of BIBLE CHRONOLOGY has been worked out with care; but it is based in part on theories that do not command universal assent; for example, on the belief (1) That "in the matter of patriarchal birth-dates preference" should be given "to the figures of Josephus," which are "free from those irregularities which characterize the Hebrew text;" (2) That "Jacob's descent into Egypt was the Half-way Station in [the four hundred and thirty years of] the sojourning of the children of Israel in Egypt" (p. 8), so that the actual sojourn in Egypt was two hundred and fifteen years; (3) That the four hundred and eighty years in I Kin. 6: 1 are consecutive years and not, say, twelve cycles of forty years. The author thinks that in the book of Judges, where four periods of rest are given as 40, 80, 40, and 40 years, "from some unknown cause ciphers have been affixed to the true numbers; that is, to the Nos. 4, 8, 4, and 4, thus making the quantities ten times as great" (p. 9; and see explanation in How to Read Josephus, p. 8). If the author is wrong in these points alone, his whole chronology from Adam to Solomon is vitiated; and it is not "evident that the history of our race began with the year B. C. 5301."

In the pamphlet entitled TO CANAAN IN ONE YEAR, the itinerary of



the journey of the Israelites from Rameses in Egypt to Gilgal near Jericho, as drawn up by Moses and published in Num. 33, is supplemented from the narrative of the journey given in Ex., Num., and Josh., and from the allusions in the farewell address of Moses. The distances of the encampments and battle grounds from each other in the line of march are marked, and dates are assigned wherever the calculation is reasonably possible. The time between the departure of the Hebrews from Rameses and their arrival at Kadesh-barnea within the eventual bounds of the land of Israel was about a year; hence the title of the brochure. The people afterwards roamed for thirty and eight years in the wilderness. The exodus is dated in 1477 B. C., and the time of the subsequent events is, of course, calculated from it.

As appears from the brief treatise entitled *HOW TO READ JOSEPHUS*, the author is troubled by the fact that Josephus "says in one place regarding Solomon's Temple that from the building to the burning was 470 years, in another place 466 years and by computation, using figures taken from his own book, we obtain five more values. Thus in effect he assigned seven values to one period . . . In like manner Josephus gives two values to the period between the Exodus and the building of the Temple, viz: 612 years and 592, both of which are wrong." The author might have added that the Hebrew writer of I Kin. 6: 1 reckons the time at 480 years, and the apostle Paul apparently at 574. However, there is no cause for the dismay. These diverse statements appear contradictory to the modern reader who lacks the historic sense and cannot divest himself of modern chronological conceptions; but they are accurate in the sense in which they were intended and in which they were understood. The method of calculation was well known, and the character and meaning of the results were fully understood. It would be a mistake to alter the statements of Josephus; although, of course, it would be quite proper to jot down on the margin of Josephus' works the true chronology, as Mr. Auchincloss proposes. His long list of suggested corrections includes the peculiarities of his own system.

*Princeton.*

JOHN D. DAVIS.

*THE CHRISTIAN ERA* is another little pamphlet that represents much study. The treatise by Mr. Auchincloss on "The Only Key to Daniel's Prophecies", was reviewed at considerable length by the Rev. J. R. Donehoo in the issue of this REVIEW for October 1904, pp. 675-679. In that work the author argued that the birth of our Lord occurred in "the Spring of A. D. 1", among his reasons being "the ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY that the death of Herod occurred in the last half of A. D. 1" (p. 75). In this reprint from "The Book of Daniel Unlocked", he endeavors to show that the death of Herod occurred "February, B. C. 1", and the birth of Christ in the "Fall, B. C. 2".

Josephus dates the accession of Hyrcanus in the 3rd year of the 177th Olympiad, i. e., 69-70 B. C. (*Ant.* xiv. 1, 2). Hyrcanus reigned 3 months (*Ant.* xv. 6. 4), Aristobulus 3 years and 6 months (*Ant.* xiv. 6. 1). As the reign of Aristobulus was terminated by the

fall of Jerusalem before Pompey in 63 B. C., Josephus antedates the accession of Hyrcanus by about 3 years. Mr. Auchincloss holds that this error has affected the Herodian chronology of Josephus. The error in question is generally recognized (Schürer<sup>3-4</sup> i. 256, n. 1), but as it may have originated from a faulty synchronism, the question of its influence on the Herodian chronology must be settled by evidence. In support of his theory Mr. Auchincloss directs attention to the date assigned to the death of Philip, in the 20th year of Tiberius, *i. e.*, 33-34 A. D., after a reign of 37 years (*Ant.* xviii. 4. 6). He argues that this date is 3 years too early, for Agrippa went to Rome a year before the death of Tiberius, *i. e.*, in 36 A. D., "to treat of some affairs with the Emperor" (*Ant.* xviii. 5. 3). Josephus does not indicate the nature of these affairs, but Mr. Auchincloss thinks that they concerned the tetrarchy of Philip; and, as it seems unlikely that Agrippa would have waited three years after the death of his uncle before urging his claims on the Emperor, it is held that Philip died in the 23rd year of Tiberius, *i. e.*, in 36 A. D., and that his reign of 37 years began after the death of Herod the Great in 1 B. C. This argument, however, is extremely uncertain. In *Ant.* xviii. 4. 6 Josephus says that after the death of Philip the tetrarchy was added by Tiberius to the province of Syria, and there is no evidence to show that Agrippa sought to secure the succession immediately after the death of his uncle. The relations of Agrippa with Tiberius and Caligula, as described by Josephus in *Ant.* xviii. 6. 1-11, fully explain the action of Caligula in bestowing the territory of Philip on Agrippa, but they do not afford evidence of a chronological error on the part of Josephus in the date assigned to the death of Philip.

Mr. Auchincloss seeks further support for his view that Herod the Great died in 1 B. C., from the statement of Josephus (*Ant.* xvii. 6. 4) that the eclipse of the moon which preceded the death of Herod by a short time, was itself preceded by a fast day. "Astronomers say that on Jan. 9th, B. C. 1, there was an eclipse of the moon and the calendar of Rabbi Hillel ii. tells us that the tenth of the month Tebet, known as the 'fast of Tebet' coincided with January 10th in the year B. C. 1." There was another eclipse visible in Palestine on Mar. 12-13, in 4 B. C., but Mr. Auchincloss thinks that this is "absolutely out of the question" because it occurred during the "feast" of Purim, which was not a "fast". Mr. Auchincloss is correct in regard to the character of the feast of Purim. According to the *Megillath Taanith* fasting was prohibited not only on the 14th and 15th of Adar when the feast of Purim was celebrated (cf. *Ant.* xi. 6. 13), but also on the 13th when Nicanor's day was celebrated (cf. *Ant.* xii. 10. 5, 2 Macc. xv. 36, 1 Macc. vii. 49). The "fast of Esther" on the 13th of Adar as well as the custom of fasting after Purim is of much later origin (cf. *Jewish Encyclopedia*, art. "Fasting and Fast-days"). The prohibition of fasting on the 12th of Adar, Trajan's day, is also later (*Megillath Taanith*). If Mar. 12th was a fast day and it were shown that it coincided with the 13th, 14th, or 15th of Adar in the year 4 B. C., there would be some difficulty in

harmonizing the account of Josephus in this matter with other data which point to the year 4 B. C., as the date of Herod's death. But Josephus does not say that the day preceding the eclipse was a fast. The sentences beginning ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ Μαθθίου τούτου ἱερωμένου and continuing through συγγενῆς ὧν are parenthetical and recount an incident which occurred during the high-priesthood of Matthias in connection with the celebration of the day which the Jews observe as a fast (ἡν Ἰουδαῖοι νηστεῖαν ἄγουσιν) probably the day of atonement (cf. Schürer<sup>4</sup> ii. 270, n. 7). The narrative is taken up again with the words Ἡρώδης δὲ τὸν τε Μαθθίαν and the eclipse is connected with the deposition of Matthias from the high-priesthood and the burning of the other Matthias and his companions who had been concerned in the tearing down of the golden eagle from the great gate of the Temple. There is thus no close chronological connection between the fast and the eclipse. On the other hand, there is considerable evidence of a cumulative character which makes it highly probable that Herod died in the Spring of 4 B. C. This evidence is derived from various sources and has been stated in detail frequently. It will be sufficient in this connection to refer to Schürer, *Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi*<sup>3-4</sup> i. 415, n. 167.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

JERUSALEM. THE TOPOGRAPHY, ECONOMICS AND HISTORY FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES to A. D. 70. By GEORGE ADAM SMITH, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Old Testament Language, Literature and Theology, United Free Church College, Glasgow; author of "The Historical Geography of the Holy Land," etc. In Two Volumes. With Maps and Illustrations. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 3 and 5 West 18th Street. 1908. 8vo. Pp. xx, 498 and xvi, 631. Net \$7.50.

This comprehensive work on the city of Jerusalem is not popular in character, like the author's *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*; but is an elaborate discussion of the facts and theories regarding the geography, geology, water supply, climate, walls, economic conditions, and civil history of ancient Jerusalem. The constant reference to the literature of the subject and the citation of authors makes the first volume a convenient thesaurus for the student. It brings to his hand the substance of many technical papers, otherwise somewhat difficult of access, because widely scattered in periodicals and rare books. Its presentation of learned discussions fully acquaints the reader with the questions at issue. Few exceptions occur to the usual completeness of treatment, the inquiry into the date of the Siloam inscription being one of the few. It registers the information that has been obtained by excavation, and the progress in the solution of old problems that these discoveries have rendered possible. It is a handy tool for the skilled workman, but will prove cumbrous to the unskilled.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

STUDIES IN THE BOOK OF PSALMS. By LINCOLN HULLEY, Ph.D., President of John B. Stetson University, DeLand, Florida. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Pp. 178. \$1.00 net.

This little volume consists of the substance of lectures delivered at Chautauqua and other summer schools. The material has been published "in response to many requests to have printed copies." The lectures have evidently given delight to many persons, and proved informing to them. The work has its excellencies: good service is done in emphasizing the fact that uniformity of structure and a regular meter were not characteristic of Hebrew poetry (pp. 27-35); and the titles proposed for the psalms (pp. 57-60) are always suggestive and often describe the contents most happily.

But on the whole, the book is superficial and marred by carelessness. One does not read far without becoming impressed with the extravagance of the author's assertions. He shows a marked tendency to use the superlative degree and the universal negative. More's the pity; since the statements he makes are often untrue in the form in which they are made, while yet containing important truth. The author is rather heedless of facts. He makes Doeg a Moabite, and locates his early home amid the hills across the ravine of the Jordan (p. 67). It will be difficult for the author to prove that the prophets "carefully cast their messages into verses, filed their sentences, set them to music, waited for occasion, and then chanted their message" (p. 15). He informs the reader that "the book [of the Psalms] is a collection of that wider field of song such as . . . the song of the Hebrew maidens over Jep[h]tah's daughter . . . and the song of the well, chanted by the women water carriers" (p. 53). Here is certainly news. It has not been heretofore known that the lamentation of the maidens for Jephthah's daughter was an extant song, or that the song of the well was chanted by the women water carriers. He tells us on page 169 that "tradition assigns to Manasseh's period [Psalms] 140, 142, 64, 54." Tradition? The only tradition regarding these poems is embodied in their titles, and it assigns these four psalms "to David," and one of them, the fifty-fourth, definitely to the time of the persecution of David by Saul.

Several errors have been allowed to pass by the proof-reader: Delitzsch (p. 74); Renos for Reuss (p. 136); professional, as the title of a group of psalms, for processional; and the definite article inserted before the proper name Ephrathah (p. 132). A noted hero of Judah is called Sampson (p. 22).

*Princeton.*

JOHN D. DAVIS.

THE HISTORICAL BIBLE.—The Heroes and Crises of Early Hebrew History, from the Creation to the Death of Moses. By CHARLES FOSTER KENT, Ph.D., Woolsey Professor of Biblical Literature in Yale University. With Maps. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1908. Pp. xvi, 251.

Same Series, Author and Publishers.—THE FOUNDERS AND RULERS OF UNITED ISRAEL. From the Death of Moses to the Division of the Hebrew Kingdom. New York: 1908. Pp. xii, 238.

The volumes are the first two in a series of six, projected and announced by the same author and publishers, and "intended," in the words of the author's preface, "for use, (1) as a text-book for college, seminary and preparatory school classes; (2) as a manual for teachers' training classes; (3) as a basis of study for general readers, who desire to gain from the modern point of view a systematic knowledge of the history, literature and teachings of the Bible; (4) as a text-book for senior and adult Bible classes." This is by no means the first appearance of Dr. Kent as a popularizer of what he terms "the modern point of view" of the Old Testament, and it is, perhaps, superfluous to state what he understands that point of view to mean. But there are a few observations that can scarcely be avoided, when one takes up these little volumes to see the fulfillment of the promise contained in their strikingly pretentious title: "The Historical Bible." It is a word to conjure with in these days, on both sides of the water—this word "historical." It is selling booklets by the thousand in Germany; it is bringing in a good commercial return in this country. But, O History, what crimes are committed in thy name! It is not in the preface, which reads fairly, but in the body of the book, page after page, that the author's working concept of the word "historical" is revealed. For example, in the section on the Fall, we read of it, after a comparison of it with the parables of Jesus, "It is *in every respect historical because it is absolutely true to human experience.*" From first to last we are impressed with the effort—evidently a conscious effort—to confuse the true and the real. Even for a reader well acquainted with much that lies back of a brief comparison or criticism, it is difficult to keep clearly in mind whether what the author is commenting upon is to him an historical personage, occurrence or utterance, or whether it is merely a part of what his "prophetic authors" believed. Indeed, we are not always assured that those authors themselves believed what they recorded. For Prof. Kent has this to say of the aims of these "early prophetic historians" (J and E): "The first was to trace the outlines of Israel's history and to *interpret in the light of that record* the divine purpose which was being realized in it. . . . The second aim was to *set before later generations* in the person of their earliest ancestor *a character* that would inspire in his descendants the noblest ideals and aspirations. . . . The third aim was to *illustrate concretely*, and therefore the more effectively, certain universal truths which had been revealed through the experiences of the Hebrew race",—which truths the writer proceeds to enumerate, from one to seven. Everywhere the language is worded as carefully as that of a political platform, where two quite different ends are in view. The italics (the reviewer's) in the above quotation indicate the spots where a critical reader would prefer to have definite statements, committing the author clearly to the historical, the idealized, or the mythical view of Abraham's career



and the like. The "preachy" tone adopted is as little agreeable with the true purpose of these books as is the character of Isaac to the taste of their author: "He is conventionally pious, and goes out to meditate at eventide." If this tone is what is meant by the well-loved word "constructive", applied with such iteration to these booklets by their author, then let us have frankly destructive books! We confess that "the modern point of view" of the Bible is nowhere else so distasteful to us, as where administered in these small, cut-price doses, compounded of Kuenen, Winckler, Cheyne *et al.*, well mixed and in convenient form, "sugar-coated, but otherwise unchanged",—to borrow Mr. Cleveland's now celebrated epigram. It is not often that anything approaching an argument or a defense of the position adopted is presented. The style is almost invariably didactic, and the tone positive. This is natural, and in keeping with the purpose of the books. Yet when the author occasionally ventures an explanation, he shows that he is capable of quite as astonishing things in logic as any Cheyne or Budde. This will serve as an illustration. The sixteenth and eighteenth chapters of Genesis are brought together as one section of the J-narrative. In the sixteenth chapter the Angel of Jehovah is Hagar's interlocutor; in the eighteenth chapter Abraham's interlocutor is Jehovah. Of this noticeable change in the designation of the divine personality Prof. Kent says: "The sudden introduction of Jehovah in connection with the promise, instead of the angelic beings, suggests, perhaps, that in the earlier part of the narrative the prophetic historian did not wish to represent the Deity as partaking of food." In fact, it is in the part of the narrative where no food is in question that the Angel of Jehovah appears, and precisely where food comes into the narrative that Jehovah Himself is introduced. There are also mistakes in statements of fact, which, if recognized by the reader, will incline him to distrust the author's care in statements of opinion. We suppose it is merely a slip of memory, when the author declares that "the two accounts of Isaac's deception regarding Rebekah" are "in Genesis 12 and 26", whereas in chapter xii (and equally in chapter xx) Abraham's deception regarding Sarah is the subject. And the statements that Eridu, Ur, Lagash, Uruk, Larsa and Nisin were the important cities in the *north* of Babylonia, and Agade, Nippur, Sippar, Kutha, Kish and Babylon were those in the *south*, and that the Libyans lived *east* of Egypt, should, doubtless, be charged merely to inadvertence. But the author is quite at sea where he declares that "from southern Arabia colonists crossed the southern end of the Red Sea to Africa, and founded the nation of the Cushites or Ethiopians, of whom are descended the modern Abyssinians". The modern Abyssinians are indeed descendants (in part) of those ancient Arabian colonists. But that, in spite of their fond appropriation to themselves of the name "Ethiopians", they have any claim to descent from the "nation of the Cushites or Ethiopians" which plays its part on the pages of oriental and classical histories, is a view for which we know of no modern defenders. The kingdoms of Meroë and Napata are quite apart from everything Abyssinian and Arabic, geo-

graphically, ethnologically and linguistically. There is throughout these volumes a strange mixture of the certain, the probable, the possible, the conceivable, and the false, but all uttered with equal confidence. We are sorry for the young who follow this pied piper. For, finally, the books are attractive. They play sweet music for young ears. Some of us, however, are tired of "the comparative method", with its sudden surprises as Romulus and Remus are named beside Cain and Abel, Orion beside Isaac, Niobe beside Lot's wife. These are the puns of Biblical science. The first time they are heard they please by the surprise of recognition and discovery. But like puns they cannot bear either elaboration or repetition. The praise which we are ready heartily to accord to these books is for their pedagogical plan. Everything in the method of presentation is well adapted to accomplish the announced purpose. Both the author and the publishers are to be congratulated upon the production of volumes which both in appearance and in method are so perfectly in keeping with the end in view.

*Princeton.*

J. OSCAR BOYD.

NOTES ON HEBREW RELIGION. By HAROLD M. WIENER, M.A., LL.B., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Reprinted from *The Churchman*, March, April, and May, 1907, with a Prefatory Note. London: Elliott Stock. 1907. Pp.32.

In this pamphlet Mr. Wiener has collected the scattered notes on Mr. Addis' "Hebrew Religion", which appeared in *The Churchman* in successive issues. There is nothing that gives unity to these notes, except the two constants, Mr. Wiener's standpoint and Mr. Addis' standpoint, which are hopelessly at variance. Mr. Addis is the easy-going patron of the fashionable in Old Testament criticism, equally ready to adopt as verity the lightest suggestions of the leading analogists, and to combine views that are mutually antagonistic without apparently being troubled in the least by thoughts of consistency. Mr. Wiener is the fortunate and yet ill-fated critic who has found too easy a mark. The lawyer, with his demand for facts, for evidence, for proof, is embarrassed by the wealth of his material when he takes up a writer like Mr. Addis and dissects his loose assertions. The critic may do good in warning possible readers of Mr. Addis who might lack critical insight; he will hardly succeed in persuading Mr. Addis of a single fault.

*Princeton.*

J. OSCAR BOYD.

DER ZWEIFEL AN DER MESSIANITÄT JESU. Von D. A. SCHLATTER, Professor in Tübingen. Gütersloh. Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. Beiträge zur Förderung Christlicher Theologie. 1907. 4. Heft. Pp. 75.

The question of the Messianic consciousness of Jesus has in recent times become a burning question. To any one who sees beneath the surface it is plain that not merely critical or historical motives, but the most vital religious and theological interests are here at play. Prof.

Schlatter calls attention to this when he remarks that the unwelcome character of the religious consequences following from the recognition of Jesus' Messianic purpose has obviously influenced the denial of the latter as expressed in the conjectures of Wrede or in the vacillating reflections of Wellhausen. He does not, however, specify what are the great issues at stake. Nor does he address himself in this treatise to examining or refuting the historico-critical arguments with which the opponents of the Messianic consciousness seek to justify a doubt arising actually from dogmatic prepossessions. What the author aims at is something midway between these two. While recognizing that the deeper source of the doubt is theological, he also recognizes that there is at least a semblance of support for it in certain phenomena of the Gospel-account. But, instead of dealing with these phenomena directly, he prefers to deal with certain peculiarities of the Messianic consciousness, to which in his view the phenomena are ultimately traceable. The method is that from the center of the Messianic consciousness and the Messianic calling the conditions are deduced which would inevitably give rise to doubt. And this is justified by the peculiarity of the situation which is found in this, that the apparent grounds for the modern doubt, so far as they are objective and not merely *à-priori* theological, appear to be identical with those that already led Jesus' contemporaries to call his Messiahship into question. Wrede and Wellhausen in principle take exception to the same features in the account of Jesus' activity as did the people of Jesus' own time when confronted with these features in his actual career. The result of such a mode of treatment is that the objections are not always treated with the fulness of detail that an interested student of the controversy might desire. A full answer, *e. g.*, to Wrede would have to take into account a great many things, which Schlatter does not even touch upon. Sometimes it may be questioned whether the peculiarities of Jesus' Messianic procedure on which the author dwells actually explain the phenomena of which the sceptical critics have made so much, and whether not perhaps other factors must be brought into requisition. But, nevertheless, the author has, to a remarkable extent, succeeded in throwing light upon the perplexing aspects of our Lord's attitude with regard to the Messiahship and has shown that these perplexing elements are not accidentally there, but the necessary result of the way in which Jesus fundamentally conceived and approached the Messiahship.

The difficulties, in Dr. Schlatter's view, go mainly back to three causes. The first of these is that Jesus broke with the nation of Israel and gave to his Messiahship a meaning and value independent of its acceptance by his own people. This was the result of his absolute insistence upon the ethical and religious nature of the Messianic function. Because it existed for the very purpose of realizing righteousness, it had to adopt the method of summoning to repentance, and, where repentance was refused, not to shun the consequence of this, but to proceed unswervingly to the treatment of Israel as rejected of God. In discussing this it is strikingly brought out how thoroughly Messianic

our Lord's preaching is not merely in individual traits such as that the last messenger in the vineyard-parable is the Son or that the mission of Jesus appears in the supper-parable as a banquet for the Son, which might be explained from subsequent Messianizing remodelling of the tradition, but in its whole trend and tenor, since it everywhere implies that now the last, decisive crisis has arrived for Israel, that the nation by its attitude towards Jesus must either make or break itself, that he is set for the rising or falling of those to whom the message comes. Even if all else were discounted, Jesus' ethical preaching, although so often contrasted with his Messianic message, as if it were something independent of the latter, or even heterogeneous, would alone suffice to establish the highest conceivable official consciousness on his part. If no more than a reformer, he would still be an authoritative, royal, Messianic reformer. The conclusion of the Sermon on the Mount is not out of keeping with its beginning or central portion. All this is eminently true and of the greatest importance for a correct understanding of our Lord's work. The main question, however, is how far the phenomena which Wrede has grouped together under the rubric of "the Messianic secret" are explainable from this primary principle. So far as Jesus' holding back and keeping silence towards the people are concerned, undoubtedly much can be set down to this cause. Johannes Weiss has already pointed out that the secretive employment of the parabolic method of teaching must be explained not from Mark's desire to introduce into the Gospel a phantom-like *prae-resurrection* Messiahship, which was to appear real and unreal at the same time, but from his apologetic desire to account for Israel's unbelief by the theory of hardening, Mark following in this respect in the footsteps of Paul, Rom. ix-xi. It is only necessary to go one step farther back to arrive at Schlatter's explanation. The necessity to withdraw the truth in general, and the truth of the Messiahship in particular, was not first an apologetic necessity in the mind of Mark or Paul, but from the outset an historical necessity is the actual life of Jesus, because his presentation of himself as the Messiah of repentance had led to the forfeiture by Israel of the Messianic inheritance. Thus "the Messianic secrecy" is seen to be the first result of the ethical Messiahship. And what applies to the parables would apply to other forms of Jesus' self-withholding or self-withdrawal, such as the prohibition to make known his healing activity. The only fault that can be found with this is that it does not explain the other difficulty on which Wrede has placed equal emphasis, viz., that the disciples from whom the Messiahship was not kept secret appear, especially in Mark, utterly incapable not merely of understanding but of apprehending it. Here the solution will have to be sought in another quarter than that explored by Schlatter. It must also be remembered that the judicial withdrawal of Jesus cannot be introduced as a principle of interpretation until a somewhat advanced stage of the public ministry, since the unrepentant attitude of the people needed some time to develop and show itself. In so far as similar phenomena appear from the beginning, as to some extent they do, it will



be necessary to assume that at different times the same attitude may have been prompted by different motives. No doubt to the mind of Wrede, who insisted upon lumping all instances showing a general resemblance together and upon postulating for all one uniform explanation, this appeared tantamount to a confession of weakness or failure. It may well be questioned, however, whether on the principle that we deal here with the actual life of Jesus, and not with the mind of the Evangelist, such an exegetical monism is a safe principle to follow. Reality is not always uniform in its determining causes, even where the phenomena appear strikingly alike.

The second cause, with which the author deals more briefly, is found in Jesus' reliance on the word as an instrument for asserting his Messiahship. The hidden, spiritual character of the kingdom had for its correlate the hidden, unrecognized character of the Messiah. But here also the contradiction was only an apparent one. Not in spite of his activity through the word, rather in virtue of it Jesus carried through his true Messianic function. For to Jesus the Messiahship was not purely prospective, so that the word might have served the bare purpose of predicting it or preparing for it. The word is a Messianic instrument in the fullest sense. Hence the doubt whether such an attitude of dependence on the word can be reconciled with the claim to Messianic power. The removal of the difficulty depends again on a proper appreciation of the God-centered, religious form which the conception of Messiahship assumed in the mind of Jesus. Because the Messiahship is for the purpose of revealing God and establishing communion with God in the spiritual sphere, the word is its normal instrument. But to the people of that time, in whose minds self-centered ideas strongly colored the whole Messianic outlook, such a Messiahship naturally appeared attenuated, elusive, unreal. And that something not unlike this process repeats itself in the modern mind is clear from the suspicion into which since long the idea of the present, spiritual kingdom has fallen. It is true many of those who deny the latter, throw themselves with all the more eagerness on the eschatological kingdom as embodying the true conception of Jesus, and with reference to this at least uphold the reality of a vigorous Messianic consciousness in a prospective sense. But where less enthusiasm prevails for the eschatological, it is just as possible to construe the matter in this way that Jesus, while looking forward to a future kingdom, did not put his own person in a Messianic relation to the same. Or the Messiahship comes to be regarded as a mere accidental form in which Jesus' sense of his own religious uniqueness expressed itself. Thus the temptation reappears to substitute the preacher of religion for the Messiah. But here as in the other case the mistake is that the absolute, authoritative, royal tenor of Jesus' religious preaching is not appreciated. The trouble is not merely that the emphasis on something else rules out the Messiahship, but that with the Messiahship ruled out, this other thing becomes distorted to the view and ill-proportioned.



The third cause which Dr. Schlatter names as contributory to the ancient and modern doubt on the Messianic question is the passivity of Jesus with regard to the honor and glory of his office. Jesus did not make any effort on his own part to appropriate what was his right. He waited for the Father and for others to give him the name above every name. It is pointed out that this also was the result of the profoundly religious spirit in which he apprehended the Messiahship as something given from God and existing for the sake of God. Hence he did not force it even upon the disciples. But, while remaining silent about the Messianic title, he felt no hesitation about freely and openly claiming the Sonship which underlay the former. In the case of the Sonship the God-centered, thoroughly religious nature of the idea was so obvious that the possibility of misinterpretation in an egotistic sense was of itself excluded. Many good and striking things are said by the writer in this connection. If we were to make any stricture it would be that the self-effacement of Jesus is too exclusively placed to the account of his general filial attitude towards God and not sufficiently placed in a soteriological light as an aspect of his humiliation, after the manner of Paul in Phil. ii. Nor are we quite satisfied with the view Dr. Schlatter would seem to take of the Sonship itself. This is too much restricted to the religious sphere, the solid trinitarian underground is lacking. Hence the assertion that the Sonship cannot even be thought apart from the Messiahship, and the polemic against the Christ who could do without an office as necessarily a gnostic Christ. But if we are thoroughly in earnest with our ascription of deity to the Saviour, we cannot deny him the attribute of self-sufficiency (in this case independence of the need of office) which is characteristic of God. These, however, are matters not essential to the argument. The main point is that the self-effacement, the passivity of Jesus is set forth as an important factor in Jesus' conduct which explains his abstention from positive assertion of his Messianic dignity even in the midst of the fulness of his Messianic work, and so is adapted to resolve the doubts which the coëxistence of the two apparently irreconcilable attitudes has produced in the mind of observers.

In a brief concluding chapter the author deals with the light that is thrown back from the Messianic conception of the early Church upon that of Jesus. The *prae-Christian* Jewish Messianic conception was far from completely ethicized and spiritualized. How then can the presence of such a thoroughly ethical and spiritual Messianic belief in primitive Christianity be explained otherwise than on the supposition that it was inherited from Jesus? The same applies to the exchange of places that appears to have happened as between "the people" and "the king" in point of importance. Previously the implication had been that he who belonged to the people would share in the Messiah and his reign. Now the watchword becomes that appurtenance to the Messiah determines one's place among the people and in the kingdom of God, and in result of this the eschatology becomes simpler, and more spiritualized because centered in the Christ. For this also a historical cause can be found

in the work of Jesus only. The unique character of primitive Christian ethics, which reckons not with relative conceptions, but with such absolute conceptions as forgiveness, justification, regeneration, sanctification, finds its explanation in nothing else but the absolute character of Jesus' Messianic work as an accomplished fact not only to the minds of those who preached such things, but also to their historical experience. Finally, the unanimity with which in early Christian teaching the Messiahship of Jesus is based on his Sonship, whereas in the abstract other derivations were possible, bears conclusive testimony to the reality of the rôle played by Sonship and Messiahship and their intimate union in the life and teaching of Jesus.

*Princeton.*

GEERHARDUS VOS.

INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE. A SHORT HISTORY. By GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT, Ph.D., D.D., Author of *The Student's Life of Jesus*, *The Revelation of Jesus*, *The Student's Life of Paul*, *A History of Christianity in the Apostolic Age*, etc. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. Pp. viii, 309. \$1.25 net.

"This book surveys a great but neglected field"—the opening sentence of the preface is sufficient to gain a careful hearing for the exposition that follows. Surely the interpretation of the Bible has involved enough of human effort and exercised enough influence upon human life to be well worthy of the historian. Yet a good brief survey of the whole field has been conspicuously absent.

Gilbert possesses many of the qualifications necessary for filling the place so surprisingly left vacant by modern scholarship. His reading has evidently been very extensive; he has planned the work well, giving just enough detail to be convincing and forcible without causing the larger development of the history to be lost from view; his style is at times brilliant and always admirably clear. The result is a very instructive and thoroughly readable book.

On the other hand, Gilbert approaches his subject-matter with certain very strong convictions as to the requirements to which exegesis should conform, and unless the reader shares these convictions he will be apt to regard some of Gilbert's judgments as rather one-sided.

In the first place, in order to win our historian's approval, an interpretation must find as little dogma in the Bible as possible and display as little interest as possible for the dogma that unfortunately is there. Thus on page 144 (footnote) it is urged apparently as a reproach against the commentary of Theodore of Mopsuestia on Philippians that it devotes "about one-fifth of the entire space" to the christological passage, Phil. ii. 5-11, "which passage amounts to only one-thirteenth of the Epistle". Comparing Meyer, we find that one of the leading exponents of the modern grammatico-historical method exhibits almost the same preference for dogma by devoting over one-seventh of his space to that same passage. It should not be regarded as injudicious to devote the chief attention to passages that are at the same time most

important and most difficult. Again, Luther is taken to task for preferring "the Gospel in the semi-dogmatic form in which it appears in Paul's Epistles rather than in the simple, un-theological words of Jesus", but it may be questioned whether this may be classed among his many errors. We venture to think that not even among the words of Jesus could he have found better weapons against the legalism of the Roman Church than were afforded by the "charter of Christian liberty". Gilbert's criticism depends upon the view that Galatians and Romans are not, as they were to Luther, "the purest Gospel", but "a human *interpretation* of the Gospel". Such separation between the words of Jesus and the other revelation recorded in the New Testament is one of the greatest obstacles now standing in the way of a well-rounded development of the life of the Church. Furthermore, dogma can be removed from the words of Jesus only by a conspicuous exercise of dogmatic exegesis. The undogmatic Jesus may be required by the exigencies of the modern Church, but can be evolved from the Gospels only by an exegesis that depends as fully upon a preconceived idea as did the exegesis of the fourth century.

In the second place, Gilbert exhibits a partiality for those interpretations that break most completely with the exegesis of the first three Christian centuries. That the interpreter should see with his own eyes may certainly be conceded. The only question is whether a substantial agreement with Nicene exegesis is always a sign of bad eyes.

In the third place, Gilbert gives that interpretation the preference which abandons most completely the old doctrine of inspiration. Here again the question is a question of fact. If the Bible is merely a human book, Gilbert is right—to regard it as divine, like all other errors, will have an injurious effect upon exegesis. Perhaps, however, the history of exegesis teaches that the injury is less serious than Gilbert supposes. At any rate, it is useless to say "Peace" when there is no peace, as Gilbert does when he says (p. 273): "The Bible has been humanized, given its place among the religious literatures of the world, and thereby its divine character is being for the first time truly appreciated." Exactly how its divine character is being more truly appreciated through its humanization than it was when men regarded it as a direct message from God, Gilbert does not say. Even if modern science required us to abandon or modify our view of the Bible, it could not prevent us from recognizing the value of the old view. The authoritative Bible has been and is to-day the very foundation of popular Christianity. With it, Christianity is striving with new vigor to win the world for Christ; the Christianity that does without it has never exhibited the power to become anything more than a religion of the few. If we really have to abandon the Bible, we should at least not conceal our loss by sentimental phrases, but should address ourselves with all our might to the task of finding a real substitute for what is gone.

Of course, the three criteria just mentioned are not the only ones that Gilbert uses in estimating the progress of exegesis—far more prominent than all of them is the criterion afforded by the degree and

manner of application of the historical method in general. Here, of course, no objection can be made; the development of historical exegesis is not least among the achievements of modern science. Only, the historical method is not the only requisite for successful exegesis; it may even become a hindrance rather than a help if it causes the interpreter to evade the great "Thou art the man" of the Bible. After all, the Bible is a religious book, and a religious book must be studied in the light of religious experience. Without the religious sense and the consciousness of one's own personal need, all the historical and grammatical study in the world will never penetrate beyond the shell, and the possession of such a sense will sometimes lend an enduring value to interpretations that are woefully defective from the point of view of modern scholarship. The facts of universal human experience are just as truly part of the "setting" of the Bible, just as necessary for its comprehension, as are the facts of Jewish history. Gilbert has recognized this principle (see especially the tribute to the spiritual insight of some of the rabbis and to the commentary of Bengel), but the recognition has not been general enough or hearty enough.

The last chapter, which discusses "the scientific era of Biblical interpretation", is disappointing. A good survey of nineteenth century exegesis (in the narrower sense) is greatly needed, but Gilbert has merely added one more to the many reviews of the progress of modern Biblical study in general. The chapter is animated by an overflowing enthusiasm, which hardly seems justified by the facts of our rather prosaic age. "At the close of the eighteenth century", says Gilbert (p. 260), "the science of Biblical interpretation had reached the foothills of the 'promised land', but no one saw or could see the heights that rose in majesty just ahead. The progress of the past three centuries—yes, of the past thirteen—was to be more than duplicated before the nineteenth century should have given way to the twentieth. A simple enumeration of the discoveries affecting Scripture interpretation, and of the changes in the dominant conceptions of the Bible, which were to come in the next hundred years, would have seemed to the men of that day stranger than fiction, and by the great majority even of thinking people would doubtless have been regarded as heralding the final and irremediable collapse of true religion." Nevertheless, the fact remains that the new conceptions of the Bible have as yet given rise to no religious movement that can, for a moment, be compared with the great movements of the past, and if they have not yet brought about "the final and irremediable collapse of true religion", perhaps that is because they are not so completely "dominant" as some men suppose. Gilbert himself confesses that the "partial and imperfect dawn of a new era of interpretation is as yet seen and felt by only a few in the wide Church of God". So perhaps we are still pretty much in the same position as Gilbert's eighteenth-century observer. The new view of the Bible may produce a greater and stronger Christianity in the future; it has not done so as yet.

What Gilbert means by a "disenthralled Bible" (p. 292) is essentially a Bible from which we have been disenthralled.

*Princeton.*

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

ΠΡΟΣ ΡΩΜΑΙΟΥΣ. DIE EPISTEL PAULI AN DIE RÖMER, verdeutscht und erläutert von G. RICHTER, Pfarrer in Gollantsch. Gütersloh. Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. 1907. Pp. 90.

The aim of this little book seems to be somewhat similar to that of the commentaries of Rudolf Niemann on the same epistle (see PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol. VI, p. 144). The author seeks to awaken interest in the Epistle to the Romans outside the circle of the trained theologians or even of advanced students in any department. The commentary is arranged throughout in two columns, of which the former is devoted to details of exegesis, the second to an exposition of the general progress of the thought. An acquaintance with the Greek text is presupposed. The effort to attain brevity and simplicity has perhaps been carried almost to an extreme, but the book will no doubt prove useful in the place that it is intended to fill.

*Princeton.*

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

The Baird Lecture for 1907. THE FOUR GOSPELS IN THE EARLIEST CHURCH HISTORY. By THOMAS NICOL, D.D., Professor of Divinity and Biblical Criticism in the University of Aberdeen. William Blackwood & Sons: Edinburgh and London. 1908. Pp. xxii, 326.

Dr. Nicol believes that the "first line of defense" of the credibility of Gospel history "must always be the external evidence". It is important that this evidence should be set forth from time to time in popular form, and in the light of recent discussion; and it is fortunate that the work has been done this time by a careful and thoroughly competent scholar. Those who have studied the masters, "Westcott and Lightfoot, Sanday and Stanton", will be upon familiar ground, but will read with enjoyment and profit this fresh presentation of the evidence. Dr. Nicol adopts the method of Salmon and Zahn and begins with the literature at the close of the second century, and works back toward the Apostolic age. This he does first for the fourfold collection and then for each Gospel separately. He makes the point (alluding to Harnack's work on Luke) that where the internal evidence, as examined by modern scholarship, is conclusive, it confirms the traditional authorship. He believes it to be a reasonable conclusion that the Four Gospels "were written by the Evangelists whose names they bear." A bibliography of some one hundred titles and an index add to the usefulness of the volume.

*Lincoln University, Pa.*

WILLIAM HALLOCK JOHNSON.



## HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

THE LETTERS OF MARTIN LUTHER. Selected and translated by MARGARET A. CURRIE. London: Macmillan & Co. 1908. 8vo.; pp. xxxv, 482, with (insufficient) index.

It is a most surprising thing that no attempt has been made hitherto to set a selection of Luther's letters before that wider public which cares more for the records of a rich personality than for the documents of an ecclesiastical movement, however epoch-making. Miss Currie tells us that a small volume of *Letters to Women* is the only collection of Luther's letter which has heretofore been published in English. She herself has gathered together five hundred of his homeliest and most personal letters and, having rendered them into simple English, invites us to see in their mirror Luther the man. The principle on which she has selected the letters to be translated seems to have been biographical importance, taking the term biographical in the most personal sense. She has been guided by the citations in the Lives of Luther,—Koestlin's and Kolde's,—as well as by the citations in the Lives of many of his friends. The result is that the letters here given are particularly rich in intimate details. We see in them Luther in his household, in the midst of his friends, and in his activities having particular rather than general ends in view. As we read on through the volume we are more and more amazed at the multiplicity of his interests, the strength of his friendships, the untiring devotion he exhibits not only to his cause but to his helpers. There is no detail of the personal life of his acquaintances in which he does not concern himself. We might be prepared to find him diligent in such matters as the settlement of pastors, and the marriage of ex-priests and escaped nuns. But it becomes soon very apparent that his engrossment with these things is not merely official. He stands out clearly in his letters as the good-providence of all those into contact with whom he came. His influence at court, his intercession with superiors, his time, labor, table and house were always at their disposal. It would be scarcely possible to conceive one spending himself more freely in the interest of others. We wonder how he had time and strength left for any more general employments.

It is this picture of Luther the man that Miss Currie's selection of his letters brings before us. Her object is not historical; and her work is not to be judged from the point of view of scholarship. Those who are seeking to understand the Reformation and the work of Luther the Reformer must go elsewhere. Scholars do not need an English rendering of Luther's letters, and cannot content themselves with a mere selection of them. If we would know Luther through and through, on all sides of his personality and in all his activities, we must read all his letters, and we must read them in the originals: and then we must go on and read all his other writings and all the writings of his contemporaries and the records of the times. For those setting such ends before them Miss Currie's meagre selection would be inade-

quate indeed. But for its own proper purpose of giving the general reading public an insight into Luther's private life, the richness of his affections, the amazing breadth of his sympathies, and the daily sacrifice he made of himself on the altar of friendship, it is fully adequate. The picture it gives us is the picture of a good man, providentially placed in a position of influence and using his influence unstintedly in doing good. We cannot say we rise from reading these letters with an admiration for Luther as a letter-writer. His letters were not ends in themselves, but instruments—often very rough and ready, but always very direct instruments—for doing good. What we rise from them feeling is that Luther was a good man, and that it was good to know him and good to have him for a friend.

Incidentally, of course, we learn from his intimate letters many things of the manners and customs of the times, and of the adjustments of nascent Protestantism. How full these letters are of questions of marriage and what peculiar problems faced the first Protestants with respect to marriage! The revolution in the estimate of the marital relation wrought by the Reformation can scarcely be appreciated by us now: nor the difficulties created by the change. It has been said that Calvin kept a marital bureau. Luther much more so: it seems to have been his task to supply all escaped nuns with husbands, all Protestant pastors with wives. Over and over again in these letters he urges on his clerical correspondents to marry and the hints are frequent that he is ever bearing their marital affairs on his mind. "I am delighted", he writes to Capito at Hamburg, May 25, 1540—"I am delighted to hear of the marriage of the priests, monks and nuns among you; and that the former are now husbands in defiance of Satan, and am pleased when they get livings." This is a constantly recurring note. Evidently Luther was zealous for a married clergy. The business-like way in which the affair was sometimes managed is amusing enough. Justus Jonas is commiserated for the loss of the best of wives in a letter of Dec. 25, 1542, and congratulated on his marriage with a new one in a letter of May 4, 1543. When the pastorate at Lochau fell vacant, Luther in a letter of Sept. 3, 1528, asks the place for Michael Stiefel and adds: "Were he to become pastor in Lochau we would try to get him to help the poor widow with her two children, she being left in great poverty, perhaps by marrying her, but if not—God's will be done." Accordingly, on the 25th of October he writes: "I am just starting for Lochau to marry M. Stiefel to the widow of the Bishop of Lochau, and to introduce him to his new charge." One is glad to learn from a letter a month later (Nov., 1528) that the marriage commenced at least auspiciously: "I am delighted, dear Michael", Luther writes to the happy groom, "that you are so pleased with your wife and her children, and that she loves you. May God maintain this unity!" Luther himself, as we know, married Katharine von Bora on the 13th of June, 1525, partly as his most impressive protest against the celibacy of the clergy,—though, of course, not without also deeper and more personal motives. It is startling, however, to observe him only a few months

before (Oct. 12, 1524), in his capacity of general marriage-monger, gaily offering Katharine von Bora to another. "Moreover, if you intend marrying Katharine von Bora", he writes to Hieronymus Baumgärtner, "make haste before she is given to someone else, for C. Glatz, pastor in Orlamunde, is ready waiting. She has not yet got over her love for you. I wish that you two were married." Luther himself was apparently not yet on the waiting-list.

We must, of course, bear in mind as we smile over these things that they occurred in sixteenth century Germany, not in twentieth century America; and that in sixteenth century Germany marriage was in any event much more of a formal arrangement than it is with us. Such a serious affair was not left in the hands of young people, subject to their caprices, but it was looked upon as the duty of parents to provide proper marriages for their children and parents were prone themselves to look upon this duty as rather their right which could not be permitted to be infringed. In the general relaxation of old bonds which the Reformation brought with it, creating in men a new sense of freedom, which manifested itself here and there in lawlessness, these time-honored customs were endangered. Young people actually took the matter into their own hands and formed engagements—or entered into entanglements—for themselves without even asking their parents consent. In a university town like Wittenberg the evil was naturally particularly flagrant and there was grave danger that the newly acquired freedom would degenerate into license. Luther explains to the Elector John Frederick (letter of Jan. 23, 1544): "Many young people are here from many lands, so that the maidens have become very bold, and pursue the students into their rooms, offering them their love; and I hear some parents are ordering their sons home, declaring that we hang young women about their necks, depriving them of their sons." Of course, Luther would have none of this; and he opened a crusade against the validity of engagements of marriage entered into by young people for themselves. "I have proclaimed from the pulpit", he declares, "that a child cannot become engaged himself; and that if he do, it is no engagement, and a father must not acquiesce therein." "We must", he insisted, "adhere to the old paths, which from time immemorial have been inculcated in the Holy Scriptures, and among the heathen as well as among ourselves, viz., that parents shall dispose of their children without any previous engagement, which is an invention of the Pope, at the devil's instigation, to undermine the God-given authority of the parents, robbing them of their children to their deep grief, instead of said children honouring them according to God's command."

We may judge how widespread the tendency which Luther thus assaults was by the fact that not only had Duke Philip's son Ernest entered into such a "private engagement", but so had a son of Melanchthon's, and indeed, says Luther, "something similar nearly happened in my house". And he was astonished to find that in his efforts to reëstablish "the old ways", it was "from those whom I

regarded as the truest friends of the Gospel that I have had the most opposition". It must not be supposed, however, that in his zeal in vindicating the parents' rights in arranging for the marriage of their children, Luther was disposed to treat the preferences of the young people as of no importance. In this controversy he was vindicating the rights of parents; he knew also how on proper occasions to impress on them their duties. Miss Currie prints a very pretty letter from Luther to a mother who was disposed, as he thought, to assert her authority unduly. "I have already written you", he writes, "concerning your son John, who has fallen in love with an excellent maiden, and I hoped for a favourable answer; but no attention having been paid to your son's request, I am constrained to write again, for I do not wish him to lose heart and sink into despair. But as he loves this girl so dearly, and she is quite his equal in station, besides being a gentle, quiet creature, I think you ought to be satisfied that he has shown such child-like obedience in humbling himself to ask your consent to the marriage as Samson did; and now do your part as a loving mother, by giving your consent thereto". And then he lays down both sides of the question: "For although we have written that children should not become engaged without their parents' consent, still parents should not hinder their children from marrying those they love. The son must not bring a daughter to his parents against their wish, but the father must not force a wife upon his son." Thus Luther holds the balance true—as was to be expected. What might have been unexpected is that we should get such a glimpse into the life of the young people in Wittenberg from Luther's letters. What a seething life was going on in that little university town in those days of new illumination; and how fully Luther was in it all!

The sturdy good-sense of Luther is in evidence on every page of these letters. As good an example as any is provided by his remarks on the tendency of people to criticise their ministers unduly. His tenet here is that the ministers are here not to please people but to give them the Gospel; and if they give men the Gospel, men should be satisfied with that. The people of Torgau wanted their pastors removed because, they said, their voices were too weak to fill the churches. Luther writes to Spalatin (Dec., 1554) to protest. It is an old song, he said; and people must not be permitted to change good pastors on such frivolous grounds: the only important question is, Do these pastors teach the Gospel faithfully? A few years later (July 9, 1537), he writes to Johann Schreiner: "Say to the nobility, which Spalatin refuses to do, that one cannot have the clergy exactly as they wish, and they should thank God for the pure Word, which they now hear out of one book, when they think of past times under the Pope, and the nonsense they had to listen to and pay dearly for. How can the nobles expect to procure Dr. Martins and Philips for such a beggarly service? If nothing short of St. Augustines and St. Ambrosiuses will satisfy them let them supply them themselves. When a pastor pleases the Lord Jesus and is faithful to Him, then a nobleman, who is certainly



of much less importance, ought also to be pleased with him." Obviously, with Luther the maxim rules that what is required of stewards is that they be found faithful. That being present, other things may be condoned.

In ordering the details of worship the same good sense rules. Obviously Luther's own preferences were for a simple, spiritual service: and he not infrequently announces fairly and squarely "the Puritan principle". Writing to Bartime von Sternberg (Sept. 1, 1523), for example, he exhorts him to intermit such things as masses for the dead, "primarily", he says, "because God did not institute the mass for the dead, but as a sacrament for the living, and it is a dreadful thing for man to presume, without God's permission, to turn a sacrament for the living into a sacrifice for the dead". And then he supports this by an explicit announcement of "the Puritan principle": "For a Christian must do nothing that God has not commanded, and there is no command for such masses and vigils, but it is solely their own invention"—that is, the invention of "the priests and monks". So again in a letter to Wolfgang Brauer (Dec. 30, 1536), he remarks as to the private administration of the sacraments that "it must not be lightly undertaken without special direction from God". Nevertheless, a few years afterwards (Nov. 26, 1539) he writes to Anton Lauterbach that, though for his own part he would wish these private communions to be done away with altogether, yet he only advises Lauterbach "till this matter is settled, do the best you can",—though letting it be thoroughly understood "that it will not continue". Here we have apparently Luther's principle of action. He was prepared to allow the largest liberty in things not commanded for the present distress. The chief thing was to get the Gospel preached in its purity: and when that could be got, meanwhile much of the old husk could be endured. The most striking expression of this is given in a lively letter to Buchholzer, who had complained to Luther of the half-way methods of reform insisted on in Brandenburg. Luther writes: "In regard to the things of which you complain, the cowl and surplice in the procession on feast days, and the walking round the churchyard on Sundays and at Easter, etc., etc., this is my advice: If your Lord, the Margrave and Elector, allows you to preach the Gospel of Christ purely, without man's additions, and permits the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper according to Christ's appointment, and does not insist upon the worshipping of the saints as mediators and intercessors, and the carrying of the host in the procession, nor upon daily masses for the dead, nor holy water, nor responses and songs, Latin and German, in the processions, then in God's name go round with them, carrying a silver or gold cross, and cowl and surplice of velvet, silk, or linen. And if one of these be not enough, then put on three, as did Aaron, the High Priest, each one more beautiful than another, from which Church vestments in the Papacy are named Ornata. And if your Lord the Elector be not satisfied with one procession, then go round seven times, as Joshua went round Jericho with the children of Israel blowing trumpets, and if



your Lord has any desire let him go on in front, singing and dancing with harps and cymbals, drums and bells, as did David when they brought the Ark of the Lord up to Jerusalem." Here certainly "the Puritan principle" is not in evidence, but the principle that rules is that while we must do what God positively commands, yet what He does not command is "free"—though Luther adds that they do not propose to do these "free" things in Wittenberg.

If there seems to be a fine charity breathing through this attitude towards the adiaphora, this charity is certainly not extended to the Zwinglians. Luther's bitterness towards them almost passes belief, and its expression is almost the only thing which mars the geniality of these letters. "Blessed is the man", he exclaims, "who does not wander in the counsel of the Sacramentarians, nor standeth in the way of the Zwinglians, nor sitteth where the Zurich people sit" (p. 468). And a more truculent letter could scarcely be imagined than that he wrote (Aug. 31, 1543) to Froschauer the Zurich printer, who had sent him a present of a copy of the Zurich Bible. "I have received the present of the Bible", he wrote, "which you sent by your manager, and I thank you for it. But seeing it is the work of your preachers, with whom neither I nor the Church of God can have any communion, I am sorry their labor should be in vain. They have been sufficiently warned to quit their errors and not take the poor people to hell with them. But admonition is useless, therefore they must go their own way, but never again send me any of their work. I shall be no partaker of their damnation or damnable doctrines, but pray and teach against them to my end." Luther, certainly, was a good hater, as some of his letters to Roman Catholic persecutors with more propriety also testify.

But if he was a good hater he was an even better lover, and it is to this that these letters particularly bear witness. Here are letters of encouragement and consolation which still go to the heart, affectionate playful letters to his wife and children, and a true friend's letters to his friends. Very few of the letters here gathered are distinctly pastoral letters or deal directly with matters of personal religion; fewer still broach doctrinal questions. When either the one or the other is alluded to, however, it is with the hand of a master. Could a more consoling word be spoken to a burdened soul than this? "And even if your conscience tell you that you are in fault, you must not despair on that account. For it is a precious sign that God has so soon led you to repentance." Our very sense of guilt is thus made a sign of grace! And could any doctrinal exposition be clearer or more to the point than this on good works? "One single passage lights up the whole: an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit. For as the fruit can never make a tree good, so works can never make a man pious. On the contrary, according to the tree, so of necessity the fruit; thus it is after the man is pious that good works follow, not that they make him good but that they prove that he is good. So what the Bible says concerning good works must be thus understood, that the man does

not become good thereby, but that they testify that he is good. Therefore at the last day, Christ will cite good works in proof that they who practiced them were pious."

We must not, however, multiply quotations. Enough has been said, we trust, to suggest the interest of the volume, and beyond that we need not go. Miss Currie is to be congratulated upon her success in putting so large a body of Luther's familiar letters into such easy and familiar English. There is an odd use of the phrase "in case" repeated occasionally which confuses the sense to those to whom it is (as to us) unfamiliar. Thus, p. 268: "I know of nothing to write about, so, in case of burdening you, do not write." Again, p. 430: "I let them do as they will, in case they look upon me as my own enemy." "In case" in these passages seems to be equivalent to "for fear".

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

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## SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

RECHTFERTIGUNG UND WIEDERGEBOURT. Von E. CREMER; Pfarrer in Rehme i. W. *Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie. Elfter Jahrgang. Fünftes Heft.* 1907. Gütersloh. C. Bertelsmann. Pp. 163.

In this monograph E. Cremer defends the position which was held by H. Cremer in regard to Justification and Regeneration, against the later Lutheran theology, especially that of the Erlangen School as represented by Frank. Cremer's thesis is that Regeneration is simply Justification, and that the conception of Regeneration which regards it as an inward change in the sinner, produced by the Holy Spirit, is a departure from the doctrine of Luther, of the Apology, and of the New Testament writers. Regeneration, according to Cremer, means the translation of a sinner from a state of guilt and death into one of grace and life. This idea, Cremer affirms, was that of Luther and also of the Apology for the Augsburg Confession. The change to that conception of Regeneration which considers it as an inward renewal of the sinner by the Holy Spirit, and as distinct from Justification, begins in the Formula of Concord, and was carried out more clearly in the old Lutheran dogmatics. Cremer also maintains that the doctrine of Luther and of the Apology has the support of Paul and John, and, in fact, of all the New Testament writers. For example, in Titus iii. 5ff., Cremer affirms that Paul calls baptism a "bath of Regeneration" because it "mediates Justification", and so gives the sinner a completely new start in the Christian life. So also Romans vi, 3 ff., and Colossians ii, 11 ff., according to Cremer, afford no ground for the view that Regeneration is an inward spiritual change. The same thing is claimed to be true of the discourse of Jesus with Nicodemus, recorded in the third chapter of John's Gospel. Moreover, whenever Regeneration is referred to the Holy Spirit as its author, Cremer main-

tains that the meaning is that the judgment of God in Justification is made actual in the consciousness of the believer, *i. e.*, that the Holy Spirit produces in the believer a consciousness of justification.

Cremer's whole treatment of this subject is quite unconvincing. In fact, it is not only true that the idea of Regeneration underwent a development in the direction of a more precise statement; the doctrine of Justification also underwent a similar development, especially in Melancthon's controversy with Osiander, in which the objective and forensic character of Justification was more clearly set forth and separated from all subjective elements. Consequently the doctrine of Justification in the Apology is not satisfactorily stated, and so far is Cremer's position beyond doubt, that Loofs has asserted a precisely opposite view, *viz.*, that in the Apology the term Justification is not used in a forensic sense at all, and that instead of Regeneration being equivalent to Justification, Justification is just Regeneration, when this latter term is taken in its widest sense as denoting the entire change wrought in the sinner, including the whole of renewal. *Cf.* Loofs, *Die Bedeutung der Rechtfertigungslehre in der Apologie; Studien und Kritiken*, 1884; and Eichhorn maintains that while in the Apology the main element in Justification is the pardon of sin, it nevertheless includes the whole process of renewal or sanctification. *Cf.* Eichhorn, *Die Rechtfertigungslehre in der Apologie; Studien und Kritiken*, 1887.

Moreover, that the historical development of these doctrines was in the line of departure from the truth could only be maintained if Cremer's interpretation of the New Testament teaching is correct.

The exegetical basis with which Cremer supports his thesis is, however, extremely weak and unsatisfactory. He has given no adequate treatment of what Paul means by life in the Spirit as contrasted with life in the flesh, or by such expressions as ἀνακαίνωσις, καινὴ κτίσις, and ζωοποιεῖν. Some passages, as, for example, Romans vi. 3ff. and Colossians ii. 11ff., he treats regardless of the context, while in others, as, for example, the passage in Titus, he reads his own ideas into the context.

As an example of Cremer's exegetical method, his remarks on Titus iii. 5ff. may be taken as a fair example. He argues, correctly it seems to me, that by the word "bath" Paul here refers to baptism. He then affirms that the Apostle calls baptism "a bath of regeneration" because it "mediates justification". Cremer's main arguments in support of this view are from the meaning of the word παλιγγενεσία, and from the context. He points out that the word παλιγγενεσία occurs in the New Testament only in this place and in Matt. xix. 28, in which latter place it is used in an eschatological sense; that in extra-Biblical Greek it usually has an eschatological meaning and almost always denotes an external change. From this Cremer argues that the word cannot be here used to denote an inward change in the sinner. Hence he refuses to explain this more obscure phrase by the following clause: καὶ ἀνακαίνωσews πνεύματος ἁγίου, which appears to be epxegetical of the former expression and the meaning of which in Paul's writings can be

determined with some accuracy. Instead of which, Cremer seeks to determine the meaning of the entire statement from the use of the term *παλιγγενεσία* in extra-Biblical Greek. This is a precarious method, especially when the fact is taken into consideration that in extra-Biblical Greek the word *παλιγγενεσία* sometimes lost its eschatological sense and even its external sense, as, for example, in its use to denote the Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls. What could have been more natural, then, than for Paul to have chosen the word to express his idea of Regeneration, wishing to emphasize the fundamental and catastrophic character of this change in the sinner and the newness of the resulting life? In view of this it is far better to explain this word in this passage by the following word *ἀνακαίνωσις* which is connected with it by the word *καί* and appears to be exegetical of it. This interpretation is especially to be recommended since the meaning of the former phrase is somewhat obscure, whereas the meaning of the latter expression in Paul can be readily determined.

Furthermore, Cremer has read his view into the context. He says that the salvation here spoken of is one out of a condition of being under the "judicial consequences" of sin and God's "future wrath". But not one single word or hint of all this is to be found in the preceding context. On the contrary, it is the sinful characteristics of the sinner's life before the great change has taken place in him, which the preceding context mentions.

This will suffice to show the arbitrary character of Cremer's exegesis.

Moreover, the present writer agrees with Wendt, who, in criticising Cremer's book, says that he has missed the real problem, which is distinct from the question of the meaning of the term Regeneration. For even if it should be granted that the word Regeneration in the New Testament and in the writings of Luther had the meaning which Cremer claims that it has,—which Wendt by no means grants,—it must nevertheless be admitted that the inward renewal of the sinner is to be distinguished from his deliverance from condemnation. If this is so, then the question arises as to how the sinner obtains the power for the new life. Does it come from himself or is it due to the power and grace of God? How is the fact of the new life to be explained in harmony with the Lutheran doctrine of original sin? Cf. Wendt's criticism of Cremer in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1908, No. 24.

Such problems cannot be avoided. They are just the questions to which Cremer gives no adequate answer. His idea is that the power for the new life comes from the consciousness of the new relation to God given in the consciousness of Justification. But to such questions as to how the sinner gains the ability to exercise the faith which receives Justification, or how the consciousness of Justification obtains its renewing effect—whether by a merely immanent psychological effect or by the power of God—to these questions Cremer gives no answer. But whatever names be given to the renewal of the sinner in its various stages, it is a truth of Christianity which, as Wendt says, requires doctrinal statement from Christian dogmatics.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

URSPRUNG UND VERWENDUNG DES RELIGIÖSEN ERFAHRUNGSBEGRIFFES IN DER THEOLOGIE DES 19. JAHRHUNDERTS. *Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der theologischen Erkenntnistheorie.* Von KARL WOLF, Pfarrer in Neuengeseke b. Soest. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann. 1906. Pp. 134.

The author of this monograph on Religious Experience, which, though published in 1906, has just come into our hands, seeks to trace the origin and development of the idea of religious and especially Christian experience in modern theology, in order to determine its value for Christian apologetics and dogmatics. The book appears to owe its origin, in part at least, to the impulse given the author by the writings on this subject by Köstlin, Petran, Bachmann, E. Cremer, Haack, H. Holtzmann, Schian, and Daxer's monograph on Frank.

Almost the entire book is devoted to a historical and critical discussion, and the author sums up his results and states his own views in the last twenty or thirty pages.

He discusses the idea of religious and of Christian experience as it appears in Schleiermacher, Hofmann, Plitt, Frank, and Dörner; closing the historical discussion with a review of the opinions of Köstlin in his two books, *Die Begründung unserer sittlich-religiösen Ueberzeugung*, 1893, and *Der Glaube*, 1895, and of Petran in his *Beiträge zur Verständigung über Begriff und Wesen der sittlich-religiösen Erfahrung*, 1898.

After the historical and critical discussion Wolf takes up the question as to the place and function of Christian experience in relation to the origin and ground of Christian belief, and its place in the theory of religious knowledge and the statement of Christian doctrine. As regards the former of these questions Wolf concludes that, although trust rather than assent is the essence of faith, nevertheless faith "presupposes and includes" a knowledge of God and of Christ which rests on a historical revelation, and that therefore Christian experience, though it plays an important part both in regard to the psychological genesis of faith and in regard to the grounds of belief, is nevertheless insufficient by itself to support faith, which must rest upon a historical basis.

In regard to the relation of Christian experience to theological knowledge and dogmatic theology, Wolf criticises adversely the attempt of the "experiential theology" to use Christian experience as a source and norm of truth in Christian theology, concluding, however, that Christian experience is necessary for the right understanding of Christian doctrine.

*Princeton.*

C. W. HODGE.

OUTLINES OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. DESIGNED FOR THE USE OF THEOLOGICAL STUDENTS. By AUGUSTUS HOPKINS STRONG, D.D., LL.D., President and Professor of Biblical Theology in the Rochester Theological Seminary. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press. 1908. Pp. 274.

This Outline of Dr. Strong's Systematic Theology contains, as the author says, the substance of his larger work. It omits all the biblio-



graphical and illustrative material, confining itself to the statements of doctrine and main arguments. It contains, therefore, simply the matter in large print in the latest edition of Dr. Strong's Systematic Theology. This outline is designed by the author to serve as a text-book for the theological classroom. It is not necessary to state its contents, since Vols. I and II of the new edition of Dr. Strong's larger work were reviewed by the writer of this notice in THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW for April, 1908.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

THE CHRISTIAN METHOD OF ETHICS. By HENRY W. CLARK, Author of *The Philosophy of Christian Experience, Meanings and Methods of the Spiritual Life*, etc. 8vo., pp. 254. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company. London and Edinburgh. 1908.

Mr. Clark's last published work, *The Philosophy of Christian Experience*, was very favorably reviewed by Rev. Dr. Henry Collin Minton in our issue for October, 1907. Much of what he said then is so pertinent to this volume that we venture to quote it almost verbatim. "This book is a near approach to the remarkable." It is an original interpretation of the Christian's ethical development. "It holds itself rigidly to its specific theme. It is strictly a monograph in delightfully lucid English, with the clear expression which is the best proof of the clear conception. And there is no evidence of straining after effect." "The book is modest in its pretensions, reverent in its tone, and almost entirely destitute of the personal equation of the author; and it gives every evidence of devout and sincere evangelical intention. Its style raises the presumption that it was written, not for the theologian, but for the average thoughtful man who takes the twentieth century layman's view of religion generally. The theologian can find flaws that the man for whom the book was written would never dream of. The book does not say everything; indeed, it leaves unsaid some things we believe it would have been the better for saying: but if it had tried to say everything that is true, it would certainly have failed, and it would pretty certainly have said less clearly and effectively what it does say." A very brief resumé of the argument of this discussion would be something of this sort: "Man attains the spiritually ideal life by possessing within himself no thought, no feeling, no impulse, which is not born moment by moment straight from God." If this ideal were reached, there would result "an automatic right adjustment to every circumstance, an instinctive right bearing toward every question of duty and every temptation to wrong." "The moralist would be lost in and would be rendered superfluous by the saint." Ethical completeness would be demanded and would follow because it is necessary to the development of the new and divine life. As, however, the ethical ideal is never fully attained in this life, "the Christian man always retains something of his ethical affairs in his own hands". Hence, he has to

ask how in any given case "the remnant of self-activity is to be ruled". "The primary answer, of course, is that he must act as the divine life within him would act if it had all its rights. The Christian, in so far as he judges ethical questions, judges them rightly by remembering that he ought not to judge. Properly speaking, ethical questions are to be solved by permitting the divine personality, with which the Christian seeks perfect union, to attack them, rather than by any attack of his own: yet too large a margin of his own personality, so to say, remains outside the surrender at present accomplished, for this to be a true account of what is done. Obviously, therefore, that part of the Christian's own activity which remains working on its own account comes most nearly into line with the general ideal by regulating itself according to what the divine life would do (so far as this is ascertainable) if it had things to itself. The *idea* of spiritual development must be called in after all, since the spiritual development itself has not absorbed all regulative and directive power." But "it must be remembered all through that the *idea* of the divine life is capable of exercising a right regulative power only when the *fact* of it is at any rate in measure a real and present thing. The Christian man has to remember that, according to the proper ordering of things, the divine life in him is to manifest itself through, dictate to, and feed itself upon, the activities of every hour; and in his own ordering of things, so far as any remain to him, *he must act as if this, and only this, were being done*. It is as a question of spiritual biology that every ethical question will come before his mind." Hence, it is from this biological and spiritual standpoint that we should study all ethical questions, such, for example, as "Conscience", "Christian Distinctiveness", "the Christian's Relation to the World", "the Christian's Relation to His Fellowmen", "the Christian Discipline"; and if we do so, we shall take for our all inclusive rule the following: "At every emergence of crisis, the Christian must call up the living presence of the living Christ, and submit himself to its spell."

As already implied, this ethical interpretation merits high praise. A bare enumeration even of all its excellent features would be impossible within the narrow limits at our command. Perhaps, the more outstanding ones are these:

1. The insistence on the essentially religious nature of the ethical life. Morality is not what it ought to be until it is absorbed in and transmuted into religion. God must keep, and only God can keep, his own law. Hence, we cannot be truly moral save by outgrowing mere morality. To do and to be what we ought, it must be 'no more we who live, but Christ who lives in us'. This cannot be emphasized too strongly. It is both that which distinguishes Christian ethics from every other and that which gives to it its unique power.

2. The demand for faith in a Christ who *is* rather than in a Christ who *was*. It is the *living presence* of the *living Christ* that the Christian is to call up and to whom he is to submit himself for guidance and for inspiration. It is the actually indwelling Spirit of the glorified

Christ in whom he is to live and to whom he is to look for the disposition and the wisdom and the power with which to keep the law. In this we have not merely a unique distinction of Christianity, but one quite commonly unrealized. How many put their faith in the crucified Christ only to forget that he is now on the throne. Hence, the narrowness and the ineffectiveness of not a little of the Christianity of our day. "To inherit the earth" we must realize that we are "the children of the King".

3. The author's analysis and interpretation of conscience if qualified as we shall see later on. His conception of it is unusual, if not peculiar to himself. He does not regard it as personality functioning in the sphere of morals. He conceives of it much more narrowly and so much more definitely. "Conscience is the voice within everlastingly reminding man that right is the one thing to be exalted above all else; it is not a voice explaining to man what right is." "Conscience simply declares that what is judged to be right must at all costs be done." This conception guards the infallibility of conscience while admitting the diversity of moral judgments. Conscience as such does not pass any judgment as to what is right. This is left to the intellect of the individual to determine; and in so far as the individual is in the ideal ethical condition, it is left by him to the indwelling Sovereign and Life of his life, the Spirit of Christ. Nor is this to make what right is a subjective matter. It is to prevent subjectivism. In theory, at least, it is to bind one to the most objective of all standards, even the will of him whose nature is the ultimate ground and norm of right.

4. The doctrine that union with God is the only adequate foundation for love to man. The brotherhood of men cannot be realized in any true sense except through and because of obedience to God. We can really be brothers to our fellows only as we imitate our Elder Brother. His relation to God must be our relation to God; and his relation is summed up in three words, he was "*obedient unto death*". In so far as we develop his life such must be our life among men, and it was to develop his life in ourselves and then in them that we were brought into association with men. "One of the lessons the world most greatly needs to learn is that we shall not keep our relations true with man unless the stress of the whole thing falls, not upon this relation, but upon the relation with the life of God.

Here we might pause; and if Mr. Clark's book were an ordinary one, here, after pointing out its chief merits, we ought to pause: but it is so far from being an ordinary book that we must go further; it is so good that we must indicate, and thus do our best to eliminate, its defects. Though these arise altogether from the popular style and aim of the writer, that seems to us to be *the* reason why they should be noted. It is just because the water supplied to a community is so pure and so refreshing that they cannot suspect the presence of impurities that these, if there are any, ought to be made known.

We would, therefore, call attention:

1. To the author's conception of God's part in the ideal ethical life.

This would seem to be to supplant, and even to do away with, our activity, yes, with our personality. The true Christian "possesses within himself no thought, no feeling, no living impulse, which is not born moment by moment straight from God" (p. 56). These words, if taken in their obvious meaning, deny causation and even activity to the Christian. The doctrine is not that of Gal. ii. 20, where the Apostle after asserting the supremacy of the divine life in him, is at pains to affirm the persistence of his own life. It is rather the "exercise scheme" of Emmons; it is not unlike Edward's theory of continuous creation: and the objection to both of these is that they squint toward pantheism and so tend to weaken moral responsibility. Nothing is more true and more precious than that Christ, in the deepest sense, is the life of the Christian; but he is so by developing, not by supplanting or even suppressing, his personality. Our thoughts, feelings, and impulses are all the more our own because 'the grace of Christ is sufficient for us' and 'his strength is made perfect in our weakness'. Our acts are all the more ours because the power in them is wholly his. We ourselves will all the more really for the reason that it is Christ who makes us willing and who alone could do so. In a word, He lives in us by disposing and enabling us ourselves truly to live.

2. This being so, it can scarcely be said that the "Christian, in so far as he judges ethical questions, judges them rightly by remembering that he ought not to judge" (p. 131). On the contrary, he has been made a Christian that he may judge rightly. It is thus that he must live, and it is only thus that he can live, his own new and true ethical life. The mind of Christ on moral questions is not to become his mind through any abdication on his part of his rights as a person; it is to express itself in his full and perfect exercise of his right and duty to think and to judge. 'The moralist is not to be absorbed in the saint', but 'the saint is to unfold himself in the development of the moralist. Mr. Clark, instead of realizing the ideal of Christian ethics, would do away with it. It is true, as Augustine said, that, if we loved God as we ought, we might do as we inclined': but then no one does love God as he ought; and if one did, the fact would be, not that inclination had superseded judgment, but that inclination had become one with judgment.

3. In view of all this, "the inclusive rule for the Christian's conduct" is at least open to criticism. "At each emergence of crisis, the Christian must call up the living presence of the living Christ, and submit himself to its spell" (p. 241)—what does this mean? If it means, as the author says, that 'Christ unites Himself with men, heart with heart, thought with thought, will with will, soul with soul, *life with life*, till his personality folds itself close round theirs, substitutes itself for theirs' (p. 253); then we are in the grasp of mysticism, as even Mr. Clark is almost ready to admit. Indeed, he goes on to defend his scheme on the ground that such "mysticism" is vital both to the Christian religion and to Christian morality. We can not think so. As already remarked, Christ lives in us, to develop and perfect our own personality, not to

substitute his will for ours. Moreover, he has revealed his will for us infallibly in the Bible. To this fact, in so far as we can remember, our author makes no reference. Of course, his "all inclusive rule" might mean that at each crisis the Christian was to "call up the living presence of the living Christ" to show to him the Bible's application to the case in hand. This, however, would involve the exercise of judgment on the part of the Christian, and yet this is the very thing which he is bound to outgrow. On the whole, it looks to us as if the outcome of our author's scheme were to exalt the consciousness of the Christian above the written Word: and this we must regard as both unreasonable and dangerous; for it is only by the Word that we can discriminate and justify the Christian consciousness.

4. Mr. Clark's conception of conscience also, while, as remarked, definite and, if understood, convenient, is too narrow and so misleading. There is a material as well as a formal element in the judgment of conscience; or if the function of conscience be purely formal, to emphasize that the right ought to be done rather than to tell us what is right, then another moral faculty must be called in to account for the material element. For there is such an element. The law has been written on the heart, on the heart of man as man; and it may still be discerned there, very obscurely and imperfectly, it must be allowed, but yet as really as on the renewed heart. Evidently man was created to read for himself in his own nature the will of God. That was to be his ideal condition. That condition was not to consist in having Christ do the reading for him. Christ promised his spirit to give us spiritual discernment, not to make it unnecessary.

5. Finally, it is at least unfortunate that, so far as we can discover, there is not one reference in the whole discussion to our Lord's satisfaction for our sins. In this fact above all else the dynamic of Christ resides. It is because of His death for our guilt and in our stead that we should and can 'present even our bodies living sacrifices unto God'. Surely, then, the relation of the cross to the Christian life ought to have been more than implied. It ought to have been distinctly affirmed and strongly emphasized. "Christ crucified" is the ground, the norm, and the inspiration of the righteousness which is through Him.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE AXIOMS OF RELIGION. A New Interpretation of the Baptist Faith.  
By E. Y. MULLINS, D.D., LL.D. Philadelphia: American Baptist  
Publication Society. 1908. Pp. 316.

This book, as the preface explains, grew out of addresses delivered, in 1905, before the American Baptist Publication Society, in St. Louis, Mo., and the Baptist World Congress, in London, England; in 1906, before Richmond College; and in 1907, before the Baptist Convention of North America, at Jamestown, Va. The aim in writing is to state "in a constructive and irenic spirit" the Baptist position, in order that the world may "understand us better".



According to Dr. Mullins, "Denominationalism has been, since the Reformation, the characteristic expression of Christianity on its ecclesiastical side". The test by which denominations are to be tried is two-fold: Conformity to Scripture teaching and adaptation to ever-changing and enlarging tasks. These tests Dr. Mullins applies to the Baptists in order to show their superiority to all other denominations in that they are not as other men are: contradictory, inconsistent and unfaithful to the precepts of the New Testament.

The scriptural test is worked out and applied in a thoroughly novel manner. The fundamental Baptist principle is declared to be "the competency of the soul in religion under God", which is explained to mean that since man is made in God's image, and that God is a person able to reveal Himself to man, the individual soul is competent to deal directly with God. This fundamental principle, however, blossoms under Dr. Mullins' fostering care into six "Axioms of Religion", as he calls them, owing to their self-evident character. These are 1. The theological axiom: The holy and loving God has a right to be sovereign. 2. The religious axiom: all souls have an equal right to direct access to God. 3. The ecclesiastical axiom: all believers have a right to equal privileges in the Church. 4. The moral axiom: to be responsible man must be free. 5. The religio-civic axiom: a free Church in a free State. 6. The social axiom: love your neighbor as yourself. Dr. Mullins then proceeds to point out that all non-Baptist belief and practice violates these axioms. Thus Infant Baptism violates axiom 2, since it proceeds on the assumption that some souls, *i. e.*, infant souls, have a right to *indirect* access to God (*scil.* through the faith of their parents). It also violates axiom 4, since "to baptize a child in infancy is to treat it not as a free moral personality, but as a thing".

Turning from the scriptural test, applied *more geometrico*, to the practical test, we are naturally interested in these days, when the air is full of the subject, in knowing what Dr. Mullins has to say about church union. He does for the Baptists, what each member of the other denominations does for his: explains the peculiarly favorable position they occupy in this regard. It is this: Baptists accept simply the teaching of the New Testament, nothing more and nothing less. All other denominations have added to or subtracted from this teaching. It is generally agreed that church union is possible only on the basis of the New Testament. Hence, to unite, the denominations must take up what they have laid aside of the New Testament teaching and remove what they have added to it. When this is done they will find themselves Baptists! It is for this reason, in Dr. Mullins' opinion, that the Baptist who believes shall not make haste to unite with those who are not Baptists.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

## GENERAL LITERATURE.

AN ALPHABETICAL SUBJECT INDEX AND INDEX ENCYCLOPAEDIA TO PERIODICAL ARTICLES ON RELIGION. 1890-1899. Compiled and edited by ERNEST CUSHING RICHARDSON. With the coöperation of Charles S. Thayer, William C. Hawks, Paul Martin, and others. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 8vo., pp. xlii + 1168. Price, \$10 net.

This large volume of more than twelve hundred pages is the fruit of the deliberate conclusion of the Coöperation Committee of the American Library Association, that such a work was most desirable, and of the discovery by the chairman of that Committee that nobody was at all likely to undertake it, unless he did. So he did it, it is needless to say, without financial recompense. Indeed, it may be assumed, with considerable personal outlay. He will be repaid by the usefulness of the work to those who use it. Its plan is simple, and is the best plan,—a subject dictionary index, with the authors and anonymous titles arranged alphabetically under each subject. And the subject includes not only articles which discuss it, but also reviews of books treating of it, as well as references to standard theological encyclopaedias and dictionaries, and the proceedings and reports of learned societies in this country and Europe. Thus it will be seen that the term, periodical literature, has been given a wide, a necessarily wide, scope. This increases the value of the list. In several respects it modernizes Poole's method. By giving the number of pages of an article, it helps the investigator to determine whether he will find it worth while to look up a given reference or not, and all who have made much use of such lists will appreciate the further help afforded by giving the date as well as the volume of the periodical referred to. The Index contains references to about 60,000 periodical articles from more than 1,500 periodicals, together with a brief definition encyclopaedia of some 15,000 subjects. This will sufficiently indicate the vast amount of labor expended upon this book. To illustrate the amount of material brought to the attention of the student of a particular subject, it may be stated that there are 108 references to "Pentateuch", almost all of which treat of its authorship. The general accuracy of the work has been secured by the verification of nearly all of the articles from the periodicals themselves. In so far as the reviewer has tested this accuracy it has been absolute. The periodicals referred to are in all of the more important languages of Europe, except Russian, which exception will not affect the most of us. The subjects cover a wide range, including many matters outside of the sphere of theology, but closely related to it. Some will think that some of the minor articles might have been omitted, but if the compiler was willing to do the extra work, some investigator is likely to thank him for it. The book is indispensable to every theological library and will prove of great value to every large library. The gratitude of all students of religion, in its broad sense, and the double thanks of every librarian, are due Dr. Richardson. He has supplemented and improved Poole, for the period traversed, where Poole was weakest.

*Princeton.*

J. H. DULLES.



